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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an examination of Sir Dudley North’s political career and the
relationship between his political and economic philosophies and his political actions. In 1682,
Dudley North entered the national political sphere in the controversial shrieval election of the
City of London. A Tory, North’s entry into politics coincided with the Crown’s attempt to
regain control over the City and the nation. During his time as Sheriff of London, North ensured
that a staunch Tory was “elected” Lord Mayor and he also selected the panel of jurors that would
serve during the Rye House conspiracy trials. After North’s stint as Sheriff, he was rewarded by
the Crown and he was able to continue his political career in the Commission of the Treasury
and the Commission of the Customs.
After Charles II’s death, James II retained North as a Commissioner of the Customs and
North served as an MP in the “Loyalist” Parliament where he lobbied to properly fund James to
such an extent that it would have been possible for the Crown to rule without Parliament. North
utilized his mercantile experience and his notions about the political economy to illustrate his
absolutist tendencies. North reinforced his mercantile interests through his partisanship. By
seeking to ensure that James was properly funded, North was also protecting his mercantile
interests as he needed a financially stable Crown. During his seven year career, North made
decisions that helped to shape the political sphere of the nation and also contributed to an ongoing discussion about the nature of the political economy.
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the seventeenth century, as England endured revolutions, civil wars, and
factionalist strife, the nation also developed into a commercial power. In the early part of the
century, trade was primarily centered on the textile and cloth industry; however, as the century
progressed, new trade routes were opened up to the Levant, East India, and Africa. From the
early-to-mid seventeenth century, the Crown viewed trade merely as a source of revenue, and for
this reason, the government did not actively create policy that would either further or protect
trade.1 By the end of Cromwell’s Commonwealth in 1653, this had drastically changed, and
commercial policy was a government matter in the late seventeenth century. With the rise of
merchant Companies, or monopolies on certain regions or aspects of trade, merchants became
very much involved in the government, and throughout the seventeenth century, merchant
political power continued to increase.
Merchants, especially London’s elite merchants, were important in providing a crucial
service to the state—credit. Without a national bank or another established credit system, the
Crown was forced to rely upon the merchants of London for loans even as tensions grew
between the Crown and Parliament throughout the 1620s and 1630s, and Company merchants
continued to be sources of revenue for the Stuart monarchy throughout the seventeenth century.
These merchants were not simply willing to hand money over to the Crown. In exchange, they
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Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 39.
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expected to be granted certain rights or privileges, especially monopolies of trade. London
merchants also stipulated that the Crown pursue a foreign policy that was friendly to their
economic goals, and as Lawrence Stone has pointed out, they also required the “dismantling of
the . . . corruption-ridden system of economic controls over internal trade, industrial production,
land use, and interest rates.”2 Mercantile alliances were also beneficial to the Crown as it
allowed the king access to much needed income without having to call Parliament, a practice
which only escalated existing fears of despotism and arbitrary government.
In 1656, the political theorist James Harrington argued “when no Parliament, then
absolute monarchie.”3 While he espoused an overly simplistic view of absolutism, Harrington
articulated the fear of arbitrary government that historian Jonathan Scott argued permeated the
seventeenth century, but this fear was especially strong in the late 1670s through 1680s at a time
when the Stuart regime was shouldering the burden of a weak military. According to Scott, the
fear of an absolutist despot ruling England was not necessarily unjustified as it was a part of a
“universal European process”—one that was incredibly successful in Louis XIV’s Catholic
France. Along with being Catholic and absolutist, France was also incredibly powerful and
expansionist with a large standing army of 300,000 by the 1690s.4
More than a military invasion, many feared Charles II’s relationship with his first cousin,
Louis XIV. During the Civil Wars, Charles fled England and eventually lived in exile in France
for a total of eight years. When Charles arrived in France, Louis was still a boy-king and his
mother served as regent. According to historian Ronald Hutton, Charles was treated well as the
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Lawrence Stone, "The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century" in Pocock, ed., Three
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French bestowed up him the “exceptional honors of sitting and walking at the right hand of the
boy king, of occupying a chair of the same size, [and] of replacing his hat in the royal
presence.”5 After the Restoration, Charles maintained his friendship with Louis in spite of the
fact that many in opposition to him wished to pursue an anti-French foreign and trade policy by
the end of the 1660s. The anti-France contingent in England feared the French king’s
expansionist ambitions and his Catholic religion. Although the English lost the Second AngloDutch War (1665-1667), Parliament voted in 1668 to ally with the United Provinces against the
French.6
Despite Parliament’s wishes, Charles continued to hold onto to his French connections.
According to John Miller, Charles felt that an alliance with France was the best means through
which to secure England’s position against the Dutch as England’s military prowess was
lacking.7 Scott, however, asserted that Charles maintained his alliance with Louis in order to
ensure that he was protected from his own people. Charles had not forgotten what had happened
to his father in 1649 and he did not feel that he could rely on his own subjects. On the other
hand, he had been able to trust Louis since childhood as the French royal family had taken him
and his family in during their exile, and his mother and sister still lived in France.8
Charles and Louis formalized their alliance against the Dutch in the Treaty of Dover
(1670) that contained both public and secret agreements. In order to fight another war with the
Dutch, Charles need money to raise an army, but he could not rely on Parliament to grant him the
funds. Therefore, he turned to Louis and the agreement reached stated that France and Britain
would form an alliance against the Dutch, which would allow Louis to use the Royal Navy in
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Ronald Hutton, Charles II: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 20.
David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956/1984), 333-334.
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John Miller, Charles II (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), 233.
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exchange for £225,000 each year that England was at war with the Dutch. Furthermore in secret
provisions, Charles agreed that he was “convinced of the truth of the Roman Catholic religion”
and “resolved to declare it and reconcile himself with the Church of Rome as soon as his
country’s affairs permit it.”9 In exchange for Charles’s public conversion, Louis promised him
an additional £150,000 each year and aid of French troops if so needed when Charles set about
converting his subjects.10 Had it been known at the time, the secret provisions of the Treaty of
Dover would have confirmed the fears of many who had been adamantly against an alliance with
France and the Sun King.
Aside from gaining financial stability, Charles also needed to consolidate his authority
over his kingdoms. By the late 1670s and early 1680s, the opposition faction was no longer
concerned simply with an alliance between Louis and Charles, but rather they feared the
accession of Catholic to the throne and from 1679 to 1681, the Exclusion Crisis dominated
Parliament and the nation. Prominent members of the opposition faction, the Whigs, tried to pass
a bill in three consecutive parliaments that would prevent the succession to the throne of Charles
II’s Catholic brother, the Duke of York.11 In an attempt to gain control of the situation, Charles
called for a parliament at Oxford, which was known for its royalist predisposition, as he felt that
he could not call a third parliament in London due to its Whiggish leanings. The Oxford
Parliament only lasted eight days despite the change in scenery. Charles did not need to call on
Parliament again throughout the rest of his reign due to financial assistance from the French and
an increase in taxes. Because Exclusion was a parliamentary issue, it died with the Oxford
9

Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 345.
Ibid, 345-347.
11
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Kingdoms, 1660-1685 (New York: Penguin Global, 2006); Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration
Crisis, 1677-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gary S. De Krey, London and the Restoration,
1659-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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Parliament; however, the fight between the Whig faction and the Court faction was far from
resolved as the City of London became the center of national politics in 1682 after years of
parliamentary strife.
Without a parliament, the battle turned to the municipalities, especially the City of
London. This transfer from Parliament to Guildhall was welcomed by both Charles and the
leaders of the opposition faction, such as Anthony Ashley Cooper (1st Earl of Shaftesbury), the
duke of Monmouth, and William Lord Russell, who considered the City to be the center of Whig
opposition. In the event that the Oxford Parliament was prorogued, the opposition’s plan was to
reconvene at Guildhall.12 Charles sought to quiet the Whig faction in November 1681 by putting
one of its most vocal and well-known leaders, Lord Shaftesbury on trial, but the jury, which was
returned by Whig sheriffs, had been “packed” with Whiggish sympathizers who produced an
ignoramus, or “I do not know” verdict. The message to Charles was clear: to quiet the
opposition, he would have to control the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, the Crown’s legal
representatives within the City, who were responsible for constructing juries. By the time of the
London shrieval election on June 24, 1682, tensions had reached new heights in the City.
The outcome of the election was far from certain, and the whole nation watched closely.
Newspapers followed the event diligently, and both sides published a plethora of pamphlets,
treatises, poems, songs, and petitions. The shrieval election of 1682 erupted as a contest between
the Tory and Whig factions and symbolized the Crown’s attempt to regain control over the City
of London. The actual electoral process lasted from June through September of 1682, and the
court cases that ensued lasted into the next year. The repercussions of the election were felt
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Ford Lord Grey, The secret history of the Rye-House plot and of Monmouth's rebellion (1754), 6-9; Tim Harris,
Restoration, 310.
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years later, and the issue of who had the right to stand as Sheriff of London and Middlesex in
1682 would come to light again after the Glorious Revolution in 1688.
In addition to being an intense battle of wills betweens City Whigs and the Crown, the
London shrieval election of 1682 also demonstrated the level of merchant involvement in
politics, both at the national and local levels. While merchants were not a coherent group with a
comprehensive political agenda, by the mid-seventeenth century they were deeply involved in
politics. In the late-seventeenth century, London merchants were active in the formation of the
both Whig and Tory factions. Several London merchants, both Whig and Tory, were drawn into
the controversy that surrounded the shrieval election of 1682. The goals of the merchants
involved, however, depended primarily on the individual merchant and his particular factional
association. With other avenues of national political participation, such as Parliament, shut
down, the shrieval election represented a chance for these merchants to influence national
politics.
For Dudley North, the election proved to be an opportunity to enter the political sphere.
North seemed a perfect fit for a sheriff who would serve only the Crown’s interest. After twenty
years in Turkey, he was a political outsider, but as a merchant he well known in the City.13
North had joined the Levant Company as an apprentice to Thomas Davis in 1658.14 After North
served his three years in London, Davis sent him to Smyrna, a major port on the coast of Turkey,
in 1661, and he was granted a license by the Levant Company to serve as a factor for his master
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Bodl. Lib. MS Carte 216, fo. 47, letter, 20 May 1682. Dudley North was bound at the age of seventeen to Davis, a
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where he completed his apprenticeship.15 After North gained his independence from Davis, he
remained in Turkey as a merchant of the Levant Company and built up his mercantile business.
North amassed a great deal of wealth although the exact amount is unknown.16 While in Turkey,
North also began to consider to entering into political service as an ambassador after Sir John
Finch stepped down.17 However, his brother Montague North intervened and convinced his
brother that this perhaps was not the best way to become involved in politics as “[the Turks]
knew as little of London, and interest at court here, as we did of Constantinople and the Turkish
court there.”18 Thereafter, Roger North stated that the “design never took wind, nor was known
to any one upon the Exchange.”19 North’s interest in the ambassadorship in Constantinople
suggests that he did have political ambitions and it is believed that he left Turkey for London
shortly after the new ambassador was chosen on April 15, 1680.20
Although North himself did not have a political background, he had family connections
within the government. His father, the 4th Baron North of Kirtling, had served in the Long
Parliament of 1640 for Cambridge, and had supported Parliament against the king. Since the
Restoration, however, North’s family had been soundly Loyalist.21 North’s older brother Francis
joined Charles’s government in 1679 as a member of the Privy Council, and later the cabinet.22
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Upon the death of the Earl of Nottingham, Francis North was appointed Lord Keeper of the
Great Seal in 1682, and was in a position to suggest his brother as a good candidate who would
favor the Crown to hold the shrievalty in 1682.23
Charles II chose Dudley North to stand for the election because he believed that North
had “so well an Establish reputation in the Citty that he will carry it at a Common hall by
voices.”24 The chaos surrounding the election proved just how wrong Charles and his advisors
were in thinking the City would allow them to meddle in its affairs. Once Charles signaled his
approval, the Lord Keeper Francis North stepped in and worked to convince his brother that he
should accept the nomination. Francis went so far as to offer North help financially should he
take the office and need it.25 The office of Sheriff of London was not necessarily a popular one
among those who were qualified to serve in the position due to the expense of the office, but
North agreed to hold the shrievalty.
During his stint as Sheriff of London, North proved to be a staunch Tory and in return the
Crown granted him knighthood and positions within the Commission of Customs and the
Treasury Commission.26 By toeing the party line and using the London shrieval election of 1682
as his entry point into a political career, North was able to gain further appointments in
government which subsequently allowed him to be involved in the formation and execution of
trade policies during the last year of Charles’s reign and throughout the reign of James II.
In order to understand the importance of Dudley North as both a politician and a
merchant, an examination is needed of the scholarship of the Restoration, political merchants,
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R. North, Examen, 601.
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and North, himself. Part I will look at the historiography of the Restoration period, part II will
define the term “merchant” as it was understood in seventeenth-century England, and part III
considers the role of merchants in Revolutionary politics through the Restoration. By the midseventeenth century, merchants were intrinsically involved in both London and national politics,
and the politics of the merchants of the 1640s and 1650s were influential on Restoration political
merchants. Because the City of London was England’s financial center, many merchants chose
to enter politics first through the City government. Together, Parts II and III demonstrate a need
for more analysis of individual merchants, such as North, as political figures in the late
seventeenth century.
Part I: Restoration Historiography
Much of Restoration historiography has sought to explain the crises of the later
Restoration, including the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution. Early narrative
histories, such as Ronald Hutton’s The Restoration and Paul Seaward’s The Cavalier Parliament
and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1661-1667 argued that the origins of the crises could
be found in the original political and religious settlements that were constructed from 1660-1665.
Both Hutton and Seaward make clear that the restoration of the monarchy did not come without
tensions and disagreements and that, notwithstanding the Crown and Parliament’s efforts to
create political, financial, and religious settlements, the compromises reached did little to solve
the problems. Since Hutton and Seaward’s broad works, historians of the Restoration have
looked for the causes of the failure in the individual settlements that were created.27
As Tim Harris illustrated, the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 was largely
celebrated but not unanimously accepted, and a consensus could not be reached about what a
27

Ronald Hutton. The Restoration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), passim; Paul Seaward, The Cavalier
Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1661-1667 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
passim.
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restored monarchy would look like. Some wished to see a completely restructured monarchy
without many of its old prerogatives, such as control of the militia or the privilege of appointing
state officials. On the other hand, “ultra-royalists” wanted to turn the clock back to before the
reforms of the Long Parliament in the early 1640s, which had banned prerogative-based taxing,
such as Ship Money and forced loans, required that Parliament be called every three years, and
abolished prerogative courts, such as Star Chamber and High Commission. Although in the
minority, a small group remained tied to the “Good Old Cause” and continued to advocate for a
republic. According to Harris, the lack of consensus about what the relationship should be
between the Crown and Parliament led to an undefined association in which each side claimed to
have prerogative over the other.
In the end, the monarch was restored, and Charles II was assigned powers as they had
been reformed by the Long Parliament in 1641. Among his prerogatives were the rights to call
out the militia, appoint his own ministers, and summon or dismiss Parliament as long as he still
adhered to the Triennial Act. The Convention Parliament also tried to address the issue of
finance, a problem that plagued Charles I throughout his reign and would continue to be a
problem for Charles II. Harris contends that despite Parliament’s settlement which allocated
£1.2 million a year to the Crown from customs and excise duties, the Crown remained
underfunded and therefore weak. Charles II kept a larger military force than his father and
engaged in two wars with the Dutch, which placed a tremendous strain on his purse as the
customs and excise did not yield the amount that Parliament had predicted.28
The new government also had to deal with issues of religion along with the new political
and financial settlements. Both Harris and Gary De Krey saw the problem of religion as a
28
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defining feature in Restoration.29 Throughout the reigns of Charles II and James II, the
kingdoms suffered from more than simple tension between Protestants and Catholics.
Protestants throughout the kingdoms were divided amongst themselves. Initially, Anglicans and
Reformed Protestants, or Presbyterians, worked together to shut out dissenter sects, such as
Quakers, but eventually the leaders of both the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches also began
to deal with one another with apprehension.30 Anglicans wanted a re-establishment of the
Church as it had been in 1640 complete with bishops and the Common Book of Prayer, and they
began immediately to act as if the Church was restored before an official settlement was
reached.31 To turn the clock back to 1640 meant that the Church would lose much of its
Reformed character. The Anglican leaders also insisted that the Presbyterians conform to the
restored Church, which only led to further religious division within the kingdoms.32
While Jonathan Scott concurred that the crises that emerged in the late 1670s and early
1680s were the products of the failed Restoration settlements, he also argues that none of these
problems were new in the 1660. For Scott, these problems were “almost xerox copies of events,
structures, and issues of the early Stuart period.” The restored monarch, Charles II, in 1660 was
still faced with all the same issues which had led to the Revolution in 1640/1, and neither the
establishment of a republic nor the restoration of the monarchy was able to solve the problems
completely. Scott reasoned that this understandably occurred because the Restoration was not
simply the task of bringing back the monarchy. Contemporaries were seeking to reinstate the
early Stuart government, and therefore, the Restoration was an “aspiration” that sought to end
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both “troubles and revolution.”33 Although Scott made these bold claims, the Restoration was
not an exact copy as the Revolution, Civil Wars, and republicanism of the previous decades also
contributed to problems that arose in the Restoration. Despite the hopes of contemporaries,
neither troubles nor revolution ended in 1660, and by the late 1670s the monarchy was faced
once again with a series of crises.
Restoration historians have placed a great deal of emphasis on the Exclusion Crisis of
1679 to 1681. The scholarship on the Exclusion Crisis has developed into two major arguments.
First, some historians question whether or not the Exclusion Crisis was really a crisis at all. In
his biography, Charles II, Ronald Hutton claimed that “there was no ‘Exclusion Crisis’ at all”;
despite the fact that contemporaries thought that the “situation was ‘critical,’” it never became so
for Charles himself. Therefore, the overall consequence was “confusion” rather than crisis.34 In
opposition to Hutton, Scott maintained that a crisis did occur, but that the issue was not limited
to exclusion. According to Scott, a general Restoration Crisis occurred that lasted from 1678 to
1683, and was defined by the concerns of “popery and arbitrary government” in the same vein of
1638-42 and therefore, to refer to problems of 1678-1683 as the “Exclusion Crisis” is
misleading. Contemporaries referred to the issue of “succession” not “exclusion,” and within
the parliamentary realm, exclusion and succession did not garner a particularly inordinate
amount of attention. Therefore, the succession issue was not at the cause or heart of the crisis,
but rather the crisis was a result of a failure of the government to operate properly.35
Mark Knights also avoided using the term “Exclusion Crisis” to describe the events that
occurred between the Popish Plot and the Oxford Parliament.36 The Popish Plot, instigated by a
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former preacher Titus Oates, was believed to be a Catholic conspiracy that sought to bring the
English state back into the Catholic fold through the assassination of Charles II, which would
result in his Catholic brother James ascending to the throne. Oates also claimed that the French
army planned to invade and that Catholics were preparing for uprisings in Ireland and England.37
Although the plot was a fabrication, Knights suggested that it provided an impetus to address
fears of popery in the government that included the issue of succession.38 Knights, in agreement
with Scott, asserted that succession was only one issue that Parliament dealt with in regard to
popery and arbitrary government.
At the center of the second major historical argument about the Exclusion Crisis is
whether or not it served as the origin for modern political parties. David Ogg viewed the
Exclusion Crisis as the birthplace of political parties with the emergence of two factions, the
Tories and the Whigs. The new parties, however, were not so clear cut or as well defined as
modern political parties or contemporary political personalities as most men based their loyalty
locally rather than nationally.39 J.R. Jones moved beyond Ogg’s argument of personalities and
factionalism to argue that the Crown’s opposition formed a coherent and well-organized party
under a single leader, the Earl of Shaftesbury.40
Just as Scott denied the prevalence of a crisis centered on exclusion, he also rejects the
notion that the crisis created political parties. According to Scott, political parties did not
develop around the issue of exclusion and to claim that they did does not “allow for the fluidity
of the real crisis” which was one that was centered on the beliefs of the threat of popery and

37

Peter Hinds, ‘The Horrid Popish Plot’: Roger L’Estrange and the Circulation of Political Discourse in LateSeventeenth-Century London (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.
38
Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 4.
39
David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 606, 612.
40
J.R. Jones, The First Whigs (1961), 9.

13

arbitrary government.41 Scott’s provocative dismissal of the notion that modern political parties
were born from the crises of 1678-1681 has caused a great deal of backlash from historians.
Harris directly addressed Scott’s claims about the lack of party politics in two articles.42 He
conceded that the previously held view that Whigs were a party of anti-Catholic exclusionist
Parliamentarians and Tories were believers in a divine-right and absolutist monarchy no longer
holds true as both Whigs and Tories used similar rhetoric to achieve different ends. Harris,
however, argued that England was very much divided into groups, and these groups were
recognized (and recognized themselves) as two separate ideological camps, Whigs and Tories.
Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to show that political parties emerged in the late Stuart
age, and specifically during the reign of Charles II.43 Knights pinpointed the moment as not just
the years of the Exclusion Crisis, but as specifically 1681 after the dismissal of the Oxford
Parliament when both parties utilized the press to sway public opinion.44
In his study of Whiggish political thinkers, Ward also asserted that late-seventeenthcentury England gave rise to competing ideologies that were shaped into political parties. While
Ward found that party ideologies emerged around the Exclusion Crisis, he does not argue that the
Whigs, in particular, ascribed to one coherent ideology. According to Ward, seventeenth century
Whig ideology encompassed a spectrum of ideas that ranged from moderate constitutionalism to
radical republicanism. Among all the strains of Whiggish political thought, however, was the
central critique of divine right monarchy as it was espoused by Sir Robert Filmer, the “most
prominent royalist theorist” of the time. Ward identified three main “voices” among the Whig
theorists: James Tyrell, John Locke, and Algernon Sidney. Whether a republican or a
41
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constitutionalist, all three of these men were against an English absolutist monarchy. Ward
maintained that the “typical Whig supporters” during Exclusion were conservative as they were
“from some of the oldest and most respectable families . . . [and] were not predisposed to
political radicalism either by temperament of ideology.” These moderate Whigs called for a
limited and constitutional monarchy and their conservatism prevented them from supporting or
inciting popular rebellion. A limited monarchy provided protection of “property, established
privileges, and traditional liberties” while also upholding the traditional hierarchical political and
social structures. Ward argued that Whigs, such as Algernon Sidney and John Locke, were
considered radical not simply because they were willing to discuss republicanism as a serious
option, but because they were also willing to consider popular uprisings against the monarchy as
to prevent despotism.45
According to Ward, Scott was correct to assert that England experienced “troubles”
throughout the seventeenth century, but for Ward, these troubles can only be understood by
recognizing that Whig ideology did exist and that it was the “complex and multifarious character
of Whig political philosophy in the context of the great natural liberty” that provide an
explanation for the events of the late seventeenth century. Ward insisted that the English
political landscape was fundamentally altered by the emergence of Whig ideology and argued
that the ideologies of the respective thinkers could only be understood in their proper “historical
context.” Yet, for Ward, the proper historical context was an existing intellectual tradition that
was brought to light by the crises of the late seventeenth century. 46 Although Ward sought to
explain the spectrum of Whiggish political thought by examining continental influences on the
Whiggish thinkers, he does not put them in conversation with contemporary Tories. As Knights
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pointed out, Whig and Tory ideology did not develop separately from one another, but rather,
both ideologies were the result of the larger conversation and a Whig was defined, in many
cases, by the fact that he was not a Tory and visa versa.47
The most comprehensive study to refute Scott’s claim that the Restoration, or Exclusion,
Crisis did not result in the birth of modern political parties is De Krey’s London and the
Restoration, 1659-1683. In this study, De Krey examined the development of both parties in the
context of the crises of the later seventeenth century. De Krey agreed with Scott that historians
need to think in more general terms of a Restoration Crisis rather than simply an Exclusion
Crisis. For De Krey, the Restoration Crisis encompassed the Popish Plot, the parliamentary
battle over the succession issue, the crises within the City of London which included the mayoral
and shrieval elections of the early 1680s, and the conspiracies of 1683. De Krey argued that this
electoral episode of 1682 was “a turning-point” that was the “climax of the Restoration crisis”
rather than the Oxford Parliament. These crises which occurred before the shrieval election of
1682 led to the development of political parties. According to De Krey, by the time of the
Oxford Parliament, the opposition faction had fashioned a coherent party that would be known as
the Whigs, and in the years of 1681-82, the Tories, or loyalist faction, reacted with a “more
vigorous partisanship and ministerial support.” Ward argued that the dissolution of the Oxford
Parliament marked the failure of the first Whigs as they lost their platform, however, De Krey
disagreed. By the London shrieval election of 1682, political parties were a reality and the
contests within the City only further strengthened the new parties and their ideologies as they
worked to define themselves in direct opposition to one another. The City of London was the
epicenter of party for De Krey, and the crises that erupted in the City throughout the early 1680s
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were proof that Whigs did not see themselves as failures. The contest between Whig and Tory
continued as the fight returned to London.
The City also provided the foundation for merchants to participate in politics. De Krey
argued that merchants could be found in both parties by the early 1680s.48 Overall, De Krey was
concerned with the emergence of political parties during the crises that emerged in the late 1670s
and early 1680s, not with the nature of merchant involvement, and therefore, he also seeks to
determine what factors (religious, business affiliations, demographics) converge to make a Whig
or Tory. As the crises shifted from the parliamentary sphere to the City, merchants played an
increasing role in shaping party politics. It is in this atmosphere that Sir Dudley North entered
the national political sphere. Along with debating over whether or not an Exclusion Crisis
existed or if it caused the birth of the modern political systems, historians also have questioned
the political nature of London’s merchants.
Part II: Merchant Defined
The historiographical debate surrounding merchants and their political activities often
centers on the question of whether or not merchants were inherently political or revolutionary.
In focusing on this crucial question, historians have failed to reach a consensus on the definition
of what constituted a merchant in the seventeenth century. Before the political nature of
merchants can even be considered, a clear definition of the term “merchant” is needed. When
discussing merchants, some historians choose to apply the term to any dealer of merchandise
while others reserve the term “merchant” for an overseas trader. Although seemingly a minor
issue, the lack of a consistent definition presents problems of analysis and results in historians
talking past one another rather than to one another.
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In Merchants and Revolutions, Robert Brenner defined merchants as London overseas
traders despite the fact that he did not consider London merchants to be a cohesive group.
Brenner maintained that there were two types of merchants in London during the midseventeenth century: Company merchants and colonial interlopers, whom he dubs the new
merchant leadership. Company merchants were men who joined trading corporations, such as
the East India Company or the Merchant Adventurers. These companies regulated trade in a
region (such as East India or the Levant) or in a specific commodity. Colonial interlopers, or the
new merchant leadership, were shut out of the companies and therefore were independent
merchants and did not receive the same trading protections as the Company merchants. While
Brenner separated both Company merchants and the new colonial interlopers from the average
London businessmen, he acknowledged that the new merchant leadership had “strong and
extensive ties to that broad layer of City shopkeepers, mariners, and artisans who largely made
up the City radical movement….The majority of new merchants could…in 1640 be properly
regarded as belonging to that layer.”49
Despite the distinctions between various merchant groups, all these men shared the same
profession of overseas trader. While it is clear that overseas traders, whether Company
merchants or colonial interlopers, were connected to the businessmen of London, the label
“merchant,” served to make clear their occupation. Brenner did not dismiss the idea that other
London businessmen participated in politics, but he reserved the term “merchant” for men who
dealt in overseas trade. For Brenner, the London merchant had very specific political interests,
which were largely determined by whether or not they were members of Companies. Company
merchants were more likely to ally with the Crown in hopes that their trade monopolies would be
protected. Brenner, however, failed to acknowledge that economic and political interests were
49
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not just determined by whether or not a merchant was a member of a company, but also by
which company and trade one participated in.
Historian Peter Earle also made the same association of merchant and overseas trader in
The Making of the English Middle Class, 1660-1730. Although he examined a later period than
Brenner, Earle noted that by the late seventeenth century the term “merchant” was still reserved
for overseas traders, who were a separate and distinct economic and political group from
ordinary domestic businessmen. Late seventeenth-century merchants, for Earle, were simply the
most successful of the emerging middle class, and by the late seventeenth century, merchants
represented a cohesive group that held the same economic and political interests because of their
occupations.50 While he adhered to the idea that merchants were overseas traders, he
overlooked the fact that there was not a cohesive economic or political community of the
overseas merchant.
Richard Grassby took issue with the limited views of Brenner and Earle of what
constituted a merchant in seventeenth-century England. He did not separate merchants from
other businessmen and argues that contemporary evidence suggests that the terms were not
distinct in the seventeenth century because while the internal and external trades differed, “the
word merchant was applied to wholesaling in both. It was usually synonymous with
businessman.”51 Grassby’s use of sources, however, is problematic as two of his sources were
not contemporary to the seventeenth century. He based his claim that merchants were those who
dealt in wholesaling in both domestic and foreign trades on John Strype’s expanded edition of
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According to Grassby, Defoe divided businessmen into “an ‘upper’ and ‘lower’

class,” but that all were merchants. Although both Strype’s Survey and Defoe’s Compleat
English Tradesmen were published in the eighteenth century, both make a distinction between
businessmen or domestic traders and merchants, or overseas traders. According to Strype,
There is yet another Rank of considerable Traders, whose Traffick and Commerce lieth
chiefly abroad, and who employ Shipping; exporting the Products and Manufactures of
England into foreign Parts, and importing the Commodities of foreign Growth hither.
These we call Merchants.53
Defoe also stated, “some branches of home trade, which necessarily embarks the Inland
Tradesman in some parts of foreign business, and so makes a merchant of the shop-keeper
almost whether he will or no.”54 Both of these sources directly counter Grassby’s assertion that
the term merchant was synonymous with businessman.
Grassby did rely on one source from the seventeenth century—Charles Molloy’s De Jure
Maritmo (1676). Grassby was correct to claim that Molloy considered “Bankers, and such as
deal by Exchange” to be merchants.55 However, a closer look at the De Jure Maritimo shows
that Molloy reserved the term merchant for overseas traders. According to Molloy, “Every one
that buys and sells is not from thence to be denominated a Merchant; but only he who traffiques
in the way of Commerce, by importation or exportation.”56 Therefore, while Grassby created his
definition of merchant and businessman based on these sources, all three sources appear to refute
his claim.
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Perry Gauci disagreed with Grassby’s terminology and asserts that the terms “merchant”
and “businessman” were not identical and argues that contemporaries reserved the term
“merchant” for “a businessman whose primary interest lay with overseas trade.” According to
Gauci, “in the later medieval period, the title of merchant might have been accorded to any
person involved in wholesaling, or used to denote a higher status urban dweller…[but by] the
late Stuart age…the term was reserved for overseas traders.”57 Gauci attributed this shift in
definition to the fact that by the early seventeenth century overseas traders held a more powerful
position within the English government than their medieval predecessors.
As Gauci has pointed out, works from the period clearly define the term for the
seventeenth century. In The Merchant’s Map of Commerce (1638), Lewes Roberts declared that
“merchandizing principally consisteth of adventures made abroad into severall regions, and for
the most part merchants are found to traffique and negociate into divers parts and countries of the
world by the help and benefit of seas and navigation.”58 Other publications, such as The
Character and Qualifications of an Honest, Loyal Merchant (1686) are adamant that while
the title of merchants in some parts of the world, is usurp’d by almost all sorts of little
people whose business is to buy and sell; but properly (and wholly here in England) it
belongs to none but such as drive a forreign trade, whereby they are vastly differenc’d
from ordinary shopkeepers and retailers.59
Treatises of trade continued to define a merchant as an overseas trader well into the eighteenth
century, which calls into questions Grassby’s assertion that the terms businessman and merchant
were synonymous. The label of merchant was reserved for those men who dealt solely in
overseas trade.
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A call for a consistent definition does not ignore the fact that London merchants, much
less English merchants, did not form a coherent group with one singular political ideology.
London merchants were fragmented in several ways, and for this reason, it is difficult to discuss
a merchant community in London, or England as a whole. First, Company merchants lobbied for
monopolized charters so that in many ways, they controlled much of the overseas trade of the
entire country, which only served to split them from merchants in other English towns, such as
Bristol or Liverpool. Merchants within London were also divided into Companies that were
either new or entrenched. By the early-to-mid-seventeenth century, the East India Company and
Levant Company had pushed out the Merchant Adventurers as the dominant political and trading
forces in London. However, the position of the East India Company and Levant Company was
also tenuous as they were threatened by new groups of merchants who emerged in the second
half of the century.60 Aside from London and Company politics, merchants were also split on
the issue of religion. While many merchants remained Anglican, many others were turning to
the Presbyterian or Congregational faiths.61 Brenner further extended this argument by
contending that the fragmentation, whether economic or religious, among London merchants
resulted in a split of support between the Crown and Parliament during the crises of the 1640s.62
There was not a singular factor that determined which institution a merchant would support.
This same division continued throughout the Restoration. As political parties emerged, London
merchants were once again split into opposing camps of Whig and Tory.
A consistent definition of merchant is crucial due to the fact that much of the debate over
the political nature of seventeenth-century merchants has centered on the assumption that
60
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merchants, as a group or even class, acted politically. It is difficult to conceive of merchants as
acting as a community or a single political unit due to the various levels of fragmentation.
Grassby’s adamant assertions that the majority of merchants did not have a political ideology and
merchants were not inherently political during the Revolution and afterwards seem to be based
on his inflexible view of what constituted a merchant. Brenner and Gauci are focusing on a
specific group of businessmen, the overseas traders, while Grassby includes all London
businessmen in his assertion. Grassby’s contention that merchants were only political when it
benefited their bottom line may be off base if he is including all businessmen. Perhaps, the
average London businessman concerned himself with politics only when he was forced to do so
by his bottom-line, but this does not negate the claims of Brenner and Gauci that many overseas
traders were inherently political, before, during, and after the Revolution. Therefore, it is
necessary to ask the questions: what did it mean for merchants, as overseas traders, to be
involved in politics, and why, perhaps, were so many merchants politically active during the late
seventeenth century?
Part III: Political Merchants from the Revolution to the Restoration
a. Merchant involvement in the 1640s crisis to the 1650s
Although the most current historical discussion of merchant political activity centers on
the activities of English merchants within the emerging political parties of the late seventeenth
century, the earlier historical conversation focused on the role of merchants as the foundations
for the English Revolution of 1641, and whether or not the rising merchant class in London
consciously caused the Revolution. Lawrence Stone maintained that the Revolution was
brought about by two emerging social groups, the squirearchy and merchants, and English
society was at a loss as to how to “accommodate within the existing political system two new,
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economically dynamic and socially ambitious groups.”63 As the squirearchy and merchants
each vied for political influence and power, the sociopolitical system became unstable and
eventually erupted into Revolution. The merchants of London became not only politicized, but
revolutionary in their politics during the 1640s. For Stone, one of the major causes of the
Revolution of 1641 was the desire for these wealthy socioeconomic groups to find a position for
themselves within the traditional society of England as they sought to exert considerable political
power that matched the amount of wealth that they had accumulated.
Christopher Hill agreed that the English Revolution was triggered “ultimately, by
economic developments which could not be absorbed within the old régime.” There was little
room for maneuver for these merchants in the political arena although they were supplying the
Crown with a bulk of income. For Hill, the English Revolution was best understood as a
bourgeois revolution in the Marxist tradition not because a merchant bourgeoisie actively sought
revolution, but because it produced conditions that were more favorable to capitalist and
mercantile interests than had been possible under the Stuart regime of the 1620s and 1630s.64 It
is for this reason that the role the London merchants played in the Revolution is important,
whether the actual outcome was intended or not.
The arguments of Stone and Hill helped to explain how England’s merchants were able to
build a commercial nation by the end of the century, but revisionist scholars took issue with their
approach. Conrad Russell adamantly denied that the events of the 1640s were the result of
tensions between social groups or the rise of new socioeconomic groups. According to Russell,
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“it [is] painfully clear that it is impossible to interpret the Civil War as the clash of two clearly
differentiated social groups or class.”65 Instead, Russell argued that several factors, including the
problems of ruling the multiple kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, religious schisms, a
collapse in the financial and political system, and finally Charles I’s inability to deal effectively
with any of these issues, resulted in a civil war, but not a revolution.66 J.A. Sharpe also
challenged the findings of Stone and Hill. Sharpe conceded that merchants were the wealthiest
group among the growing middling sort; but he saw little connection between the vast majority
of their wealth and their respective trades as he claimed that their real wealth came from
“manipulating money.” Sharpe pointed out that the greater part of wealthy London merchants
benefited from an oligarchy rather than climbing the social ladder. For Sharpe, the Civil War
was a result of breakdown in the relationship between the Crown and the peers as the latter tried
to force Charles to accept a constitutional settlement and therefore, the English Civil Wars were
a result of “those struggles between kings and barons” than they were the result of a bourgeois
revolution.67
Brenner tried to breathe new life into the argument that the Revolution was a result of the
emergence of a merchant class by claiming it was the new merchant leadership, who resented the
oligarchic tradition in the City and the relationship between the Crown and the Company
merchants, whom were instrumental in provoking a revolution in the 1640s. When the radical
new merchants rebelled against the Crown and allied with Parliament, they were also rebelling
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against the Companies. The new merchants took advantage of the turmoil of the early 1640s to
further their own agenda, and as they gained power within the City and the nation, the economic
and political power of the Company merchants declined.68
Recent scholarship has resisted Brenner’s claims that the new merchant leadership in
London initiated the Revolution.69 Russell agreed that the majority of the City’s support for
Parliament in 1640-42 came from the new merchants; however, Russell took issue with
Brenner’s interpretation of what this meant.70 Russell maintained that the City’s power was a
“paper tiger” and argues that Brenner miscalculates the level of parliamentary control over the
City.71 In The Causes of the English Civil War, Ann Hughes pointed out that parliamentary
support could also be found among the Company merchants. Therefore, while Hughes concurred
that the seventeenth century may have been a “century of social change,” she does not
necessarily agree with Brenner that the impetus behind this change was the new merchant
leadership.72 Likewise, David Cressy agreed that the crises of the seventeenth century placed a
tremendous amount of pressure and stress on the existing social system; however, he also
insisted that “the social fabric was always at risk of fraying,” as society was not quite as well
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ordered as Brenner would suggest. The tensions in the social system were demonstrated by a
lack of deference and an “upsurge in hostility to established authority.” 73
Whether or not the Revolution and the Civil Wars were caused by merchants, or specific
merchant groups, the economic conditions were far more conducive to merchants after the
Revolution and Civil Wars than under Charles I. After Charles’s execution on January 30,
1649, Oliver Cromwell came to the forefront as England’s new leader until his death in 1658.74
During the Commonwealth, commercial policy was instituted that ensured that England’s
commerce would thrive as republican ideas were tied closely to overseas commercial expansion,
and the new merchants were directly involved in the development of policy. Despite this fact, it
is important to point out that still relatively few London merchants were sitting in the Rump
Parliament. Regardless of their small numbers, these men were very effective at instituting
commercial policies. Brenner attributed this to two factors: one, these men worked very well
together “related in part to the membership of many of them in the same new-merchants’
commercial and political networks;” and two, they also worked closely with the Rump’s
leadership. 75
Due to their ability to work together and with the parliamentary leaders, the new
merchants were able to play a chief role in passing “the antiroyalist, antiproprietor, and antiDutch colonial policies” at the same time as they were expanding plans for colonial expansion in
North America.76 The anti-Dutch sentiment of the new merchants was codified in the
Navigation Act of 1651, and the passage of this Act also signified that “free trade” would not be
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enacted under the Commonwealth despite the fact that in theory many of the new merchants had
called for free trade practices in response to their exclusion from the big trading companies. 77
Although the trading companies never reached their former levels of power and influence, they
were not abolished and the state allowed and endorsed the activities of the companies trading to
Guinea and the East Indies.
The influence of the new merchants lasted only until Oliver Cromwell dissolved the
Rump Parliament. In May 1653, a petition was presented to Cromwell insisting that the Rump
be restored. Among the forty signatures were many members of the new merchant leadership
who had exerted considerable influence throughout the preceding four years of the
Commonwealth. Cromwell would not be swayed as he intended to maintain full control over the
Commonwealth, and he summarily discharged them from their positions in the government.
Brenner noted that these men were eventually allowed to return and serve in the government, but
they never were able to exercise the same amount of influence. 78
For Brenner, the Commonwealth represented the end of the radical new merchants’
influence in the City and national governments. Perhaps this is due to the fact that once the
monarchy was restored in 1660, the Company merchants regained their old positions of power
within the City as Charles and his government placed their support in the traditional oligarchic
government centered on the Court of Aldermen. As both Brenner and De Krey have claimed, the
Commonwealth collapsed partly due to the inability of the government to restore stability to the
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City, and Charles II was able to resettle his kingdom only after he reasserted control over the
capital. The ideas of the new merchants did not simply disappear. Brenner argued that “relative
religious toleration . . . [and] . . . the desire…to make law more efficient and progressive” were
fundamental ideas of the new merchants and these same ideas would later be absorbed into the
Whig faction. While the new merchants may not have remained in the forefront of the City
government after the Interregnum, it is possible that some of their ideas about trade and the
City’s governance did seep into the factionalist ideas of the Restoration.79
b. Merchants and the Restoration
With the Restoration of Charles II came the reinstallation of the Company merchants as
the main source of power within the City. Gary S. De Krey, Perry Gauci, and Steve Pincus
extended Brenner’s argument into the Restoration and into the eighteenth century by detailing
how Company merchants sought power at both the City and national level.80 According to De
Krey, merchants formed the leadership of the emerging political parties, and he observes their
political participation through the lens of City politics.81 The City of London found itself divided
primarily into two factions, Whigs and Tories, as problems arose in Charles’s administrations in
the late 1670s. Merchants served as leaders and prominent members for both factions. In the
controversial City elections of the 1680s, merchants were at the center of the action on both
sides.82 By approaching the problem from the side of party leadership, he was also able to make
some generalizations about the political allegiance of merchants during the Restoration by
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examining the age, religion, wealth, and occupation of the party leaders for both the Whigs and
Tories. Yet, he does not seek to make the connection that the ideologies of the merchants helped
to shape the parties as they emerged in the Restoration as he is primarily interested in showing
that political parties did in fact develop during Charles’s final years. De Krey’s examination of
the leadership of the Whig and Tory parties, however, is useful because he provided data that
concretely demonstrated that many of the men who were actively involved in the early parties
were merchants.
Rather than examining merchant involvement at the City level, Gauci argued that the late
seventeenth century created a special atmosphere that encouraged both political and economic
change in the merchant community. He claimed that the Restoration created unprecedented
political opportunities for merchants as Parliament and Charles II were dealing with issues of
international trade, such as the Navigation Laws, and the taxation of commerce. Also, England
fought two wars against the Dutch, their main commercial rival. These issues were political and
commercial; and therefore merchants had a particular interest in how the government handled
them. From 1660 to 1715, the number of merchant MPs rose significantly but only a small
percentage of parliamentarians were merchants. Gauci’s work, unlike that of Brenner and De
Krey, focused on merchants who served in Parliament and also analyzed the ways non-office
holding merchants could have their voices heard, particularly through petitioning. 83 While he
has shown that merchants had unprecedented opportunity to participate at the national level, he
did not always make a concrete or even direct conclusion about merchant participation.84 What
Gauci did not fully explain is if Restoration politics were transformed due to the increased
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merchant political activity or the potential revolutionary nature of their participation. Gauci
cautioned historians about making generalizations about merchants as a group with a cohesive
political agenda.
Pincus also looked to merchants to explain how England erupted into a second
Revolution in 1688. Pincus argued that the rapid economic development of England caused by
the colonial trades with the East and West Indies and North America was a cause rather than a
consequence of the first modern revolution. For Pincus, overseas trade was politically important
because it was “the hot-house of the British economy.” The political sphere changed with the
economic landscape as the institutions of trade created new prospects for political participation.
By the late seventeenth century, economics could not be separated from politics as both Charles
II and James II devoted more time and energy to commercial policy as Charles created
parliamentary committees to handle matters of trade and James formed a commerce committee
within the Privy Council. In Pincus’s view, the expansion of trade led to the creation of an
entirely new economy which subsequently necessitated “a new politics.” 85
As merchants became involved in the political sphere, ideas about the political economy
became intertwined in the ideological debates that developed along with the Whig and Tory
parties. According to Pincus, J.G.A. Pocock overly simplified the ideas about the political
economy in the late seventeenth century. Pocock asserted that commerce was not a central
political issue that led to the Glorious Revolution, but rather the Financial Revolution occurred
after 1688 as an unintended consequence of the political revolution.86 Pocock also concluded
that while Whigs and Tories may have differed on political ideology, they did not on the political
economy as both saw land as the basis of both political and economic power. For Pocock, all
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Whigs and Tories were essentially mercantilist as they assumed all wealth was finite and
advocated for protectionist economic policies.
Pincus argued that two competing theories about the political economy emerged in the
1680s along with the Whig and Tory political parties and these ideas about the political economy
became cemented into the factions’ general political philosophies. Pincus stressed that these two
models were radically different from each other. According to Pincus, neither political faction
wanted an economy free of government interference, but instead wanted the government to
support their factional economic program. The Whig faction’s economic plan was based on two
main points: first, property was not a natural right but a human invention, and second, the
creation of a national bank was crucial to the overall well-being of the nation’s economic
security and prosperity. Whiggish political economist Carew Reynell claimed that the future of
the nation was dependent upon labor and manufacturing rather than land and raw materials. On
the other hand, the Tory faction had a less nebulous idea about property. For Tories, property
was land and therefore finite. This view of finite property, or wealth, also translated to trade and
led to Tory support of monopolistic companies, especially the East India Company and James’s
Royal African Company, instead of a national bank.

Child saw the Dutch as a natural enemy to

the English and claimed that the interlopers who sought to undermine the monopolies of the East
India Company were in direct collusion with the Dutch. Pincus asserted that the Tory notion of
how the English economy should function thrived under Charles II and James II until the
Glorious Revolution. The 1688 political revolution also brought a revolution in the political
economy, and led to the ultimate triumph of the Whig political economy and the creation of a
national bank. 87
While Pincus made a convincing case that Whigs and Tories had two separate views of
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the political economy, he failed to take into account that the spectrum of ideologies emerging in
the late seventeenth century about the political economy. Some were arguing over the benefits
of manufacturing versus monopolistic trade companies, but other merchants, such as Dudley
North, Nicholas Barbon, and Charles Davenant were beginning to theorize about the
opportunities that a free trade economy would create. Although North, Barbon, and Davenant
did not advocate eliminating trade companies, they did call for the removal of protectionist
policies which would have prohibited trade with individual nations, such as the United Provinces
and France. Pincus’s argument does much to show the levels that commercial interest were
intertwined with political ideology in the late 1680s, but he is too quick to try to neatly
categorize all merchant’s ideas about trade based on their party affiliations when in reality, there
was a spectrum of political and commercial ideologies.
For this reason, it is important to begin to examine individual merchants as individual
political actors. It is clear that there was not a united merchant community, either in London or
the nation, and also it is clear that merchants could be found on both sides of the political
spectrum throughout the seventeenth century. Therefore, to understand fully the political
activities, or even motivations, of merchants, a step back from the merchant “group” is needed
and more attention on the individual merchants who were acting politically. Because of the high
concentration of merchants in the City of London, its government offered the perfect opportunity
for merchants to participate in politics.
Part IV: Methodology: Case studies and Dudley North
In many ways, case studies can be problematic. The focus is usually a single individual
or event, and one person’s experience or one singular event does not always provide a complete
picture of what happened. For social and cultural historians, individuals are merely part of a
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larger group, and it is the development of this group over time that is most significant.
Oftentimes, the individual and his/her actions are discounted as insignificant. In the instance of
London merchants involved in politics, case studies are necessary because a coherent community
of London merchants did not exist in the seventeenth century. From the 1640s through the
Restoration, London’s merchants remained fragmented and factionalized in their political beliefs.
Historians have tried in many ways to discern what exactly made a merchant choose a
particular ideology or political path. Despite much of this work by historians, it is still unclear if
a pattern of political participation really existed, as there were always merchants who did not fit
the pattern. In the end, it seems that each merchant who entered politics did so as an individual,
and therefore individual factors, such as age, social status, and religious convictions could also
provide impetus for the desire to serve. It is apparent that there was not a single merchant
community in London or the nation. Merchants could be found on both sides of the political
spectrum throughout the seventeenth century. In order to fully understand the political activities
and motivations of merchants, historians must take a step back from the merchant “group” and
turn their attention to the individual merchants who were acting politically. Were individual
merchants simply involved to secure their commercial interests, or did these men have a more
general political ideology that was shaped by the revolutionary period of the mid-seventeenth
century? Could merchants become involved in politics to foster both their political ideology and
the commercial interests?
Dudley North makes an excellent choice for a case study of a London merchant involved
in politics. North’s political career, although short, is fascinating due to its controversial nature.
He never fully articulated his political ideology in writing, and historians must therefore rely on
the statements that he made as well as his actions in order to try to piece together his ideology.
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Due to his family connections and the controversial circumstances surrounding his entrance into
politics, a great number of records exist concerning North and his political experiences. Along
with the records that exist from the London shrieval election of 1682, North’s personal papers
include his own records from his time as Sheriff of London. Further, accounts exist also of the
1689 House of Lords inquiry into his process of jury selection as Sheriff of London. Perhaps the
most valuable sources regarding Dudley North, his life, and political career is the works of his
brother, Roger North. Roger discussed North’s shrieval election in both his Examen and his
biographies of both his brothers Francis and Dudley North known as The Lives. These works
provide valuable information about the North family and the respective careers of Francis and
Dudley North.
While any historian interested in the members of the North family will find Roger’s
Examen and The Lives invaluable, they are not without bias. The Examen was written to refute
Whiggish depictions of the election in both White Kennett’s A Complete History of England
(volume three) and Lawrence Echard’s The history of England, which presented North as a pawn
of the Crown. Roger sought to defend his brothers’ actions, but also to keep of a record of their
lives.88 According to Roger, the “whole community indeed has . . . a general concern in the
clearing up of the history of any considerable person,” but he felt that he was most qualified to
see that the “character of a truly great man, and his almost immediate ancestor, vindicated from
obloquy, and set forth in such a light as it justly deserved.”89 In his account of North’s life,
Roger divulges that his information came chiefly from Dudley North.90 Due to the inherent bias
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in a work written by a family member, it is necessary to bolster the account with the other papers
and records available.
Not only do historians have access to a great number of resources concerning North’s life
and careers as a merchant and politician, but North himself also wrote a treatise, Discourse on
Trade, in the last years of his life. While he may not have written a political tract explaining his
views upon government in the way of Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, he did clearly articulate an
ideology in regard to trade. It is possible to better understand the relationship of a merchant’s
business with his politics through examining North’s economic treatise in conjunction with his
political actions and trade policies while serving the government. North was not hesitant to use
his positions within government to implement his own ideas about trade in a manner that
benefited the Crown.
Early eighteenth-century histories of England were very interested in the events of the
late seventeenth century and often gave Dudley North a prominent position within their histories.
Yet, North is only a marginal figure in the history of the Restoration as it has been written and
discussed in the last thirty years. Most Restoration studies tend to focus either on events such as
the Exclusion Crisis, in which North did not factor, or on the place of the Restoration within a
century of crisis. In doing so, historians such as Tim Harris and Jonathan Scott have taken an
approach that tends to focus on broader themes but does not always have a place for figures such
as North. Other histories that include a discussion of the events of London in 1682 and 1683
may only mention North as a Tory Sheriff, even when discussing the Rye House Plots.
Historians have chosen rather to focus on whether or not the plots of the 1680s were in fact
threats to the government, an approach which largely leaves North out of the story. Steve
Pincus, who studied mercantile influence on the political economy and the Glorious Revolution,
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also chose to cut North out of the narrative as his ideas about the political economy did not fit the
dichotomous model that he presented. Richard Grassby took a step to reinsert North back into
the narrative with his historical biography titled The English Gentlemen in Trade, but his
approach is largely guided by the same ideas as the early histories of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century. In order to situate North properly within the narrative, another look must be
taken at how he has been treated as a historical figure and to what extent historians have based
their treatment of him on their own preconceived notions of the events in which North was
involved.
In many ways, the early histories determine the tone by which historians have written
about North and his political choices. The earliest histories that include North focus exclusively
on his short but controversial political career, which began with the London shrieval election in
1682. His contributions as a political economist, which modern day historians emphasize, were
largely ignored. Furthermore, the earlier histories were concerned not only with discussing his
political career but also with assessing North’s character and determining how it influenced his
decisions. These historians were trying to determine whether North was a good politician and if
he performed his job in the most appropriate manner. While these can be good questions to ask,
the answers were often determined by the political leanings of the historian. In 1706, White
Kennett published the third volume of A Complete History of England, which contained a
description of events spanning Charles I to William III. From 1706 to 1720, Laurence Echard
published The History of England. Both these men approached the events of the Restoration,
including the shrieval election, saw the history of the 1680s as a history of Whig persecution and
eventually, Whig triumph against an oppressive and arbitrary government. From this point of
view, North served as a pawn of the Crown and simply did their bidding.
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Roger North took extreme offense to these biased histories, and therefore wrote his own
account of his brother’s political career. Roger penned both the Examen and The Lives in an
attempt to correct what he saw as an inaccurate portrayal not only of his brother, but also of the
events of the Restoration. While all three of these histories are problematic due to bias, they are
important and necessary to understand how North has been treated as a historical figure. In
many ways historians still tend to fall into one of these two camps when discussing North and his
political career.
Kennett included a brief account of the shrieval election of 1682 and the subsequent trials
against Whig leaders that followed. Kennett approached the election from a Whiggish point of
view of arbitrary government and persecution. He did not spend a great deal of time discussing
North, but in an indirect manner he accuses him of partiality and of packing juries in such a
manner that innocent men were found guilty and sentenced to death. Kennett achieved this by
emphasizing the importance of the position of sheriff in choosing the juries. In his description of
the events leading up the shrieval election of 1682, Kennett emphasized the ignoramus trials and
the “conditions of the dissenters,” which by this point were not only “Separatists from the
Church, but . . . Enemies to the State.” Kennett was careful to make sure his readers knew that
the sheriffs were responsible for choosing the juries and that the reason behind the Crown’s
interest in choosing the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex so that Charles II might control the
juries. In this way, Kennett was able to insinuate that Dudley North and his co-sheriff Rich were
responsible for the events that transpired after their election. In referring to the shrieval election,
Kennett asserted, “The Court was very solicitous for the choice of new Sheriffs for London and
Middlesex, and earnestly recommended Mr. North and Mr. Box; but the Hearts of the Citizens
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were for Mr. Papillon and Mr. Dubois.” In essence, both North and his co-sheriff were assumed
to be pawns of the Crown and with their tenure came brutal prosecution through treason trials.91
Just as Kennett did not explicitly attack North and his character when discussing the
shrieval election, he also avoided directly accusing North of packing the juries. Instead, he made
the case that the juries were partial and inclined to find the accused guilty, but this with the
understanding that North and his co-sheriff were responsible for choosing these juries. Two of
the most prominent trials were that of the Whig leaders William Lord Russell and Algernon
Sidney, both accused of plotting to kill the king. Kennett shows a clear allegiance to these two
men in his writing. His bias is indicated by the way in which he references the men as “my Lord
Russell” and “the Honourable Colonel Algernoon [sic] Sidney.” To help make his case that
these men were wrongly convicted by prejudiced juries, Kennett included the last statements of
Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney in their entirety. In doing this, Kennett did not need to make
a direct attack on the sheriffs, but rather lets his sources make the accusations. Lord Russell
contended that his death sentence was not a surprise because “From the Time of chusing
Sheriffs, I concluded the Heat in that Matter would produce something of this kind; and I am not
much surpriz’d to find it fall upon me . . . But I wish the Rage of hot Men, and the Partiality of
Juries, may be stopp’d with my Blood.” According to Sidney, he was a victim of the fact that the
jury was “pack’d by the King’s Solicitors” and was composed of men “who are not
Freeholders.”92
Laurence Echard also had a similar view of North in the third volume of his The History
of England (1718). Echard couched his discussion of the shrieval election as a contest of
political parties and described the event as a “the great Time of Struggle between the two
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Parties.” North’s successful election as the Sheriff of London, along with another staunch Tory
as Lord Mayor, signified “a terrible Blow to the disaffected Party, and . . . Many of them found
themselves in great Danger.” Echard portrayed North, along with his co-sheriff and Lord Mayor
Sir William Pritchard, as “very active and vigilant” in their attempts to maintain control over the
City and prevent those who supported and/or led the Whiggish faction from causing chaos and
havoc within the City through their “Clubs and Conventicles.” Whereas Kennett described the
action of the partisan juries in an insidious light, Echard attached the responsibility directly to
North and his co-sheriff, Sir Peter Rich. For Echard, William Lord Russell and Algernon
Sidney, along with three other “ordinary criminals,” were found guilty of treason because the
trial was heard by “a considerable Jury summon’d by the present Sheriffs, Sir Dudley North, and
Sir Peter Rich, and the whole was carry’d on with as much Art and Management.” 93
For Kennett and Echard, North as an individual politician was irrelevant. What truly
mattered was his affiliation with the Crown and its faction. North was dispensable as a politician
because the outcome was only possible because he was of the Tory faction. Any Tory could
have packed the juries in such a partial manner. For this reason, neither Kennett nor Echard felt
the need to pay particular attention to North as an individual, and neither allocated time or space
to discuss North’s background, his connections to the government, his merchant career, or his
character. None of these factors contributed to any of his decisions because he was the Crown’s
pawn. As an agent of the Crown, North simply did what he was told.
Roger North found these portrayals of Dudley North problematic and sought to correct
them in both his Examen and in The Lives. For this reason, Roger spent a great deal of time
defending North as Sheriff of London and his later political career, as well as the character of all
those involved in the affairs of 1682 and 1683. Roger began his vindication of North with his
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defense of Sir John Moore, arguing that “Very much depended on the Character of that single
Citizen.” In order to set the record straight about North, Roger felt that it was imperative that he
show Moore was “very just and honest in all his Dealings.” For Roger, the establishment of
Moore’s character was imperative because it was a direct reflection on North. As Moore had
nominated North, it was important for Roger to present Moore as an honest and just man who
would not have chosen a man to serve as sheriff who was also not of good and sound character.
He also concluded that the factional leanings of the Lord Mayor were of no matter because “his
Office did not affect the Return of Juries” and further, he implied that Moore was such an
upstanding citizen that he would have only chosen someone qualified for the office, regardless of
faction. 94
Roger asserts that that Sir John Moore “carried in his Mind a Determination, that neither
Public nor Private should suffer through him” and therefore denied that Charles and his advisors
were directly involved in the selection of Dudley North as sheriff of London. He criticized
Kennett’s statement that “The Court was very solicitous for the Choice of new Sherriffs of
London and Middlesex” and contends that “there came no Recommendations from the Court to
the City.” Roger maintained that if the Crown had wanted to interfere in the dealings of the
City, Charles would have completely barred those with Whiggish sympathies from participating
and he would simply have chosen whomever he pleased as sheriff. Roger also refuted the claim
that Lord-Keeper Francis North was responsible for suggesting his brother for the shrievalty.
Roger insisted that it was the Recorder Sir George Jeffries who suggested the matter to Charles.95
Roger also maintained that it was Charles who approached the Lord-Keeper and inquired if
North would accept the nomination should the Lord Mayor drink to him. According to Roger,
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Francis knew that his brother was reluctant to hold the position because of the expense of office
and the responsibilities required by law. In his attempt to convince North to serve, Francis gave
his brother £1000 to assist him with shrieval expenses, with the understanding that North might
never pay it back. Furthermore, Francis was concerned that both the Crown and the City had put
too much emphasis on the shrievalty and argued that “they thought the service much greater than
it really was” and claimed the undue emphasis on the position was a result of “a terrible fear . . .
artificially raised up in the city, as if this service was the greatest hazard in the world.” 96 North
accepted his brother’s argument and decided that he would stand as sheriff if so asked by the
Lord Mayor. Regardless of North’s connections to the Crown through his brother, Roger
contended that North’s nomination as Sheriff should not have been a problem as he was “every
Way qualified to be Sherriff at this Time.” Roger asserts that North “made Justice the Rule of
his Actions,” and further contends that
He never used Tricks or Subterfuges and hated them in all others, and had a peculiar
Antipathy to a false Knave . . . . He was a frank and jolly merchant, familiar, easy, jocose,
obliging to all . . . . He had a goodly Person, and Mind capable of sitting at the Helm of
any Managery; intelligent and facetious. 97
According to Roger, North was incapable of duplicity, and therefore the circumstances that
surrounded his election as Sheriff had to be legitimate or North would have refused the position.
Roger made a great deal out of North’s hesitance to hold the office in part to show that North
was a responsible citizen of the City who would do nothing that would be perceived as unlawful.
These same character traits are what Roger used to build his argument concerning
North’s actions as Sheriff. Roger chose to spend little time discussing North’s time as sheriff,
but rather skipped to his position in the Treasury and in Parliament. One reason for this omission
of the trials concerning the Rye House Plot is due to the fact that North was not “much
96
97

R. North, The Lives, i, 355-358.
R. North, Examen, 601-602.

42

concerned with the [matter], farther than that the conspirators had taken especial care of Sir
Dudley North. For he was one of those who, if they had succeeded, was to have been knocked on
the head, and his skin to be stuffed and hung up in Guildhall.” Roger denied that North played
any role in the choosing of the juries which tried those involved in the plot, especially William
Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney. According to Roger, the juries were chosen by the undersheriffs, not by North, and he did not even attend the trials or the executions, which were carried
out by the under-sheriffs. Roger took as further evidence that North did nothing unlawful as
sheriff that he was never found guilty of any charges, even when he was examined by the
committees of both the Houses of Parliament. Overall, Roger tried to present his brother as a
lawful and upstanding citizen of both the City and his nation who served the Crown when duty
called. Roger’s defense of his brother was a direct response to the histories of the time which
sought to paint North as a malicious agent of the Crown who helped murder innocent men. 98
Despite the clear bias inherent in these two interpretations of North as a politician,
historians who have discussed North and his political activities have largely followed suit. In
Thomas Babington Macaulay’s The History of England (1849), North is described as “one of the
ablest men of his time” due to knowledge of trade and the economy. According to Macaulay,
North’s abilities in regards to trade and commerce were what attracted attention from the Crown.
Macaulay argued that the Crown found in North “an enlightened adviser and an unscrupulous
slave . . . [with] lax principles and an unfeeling heart.” The evidence for Macaulay is that
North’s juries were not hesitant to dole out guilty verdicts and death sentences. Although
Macaulay’s history is decidedly old-fashioned and guided by a known Whig bias, his portrayal
of North continues along the same lines as those printed in the eighteenth century. 99
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Macaulay’s short portrayal of North is significant because of its influence on modern-day
historian Richard Grassby. Grassby’s The English Gentlemen in Trade provides the most
comprehensive historical view of Dudley North written since Roger North’s Examen and The
Lives. Grassby’s work focused primarily on North’s activities as merchant, businessman, and
political economist. He included a discussion of North’s overall lifestyle, family, and career as a
politician. Despite the fact that Grassby sought to provide a historical biography of a
businessmen of the seventeenth century, his examination of North’s political career is largely a
rebuttal of Macaulay’s statements.
In his account, Grassby fell in line with Roger North’s interpretation of his brother’s
political career. He argued that North and his family were not absolutists or believers in the
Divine Right theories of monarchy. In fact, according to Grassby, North “was not . . . a political
animal and he never articulated a clear political philosophy.” For Grassby, North’s entrance into
the City’s political arena, and subsequently the national political sphere, was by a happy
accident. While an active participant in the Tory Reaction, North was neither a “doctrinaire
partisan” nor an “articulate Tory with strong views on monarchy.” However, North’s lack of
fully formed or defined political ideology was hardly a flaw. Rather, it was the very reason he
was attractive to the Court as their candidate for Sheriff. Grassby completely bought into Roger
North’s portrayal and insisted that North served the Crown to the best of his ability and within
the guidelines of the office to which he was appointed. Grassby, however, did concede that the
circumstances by which North was brought up to the Crown as a candidate, or those by which he
was chosen to be sheriff, might have been suspicious. 100
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For Grassby, however, this did not necessarily reflect upon North. Grassby portrayed
North as a man who simply carried out his duties as sheriff, which were often “conventional and
boring,” despite the fact that he “suffered from threats, malicious rumours and lampoons in the
press” and “faced a real threat of public disorder.” According to Grassby, North undertook his
positions of Alderman and Member of Parliament in the same manner. Grassby did not believe
the claim that North purposefully chose the juries during his tenure as Sheriff that would convict
and execute the Crown’s opposition. Grassby argued that this type of behavior was simply not in
line with North’s character. Grassby concludes his one chapter discussion of North’s political
career with several observations. The first was that North was simply a victim of circumstance
and that it was his “misfortune to be the instrument of political policies to which he did not
subscribe.” Grassby further remarks that North “had accepted the burdens of the Shrievalty as
both a duty and a symbol of public recognition. . . . But he neglected to examine his own
political convictions and he served to well.”101
Overall, Grassby’s treatment of North’s career is very brief and too influenced by both
his nearly complete acceptance of Roger North’s view of his brother as merely a loyalist who
was doing his job and his attempt to rebut views of those like Macaulay who accuse North of
duplicity during his time in office. Like Roger, Grassby sought, in a sense, to clear North’s name
and to prove that he was an honorable politician that was only acting out of duty. While for
Roger this approach was an attempt to clear his brother’s name, Grassby had a different motive.
The English Gentlemen in Trade was a by-product of Grassby’s larger work, The Business
Community of Seventeenth-Century England.
As in his biography of North, Grassby devoted a chapter to the relationship between
business and politics, and he asked questions about merchants and businessmen such as: “What
101
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were the political principles and affiliations of merchants and can they be credited with an
independent and coherent agenda?” and “How significant a role did they play in national and
regional politics?” Grassby maintained that merchants were not revolutionary or political
throughout the seventeenth century. This is partially due to the fact that Grassby insisted that
merchants, as a group, did not adopt a political ideology. He claimed that merchants “were to be
found on both sides of every controversy and a minority positioned themselves at each extreme
of the ideological spectrum.”102
Grassby is correct to assert that a community of merchants did not exist with a coherent
ideology; but, in his attempt to examine an individual merchant and his political ideology, he
refuses to let go of his preconceived notion that merchants as a group were not inherently
political. Grassby then translates this claim to Dudley North, one of the few merchants who
found himself positioned at an extreme end of the political spectrum. Grassby seems to deny
that North was such an ideologue because North himself denied it, and he did not choose to write
down his political beliefs. North’s actions suggest just the opposite is true. He stood for office
as the Crown’s pick knowing that many in the City opposed his nomination. Once in office,
North carried out his duties to such an extent that some who found themselves in opposition to
the Charles lost their lives, and he was able to garner further appointments within both the
governments of Charles and James that allowed him to influence trade policies with his own
ideas about the political economy in mind.
The crucial factor that Grassby seems to ignore in his study of North is his actions.
According to Grassby, “North’s intentions and motivations can be documented with confidence
and not simply inferred from his behaviour and actions.”103 Yet, the majority of the records that
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exist which seek to explain North’s motives and intentions are not completely trustworthy. Can
historians really rely on North’s own written defense of his actions after he was called to testify
before a committee of the House of Lords that sought to investigate his actions as sheriff?
Grassby seems to think that this, coupled with Roger’s depiction of North, is enough to
determine whether North was politically motivated while ignoring his actions both as sheriff and
as a Member of Parliament. The chapters that follow argue that North acted politically, and in
the absence of a documented political belief, historians can not ignore actions that suggest he
was politically-minded in manner that was illustrated by his ideas about trade and economics.
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CHAPTER I
THE CITY GOVERNMENT

The City offered a natural arena for merchants to become involved in politics at both the
local and national levels. The City and the Crown were intertwined and this made the City
government and its authorities very powerful. It is necessary to discuss the actual structure of
the City administration and accurately define the various positions and Courts which functioned
as the government in the seventeenth century before one can attempt to understand the way in
which North entered the national political sphere and the relationship between the City and the
Crown.
As Valerie Pearl pointed out, it can be very difficult to discern exactly how the
government actually functioned in the seventeenth century.1 There is not a shortage of histories
of London, or its government, written in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.
Yet, these “histories” are problematic. Those written in the seventeenth century were mostly
concerned with establishing the “ancient” rights of the City, and as Pearl stated, “the love of
tradition and reverence for the law weighed heavily on the minds of men, with the result that
lawyers and historians alike described the City constitution as it existed centuries earlier.”2
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In fact, many of the treatises, such as The Liberties, Usages and Customs of the City and
Angliae Metropolis were written at times when the City was facing a challenge to its authority
whether by an external force, such as Parliament, or internal forces such as during the London
shrieval elections in the 1680s. Therefore, these works tend to defend the City’s governmental
practices rather than simply describing the constitutional workings of the various branches of
government and its Courts. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century depictions, such as John
Noorthouck’s A New History of London (1773) or Alexander Pulling’s A practical Treatise on
the Laws and Customs of the City London (2nd ed, 1849) tend to focus on the City’s government
as it stood at the present time. Pearl’s treatment of the City’s government and constitution are
immensely helpful, as she combines information from the hundreds of manuscripts that make up
the Repertories of the Aldermanic Bench and the Journals of the Court of Common Council in
the City’s archives, along with John Strype’s enlargement of John Stow’s Survay and William
Bohun’s Privilegia Londonis, the two works written on the City’s constitution in the eighteenth
century that provide the most accurate historical treatment of the City’s government.
Part I: The Structure of the City Government
The City government was composed of several parts in the seventeenth-century. Pearl
divided these parts into two categories based on their function. The executive head of the City’s
government was made up of the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen. The Court of Common
Council served the legislative functions. The third major body was Common Hall which held
only electoral duties.3 Within each of these major bodies, there were also several minor courts,
including the Lord Mayor’s Court, the Sheriff’s Court, the Court of the Hustings, and many
others. These were primarily judicial bodies which handled the various judicial issues of the
City. The bulk of the City’s governing, however, was accomplished through the chief officers of
3
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the City and the major bodies of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, the Court of Common Council,
and Common Hall.
a. The Lord Mayor
The Lord Mayor of London was the “chief magistrate” of the City and “the principal
officer in the Kingdom.”4 Elected for one year, the mayoralty was an incredibly powerful and
influential position within the City and the Kingdom, and served as the City’s official
representative and voice. He was responsible for preserving peace within the City and for calling
or dismissing the main assemblies, such as the Court of Aldermen, the Court of Common
Council, and Common Hall, the primary electoral body in the City. Within the Court of
Aldermen and Common Council, the Lord Mayor was the presiding officer. The Lord Mayor
was also responsible until the end of the seventeenth century for choosing one of the City’s two
Sheriffs for the year ensuing. The position of Lord Mayor was expensive due to the requirement
that he host several state dinners throughout the year along with paying for half of his
inauguration dinner at Guildhall on November 9.5 Despite the expense of the office, the position
could be lucrative. In order to compensate for the expenses, the Lord Mayor received several
gifts throughout his tenure, including the majority of the fees for offices and a portion of the
income of rent farms.6 Along with monetary gifts, the Lord Mayor also enjoyed the privilege of
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patronage as he could install his sons, relatives, or friends into profitable offices, such as an
Under-Sheriff for the Sheriff’s Court, Town Clerk, or Common Sergeant.7
The election for the ensuing year’s Lord Mayor was held every Fall on September 29
(Michaelmas).8 Although the City went through the process of an election, the Lord Mayor was
actually chosen in a manner outlined by tradition. The final decision was made by the Court of
Aldermen, and it was customary since the early fifteenth century to choose the most senior
Alderman who had not already served as Lord Mayor. Common Hall played a customary role of
picking two Aldermen, one of whom was the most senior, and the final decision between the two
was left to the Court of Alderman. On the day of election, the Aldermen’s choice was presented
to the Common Hall, who were asked to confirm the nomination.
Although the Lord Mayor was considered to be the chief executive officer of the City of
London, he was also considered to be an officer of the Crown. While he enjoyed the same level
of status as Privy Councilors, the King’s most trusted advisors, the Lord Mayor was still a
servant to the King and could be intimidated to do the Crown’s will, as would be the case in the
London shrieval election of 1682. The City of London was incorporated under a royal charter,
which meant that the City and its officers were subordinate to the Crown.9 The Crown was
effectively able to control the position of Lord Mayor from the September 1681 election of Sir
John Moore until 1687 under the threat that the charter could be revoked. Sir Patience Ward, the
Lord Mayor for the year of 1681, was the last Whig to serve in the position until the 1687
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election of Sir John Shorter.10 With Crown support, any Whig displeasure with the actions of the
Tory Lord Mayors was easily thwarted.
b. The Court of Aldermen
The Court of Aldermen was made up of twenty-six men indirectly elected by the
wardmote, or a special meeting led by the Lord Mayor.11 The wardmote primarily functioned as
an electoral body to choose local officials and administrators within the ward, but it also served
to nominate each ward’s Alderman and to elect its Common Councilmen.12 All of the ward’s
could not participate in the meeting as the wardmote consisted of Common Councilmen and
“others of the livery residing in the respective ward.”13 From this meeting, four candidates were
chosen to recommend to the Court of Aldermen. The Aldermen could then approve one of the
four nominees, or reject them all. If the Aldermen rejected the wardmote’s recommendations on
three successive occasions, the law allowed the Court of Aldermen to choose its newest member.
Therefore, the Court of Aldermen held the ability to restrict its membership.14
The Court of Aldermen was the highest judicial power within the City, and it met twice a
week (Tuesdays and Thursdays) every month except for August and major holidays. Along with
the Lord Mayor, the Court of Aldermen also represented the executive power in the City.
Among its duties, the Court of Aldermen chose the Lord Mayor from among its ranks and
commanded the City’s militia of more than 10,000 men and the municipality’s charities.15 The
role of the Court was to
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treat, determine and discuss . . . the pleas, and matters touching Orphans, apprentices, and
other businesses of the same City. And there are redressed and corrected the faults and
contempts for those which do against the custom and ordinance of the City, as well at the
suit of the parties, as by inquest of Office… and there they use to justify…and to treat
and ordain for the government of the City, and for keeping the King’s peace.16
In some cases, individual Aldermen could also be called to serve as judges in the criminal courts
of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery. As a whole, the Court of Aldermen controlled the City
courts, such as the Sheriffs’ Court and the Court of Hustings. The Aldermen also had important
veto powers concerning elections within the City. If the Aldermen did not approve of the choice
for the City’s officers, they could simply refuse to install the candidate into the office by vetoing
the nomination. Along with vetoing the choice of officers, the Aldermanic Court was responsible
for settling disputed elections, especially when they pertained to the Court of Common Council.
The Aldermen were further able to influence the Court of Common Council as they could veto
legislation that the Council passed.17
Within the Court, matters were handled by petition. Citizens of the City could present the
Aldermen with a petition and then the Court would reflect on the affair and issue their opinion.
The deliberations of the Court were secret and the Court did not have to provide a reason for its
particular decisions. Increasingly throughout the seventeenth century, the Court grew unpopular
with the citizens of the City due to the secret nature of its proceedings. The Aldermen also
enjoyed the privilege of being able to deliver petitions directly to the Crown and through the
Sheriffs to the House of Commons.
Elected for life, the Aldermen were some of the wealthiest and most influential citizens
of the City. There were several qualifications for the position of Alderman. First, the man must
16
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be a freeman of the City, meaning he was not an apprentice to a trade guild and had taken the
oath of freedom. Further, he could not be an alien but had to have been born within the kingdom
to an Englishman. As the positions of Alderman and Lord Mayor were so esteemed, these men
also often came from the most prestigious livery companies, or trade guilds, in the City. While
seventeenth-century London boasted nearly one hundred livery companies, there were Twelve
Great Companies, which were the most prominent one could join.18 In his Survey, Strype
claimed that even if an Alderman was from one of the lesser companies, should he be elected
Lord Mayor, he had to leave his company and join one of the twelve great companies.19 Pearl
insisted that this requirement had been “relaxed” by the seventeenth century but that “the
majority still belonged to one of the great Twelve.”20 Finally, the potential Alderman had to
meet a steep property qualification of at least £10,000. While wealth was considered to be one
of the determining factors when choosing an Alderman, his reputation and desire to serve the
City’s government were also crucial factors. The position of Alderman gave the citizen extensive
patronage power not only within the City as a whole, but also within his respective ward. It was
not uncommon for the Alderman to control the individual elections to the Common Council
within his ward, ensuring that his sphere of influence was further extended. In all, both the Lord
Mayor and the Court of Aldermen were responsible for appointing over 140 officeholders. 21
The Court of Aldermen was an oligarchy and it represented the elitist and exclusionist
nature of the City government. Many of these men enjoyed the support of the Crown. Pearl
claimed, “influence at the King’s court often came even without seeking, since the crown and the
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nobility were always in need of aid from the financial circles of the City.” 22 In exchange for
financial support, the Aldermen gained access to customs farms and monopolies. However, the
relationship was also fragile. The Crown expected the Aldermen to be diligent in collecting
taxes and providing financial support, and due to the proximity of Whitehall to the City, the
Crown kept a watchful eye over the Aldermen.
During the Revolution and Civil War of the 1640s, the oligarchic nature of the Court was
challenged by City radicals who were angry about the relationship between the City government
and the Crown. The radicals were also upset at their exclusion from the great chartered
companies and subsequently, the City’s government. For a brief time during Cromwell’s rule,
the oligarchic government of the City was shut down, and these radicals were able to gain
control of the City. However, with the Restoration of Charles, the chartered companies and their
wealthy members returned to power, and many of these men sought not only to protect their own
political and commercial interests, but also to protect the customs of the City, which included the
old government structure.23 In the end, the decision to affiliate oneself with either the Whig or
Tory faction was really a decision to stand against either the intrusion of overt royalist and
absolutist power in the City, or the threat of radicalism that sought to overthrow the traditional
governmental and commercial structure of the City.
Yet, in spite of their political leanings or loyalties, it is also clear that the Aldermen
sought to preserve the privileges, rights, and customs of the City first and foremost. Rarely
would an Alderman do anything that would jeopardize his position within the City or that would
reduce or limit his substantial power or that of the Court. The Aldermen’s desire to preserve the
rights and privileges of the City was demonstrated when the members of the Court refused to
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vote in favor of surrendering their charter in 1683, which would have been an admission that
they did not have the right to govern themselves. Rather than vote against the Crown’s request,
as the Whiggish Aldermen did, the Tories of the Court simply chose to abstain from voting.
Their abstention allowed the Whigs to garner a majority against surrendering the Charter. Even
with its close relationship to the Crown, the Court of Aldermen in the end maintained that its first
loyalty was to the City.
c. The Court of Common Council
Whereas the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen served as executives of the City, the
Court of Common Council served as the legislature. The Common Council was made up of 260
members. As stated earlier, 234 Common Councilmen were elected by their respective
wardmote. The Court of Aldermen made up the remaining 26 members. Common Councilmen
were not elected for life but most served until they were chosen for a higher office.24 While
technically anyone who was a householder and paid his taxes could serve as a Common
Councilman, it was customary that the membership of the Council be drawn from the liverymen,
the most elite and privileged members of trade guilds, of the ward.25
In many ways, the Common Council was the City’s equivalent to Parliament’s House of
Commons. The Council was responsible for legislation and claimed to have sole power over the
City’s finances and taxation, much like the Common’s claim to the kingdom’s finances.
Whereas the Commons had to answer to the House of Lords and the King, the Council was
constrained by the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen who could exercise veto power on
matters regarding general legislation and/or the City’s finances. The Common Council also had
the obligation to fill several minor municipal posts when they were not chosen by the Lord
24
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Mayor, such as the Common Sergeant, Coroner, Town Clerk, and the judges that served in the
Sheriff’s Court.
The Council met only at the initiative or will of the Lord Mayor, and full meetings were
generally infrequent.26 Therefore, much of the business of the Council was carried out through
committee work. Along with legislation and finances, the Common Council also administered
the municipality’s property through its very prestigious Lands Committee. This committee was
commonly composed of the Council’s most prominent and wealthy members who either were
soon to be an Alderman or Sheriff, or had declined to hold the positions by paying a fine. The
Lands Committee was the most important and influential committee in the City. It was not
unheard of for members to meet with senior Aldermen and make decisions affecting the City,
completely bypassing the entire Common Council.27
The Court of Aldermen dominated the proceedings of the Common Council. The entire
Court served within the Council, and the agenda of the Court of Aldermen also became the
agenda of the Common Council. As members of the Council, the Aldermen voted separately due
to the fact that they had the right to veto any legislation that had already passed Common
Council. However, the veto power was not the only way the Court of Aldermen controlled the
Council. According to A.G. Smith, as long as the position of Lord Mayor was controlled by the
Court of Aldermen, only matters that had first been cleared by the Aldermen could be deliberated
before the Council as a whole.28 The Court of Aldermen and the Lord Mayor were effectively
able to keep a tight rein on the proceedings of the Council through their power of veto, their
26
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strict control of the agenda, and through the Lord Mayor’s ability to call and dismiss the Council
at his will.
d. Common Hall
Common Hall was the general legal body that either confirmed nominations for officers
of the City or popularly elected them. In order to hold a position or to vote in Common Hall, one
had to be a liveryman and a citizen of the City. Residency within the City walls did not
constitute citizenship. Rather, one had to join one of the 89 livery companies to be eligible to
apply for citizenship.29 Once the period of apprenticeship, which usually lasted seven years, had
expired, one could apply for freedom and become a freeman of the City.30 The most prominent
and wealthy members of the livery companies were known as liverymen.31 According to Pearl,
the liverymen of London numbered around four thousand by the mid-seventeenth century,
making Common Hall the largest governmental body in the City.32 By the early 1680s, the
number of liverymen in London had doubled with approximately eight thousand liverymen
residing within the City.33
Legally, only the Lord Mayor had the power to call or dissolve the Common Hall, much
in the same way the King had the power to call and dissolve Parliament. Once the vote began, it
was up to the Common Sergeant to direct those who were not liverymen to depart; however this
was not always enforced, and unless a poll was disputed and purposefully examined by the Lord
Mayor, Sheriffs, or the Aldermen, there was not a system in place to prevent non-liverymen from
voting in Common Halls.34
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The power of Common Hall did not match its size. Traditionally, the Common Hall
played a ceremonial role in the election of the Lord Mayor, and both the recommendations to the
Court of Aldermen and the affirmation of the Aldermen’s choice were only formalities. Whereas
the election of the Lord Mayor by the Common Hall was only indirect, the Hall did serve as an
electoral body for one of the two Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, the “Master Chamberlain,
Master Common Sergeant, Master Town Clerk, and the Councillors of the City, and other
Officers.”35 For these municipal positions, the Hall voted by voice and hand. Along with these
offices, the Common Hall was also responsible for electing four Parliamentary representatives
from the City.
The Common Hall’s role within the government was a matter for dispute throughout the
seventeenth century. Increasingly, the citizens of London were asserting their rights to elect
positions, such as the Lord Mayor or Sheriffs, which in previous decades and centuries, they had
only formally confirmed. During the 1640s, the Hall sought further powers when “there were
attempts to give the assembly . . . the right to consent to the raising of City loans.”36 Parliament
found an ally against the Crown in Common Hall. During the Civil War of the 1640s, Common
Hall was consulted by the Lord Mayor on its opinion as to whether or not to grant loans to
Parliament.37 Despite the continued efforts of the Common Hall to gain more legitimate
governing power in the early seventeenth century, it was not necessarily successful. However,
Common Hall’s true strength was in its numbers and its members’ ability to sway public opinion
within the City.
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e. Sheriffs of London and Middlesex
Along with the Lord Mayor, the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex served as executive
officers within the City. The Sheriffs were elected every year on June 24 (Midsummer’s Day)
and sworn in on September 28. The property requirement for Sheriff was the same as that of the
Lord Mayor and Aldermen: £10,000. Traditionally, the new sheriffs were chosen from a pool of
Aldermen who had not yet served as Lord Mayor but it was not unusual for a citizen who was in
line to become an Alderman to be considered. Custom dictated that the Lord Mayor could
choose one of the two Sheriffs, and the second was nominated and elected by Common Hall.
While this had been in practice since the fourteenth century, by the mid-seventeenth century, the
liverymen of the City were calling this practice into question. The traditional method for the
Lord Mayor to nominate one of the sheriffs was to drink to his choice during a public feast
before the election. This candidate would then be confirmed in Common Hall on election day.
The sheriff-elect nominated by the Lord Mayor often formally accepted the office by
signing bonds or chose to reject the position due to the heavy expense of the office by paying a
fine before the actual day of election. By the 1630s, the cost of the shrievalty was estimated to
be nearly £3,000, a substantial sum even for a wealthy merchant. A great deal of this expense
came from Aldermanic feasts hosted by the sheriffs during the meetings of the Assizes and
Quarter Sessions. Unlike the mayoral and Aldermanic offices, the shrieval position did not offer
as many opportunities to recover the expenses incurred during the sheriff’s tenure. In return for
the high cost of the office, the shrieval benefits included the right to choose the members that
served in their household—the Sergeants-at-Mace and the Yeoman. However, these appointees
were subject to the confirmation of the Court of Aldermen. Originally, the sheriffs also claimed
the prerogative to appoint the municipal offices of the Keepers of the Compters and the Under-
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Sheriff; however, by the mid-seventeenth century, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen appropriated
this right of appointment for themselves.38
Once in office, the Sheriff had several duties. While only the Lord Mayor could call or
dismiss Common Hall, the Sheriffs were responsible for administering the elections of Lord
Mayor, the Sheriffs for the year ensuing, and the minor offices. The Sheriffs also served a
judicial function as they were judges in the Sheriff’s Court and in the Court of the Hustings,
where they were also responsible for carrying out the rulings of the Lord Mayor.39 Although
they served within the City and were chosen by either the Lord Mayor or the Common Hall, the
Sheriffs were “the king’s officers to execute and resume legal process and . . . are not city of
corporation officers.”40 As representatives of the Crown, the Sheriffs served the King’s writs,
collected fines, helped to maintain the City’s peace, carried out the Courts’ sentences, and
supervised London’s prisons. They ensured that men also appeared in court when summoned.
The Sheriffs also had the special privilege of presenting petitions in the House of Commons from
the Court of Aldermen and the Common Council.41
Most importantly, and perhaps most controversially, the Sheriffs were responsible for
empanelling all grand and petty juries in London. For this reason, the shrievalty was a very
strategic and coveted political position especially during times of faction and strife within the
City. During the late Restoration, jurors were chosen based on their political affiliation.
Through controlling the juries, the Sheriffs could guarantee that the outcome of cases that were
tried in the Quarter Sessions of London and Middlesex would be satisfactory to the respective
38
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faction the Sheriff represented. Throughout the late 1670s, the Whigs utilized the shrievalty in
this manner, prompting the Crown to assert its authority not only over the shrievalty, but also
over the City and its government. As long as the Whig faction was able to control the juries,
they, along with dissenters, escaped prosecution. This safety net ended however with the
controversial shrieval election of 1682.
f. Other municipal officers
Along with the major executive municipal offices, there were other municipal officers
who assisted the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Common Council, and Sheriffs in the day-to-day
administration of the City. These positions included the Recorder and the City Chamberlain. The
Recorder served as “a learned assistant to the mayor, and a sort of prosecutor to the
Corporation.”42 More than a “sort of prosecutor,” the Recorder was the principal legal expert of
London. Therefore, he served as an advisor to the Lord Mayor in matters of the law. Chosen for
life by the Court of Aldermen, the Recorder was not necessarily someone who had ever served in
a legal position within the municipality. The only legal stipulation on the position was that he
was to be selected from the “‘old and learned officers’ of the City.”43 Aside from serving as an
advisor to the Lord Mayor, the Recorder also acted as an envoy of the City in negotiations with
the Crown and Privy Council. The City Chamberlain was in charge of managing the
municipality’s finances. Elected each year at Common Hall, The City Chamberlain was a
position for life, and each year’s election served as a confirmation. The Chamberlain collected
and distributed the City’s revenues, which was generated by municipal properties and charities.44
As of January 1681, the Whig faction maintained tight control over all major City
positions. Over the course of the next two years, the Tories usurped power from the Whigs, and
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for a brief period the Crown and the City operated in concert persecuting dissenting opinions
within the City. This was a feat which had never been fully achievable in the seventeenth
century, as the relationship between the City and the Crown had always been precarious.
Part II: Context for the 1682 London Shrieval Election
a. Introduction
The London shrieval election of 1682 did not occur in a vacuum. It was not the first
attempt by Charles II to gain control of the City, but it was his most successful. In the two
previous elections of 1680 and 1681, Charles attempted and failed to embed Tories into the
shrievalty.45 As a result, Charles’s efforts to try and execute prominent opponents, such as the
Earl of Shaftesbury, were quashed and he was forced to resort to even more drastic measures,
which included implementing a writ of quo warranto against the City and his more aggressive
strategy of assuring that loyalists would be successful in winning the shrieval seats of London
and Middlesex in 1682. While the third and fourth chapters will explore the consequences of
Charles’s success, this section will focus on placing the election in context and explaining why it
was such a significant event in Charles’s reign. After understanding the context of the election,
the next chapter will discuss why the shrieval election presented such an important opportunity
for merchant Dudley North to enter the national political arena.
b. The City and the Crown—a tenuous relationship
There has been much discussion about the relationship between the City and the Crown
during the mid-to-late seventeenth century.46 Throughout the seventeenth century, the Company
merchants dominated the City, and they received their monopolies from the King. The
relationship between the City merchants and the Crown was usually contingent upon both parties
45
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feeling as if their interests were protected.47 Yet, traditional Whig scholarship has argued that
the City had allied itself with Parliament immediately in the early 1640s, and had remained loyal
throughout the Revolution and Civil Wars. However, the works of Valerie Pearl, Robert Ashton
and Robert Brenner have dispelled this myth. Pearl argued that the City governors who
supported Parliament in 1641 were actually a radical minority, and that the vast majority of the
City government supported Charles because they felt it was in their economic interest (and the
interest of their monopolies) to do so.48 Ashton argued that the true break in the relationship in
the 1640s was the result of Charles’s bungling of his relationship with those in the City
government. While Brenner seemed to take a little of each of Pearl and Ashton’s arguments, he
claimed that the break between the Crown and the City was caused by Charles’s early dismissal
of the radical colonial interlopers, who would later fashion themselves into the new merchant
leadership. Despite the decades of close relationships between the Crown and the City, during
the Civil Wars, this connection was broken.
The schism between the Crown and the City in the 1640s did not automatically repair
itself with the Restoration in 1660. The City was actively involved in restoring Charles to the
throne due to its fear that the kingdom and the City would fall back into the chaos of the 1640s.49
As Charles tried to resolve and settle the issues of the kingdom, he ran into opposition in the City
due to issues pertaining to religion and the Crown’s anti-Dutch policies which had carried over
from the Interregnum. The First Anglo-Dutch War, lasting from 1652-1654 during the
Interregnum, did not solve the trade rivalry between the two countries, and Charles soon found
himself at war again with the Dutch. Prominent merchants in the City, such as Thomas Papillon,
John Dubois, and Aldermen Patience Ward, felt that Charles should make peace with the Dutch
47
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and focus his energies against the Catholic French. Many merchants also felt that the French
trade represented more of threat than the Dutch as they were not only anti-Catholic, but
supremely concerned about the safety of Protestantism, both in England and abroad.50 The
opposition in the City grew as Charles continued his war with the Dutch against the wishes of
not only prominent anti-French and anti-Catholic merchants, but also major trading companies,
such as the East India Company and the Levant Company who felt the wars disrupted their trade.
By the mid-to-late 1670s, it was becoming increasingly clear that Charles’s likely successor, the
Duke of York, was Catholic, and the City, along with many in the nation, opposed the idea of
living under a Catholic monarch.
c. The Exclusion Crisis
From 1679 to 1681, the Exclusion Crisis dominated the political sphere. Prominent
Whigs sought to pass a bill in three successive parliaments that would prevent the succession of
Charles’s Catholic brother, the Duke of York, to the throne.51 Tim Harris made it clear,
however, that the Whig faction never fully reached a consensus, even on an issue such as
Exclusion, and both Jonathan Scott’s and Mark Knights’ scholarship challenged the notion that
the Whigs were a solid political party under the leadership of the Earl of Shaftesbury or that
Exclusion was the central issue. They maintained that the Whig faction was fractured into
individual camps with different leaders with diverse solutions to a singular problem, the potential
of a Catholic monarch. In one group were the staunchest supporters of Exclusion, Shaftesbury,
and his counter-part in the Commons, William Lord Russell. While these men supported
Exclusion, they also sought constitutional reforms, whereas Algernon Sidney and the Earl of
Essex were far more radical in their pursuit of a republic. Finally, the Duke of Monmouth also
50
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garnered support from those who sought to place him, the King’s illegitimate son, in the line of
succession.52 De Krey, however, has shown that despite the lack of consensus or leadership,
members of the opposition faction were united in their efforts to prevent a Catholic from
acceding to the throne.53 According to De Krey, whether the men considered to be leaders of the
opposition faction agreed on the solution, partisan divisions were the result not only of the
Exclusion Crisis, but of the City crises that dominated the early 1680s.54 In the name of
Exclusion and later issues pertaining to the City, the Whigs launched a massive propaganda and
press campaign that only furthered their cause.
By 1681, Charles felt that he could not call a third parliament in London due to its
Whiggish leanings. In an attempt to gain control of the situation, he called for a parliament at
Oxford, which was known for its royalist predisposition. In spite of the change of scenery, the
Oxford Parliament lasted only eight days before Charles dismissed it. Due to financial assistance
from the French and an increase in taxes, Charles did not need to call on Parliament again
throughout the rest of his reign. Because Exclusion was a parliamentary issue, it died with the
Oxford Parliament; however, the fight between the Whig faction and the Court faction was far
from resolved.
d. The Fights Becomes Local: Whig Sheriffs and the Ignoramus Juries
Without a parliament, the battle turned to the municipalities, especially the City of
London. The shrieval election of 1682 was not the first attempt by Charles to control the City.
In fact, he had tried unsuccessfully during the Exclusion Crisis, in 1680 and 1681, to place
loyalist supporters in the shrievalty. His efforts were mostly unsuccessful due to the fact that the
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Lord Mayors in 1680 and 1681—Robert Clayton and Sir Patience Ward, respectively—were
ardent, if not radical, Whigs. Like the election that would follow in 1682, the election of 1680
also stretched out far longer than was custom. Slingsby Bethel and Henry Cornish, the sheriffs
chosen on June 24, 1680, did not qualify to hold office as they were well-known nonconformists.
The Court of Aldermen insisted that a new election be held and the new Common Hall took
place on June 14. Both Bethel and Cornish, having taken the sacrament, were once again chosen
over the Court preferences. Rather than loyalist sheriffs in 1680, Charles was forced to concede
that Cornish and Bethel would be sheriffs for the coming year. 55 He did not fully accept them,
however, and in October, when Clayton brought them to Charles to be knighted, as was custom,
he refused to see them.56 As De Krey noted, it appeared that Secretary of State Leoline Jenkins
and the Court decided rather than risk further damage Charles’s national image by intervening in
the 1680 election, they would concede and “learn the arts of political maneuvre from ‘the party’
they opposed.”57 If Charles was unsatisfied with the election results of the 1680 shrieval
election, he was just as displeased in 1681 when Thomas Pilkington and Samuel Shute won the
shrievalty. Once again he was faced with the prospect of two Whig sheriffs who would be
certain to pack the juries with persons sympathetic to the Whigs and their politics.
With Whigs Pilkington and Shute as the sheriffs of London and Middlesex, Charles was
unable to secure convictions in London against, most famously, the Earl of Shaftesbury and
Stephen College. College, a supporter of Exclusion, was charged with plotting against Charles
and for provoking seditious actions with his words and publications during the Oxford
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Parliament.58 According to Lord Ford Grey of Warke, he, Shaftesbury, and William Lord
Russell deliberated about the possibility of insurrection with Monmouth if Charles attacked those
who supported exclusion in Oxford. Grey stated that the plan was for Shaftesbury to remain in
London where he could be counted upon to assemble supporters from the City if Charles decided
to adjourn Parliament. The Whig MPs were further instructed that in the event that Parliament
was dissolved, they were to return to London and reconvene at Guildhall.59 Charles, however,
was cautious and decided to station a large contingent of royal guards in London during his
absence, and Shaftesbury therefore abandoned the plot.
Despite the evidence against him provided in the testimonies given by William Jennings,
Stephen Dugdale, John Smith, and others, the grand jury, which had been packed with
sympathetic jurors by Cornish and Bethel, issued a verdict of ignoramus, or “we do not know.”60
According to De Krey, a jury “more sympathetic to the London joiner could scarcely have been
imagined.” 61 The jury contained no less than twelve nonconformists, and eleven lived near
Shaftesbury in Aldersgate Without. While De Krey viewed the London hearing for College as a
“trial run” for the Shaftesbury indictment and verdict, College did not get off quite as easily as
Shaftesbury would in his trial. After the ignoramus verdict was issued, the Court pursued another
indictment against College and this time the trial would be in the loyalist holdout of Oxford, as
they argued that the crime had been committed there. This time, College was convicted and
sentenced to execution which was carried out on August 31, 1681.62
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Shaftesbury’s trial for high treason commenced shortly after in November. Just as they
had done in College’s trial, Pilkington and Shute handpicked the jury of twenty-one. Former
Exclusionist MPs Papillon and Dubois were both chosen to serve as jurors, along with many
other wealthy merchants and nonconformists. Once again, a verdict of ignoramus was issued,
and Shaftesbury was set free.63 Charles’s London courts had proved ineffective against what he
viewed as his most pubic and paramount enemies.
Shortly after the ignoramus verdict against Shaftesbury, which would be the last of 1681,
Charles issued a writ of quo warranto against the City of London, forcing them to prove by what
warrant, or right, that they existed or to give up their charter to the Crown. Charles contended
that London had given up its right to exist when they committed crimes against the monarchy,
particularly collecting illegal taxes and “sending a petition to the King charging he had been
wrong to dismiss Parliament.”64 London was not the first or the last city to be issued a writ of
quo warranto, but it was a symbol to the City that Charles had every intention of regaining
control of his capital city.
The quo warranto issued against the Corporation of London initiated a new string of
propaganda in the City that was prevalent throughout the shrieval election of 1682.65 The issue
of quo warranto and the controversy of the 1682 shrievalty were connected. One propagandist
argued that despite the argument that “so long as the City chuses the Sheriffs, and they assign
Juries, the King’s most excellent Majesty . . . must despair of Justice,” that the dissolution of the
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royal charter “will be succeeded with such a train of Mischiefs and Calamities . . . one might
write a large Volume of the evil Effects and Consequences which would probably ensue.”66
At the same time citizens within the City were arguing for their right to elect both sheriffs
rather than simply confirming the Lord Mayor’s choice, they were also fighting to maintain the
very royal charter which they claimed gave them such a right. The loss of the charter meant that
the City would “lose the benefit of chusing out Sheriffs, our Lives, Liberties, Estates.”67 While
some pamphlets such as Reflections on the city-charter sought to strike fear into the citizens
about what could happen if the charter was revoked, other tracts took a historical approach of
laying out the privileges granted to the City by various monarchs, and once again, the issue of
the quo warranto was woven into the struggle for the shrievalty. According to one pamphlet, the
second charter granted under King John granted the citizens of London the right to “make
Sheriffs whom they will” and made no further reference as to the role of the Lord Mayor’s
prerogative to choose a sheriff.68 Along with pleadings to the King to preserve the charter, other
pamphleteers also beseeched Charles to also allow the citizens to “Nominate and Chuse out of
themselves two persons to be Sheriffs of the City aforesaid, and County of said City . . . and to
make and constitute those persons so Nominated and Elected.”69
According to Harris, Charles’s launch of quo warranto proceedings against the City was
the beginning of his new tactics of “policy and police.”70 The proceedings challenging the
charter of the Corporation of London handled the policy aspect of Charles’s new plan, whereas
the policing would be taken care of by the shrieval election of 1682 as long as loyalists were
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embedded into the shrievalty. However, the proceedings also opened a debate about
sovereignty. According to historian Paul Halliday, the quo warranto proceedings issued against
London and the other municipalities of England were truly a “legal contest to determine where
sovereignty lay in the growing national state: as a singular power located in the monarchy or a
power divided between national and local jurisdictions.”71 Although the writ had been issued in
December of 1681, the proceedings did not conclude until 1683, and in the meantime, Charles
focused on gaining control of key governmental positions within the City, primarily the Lord
Mayor and the Sheriffs. In doing so, he would be able to police the Whig and dissenter
opposition.
e. The Tory Lord Mayor
Charles was fortunate that Sir John Moore was the next aldermen in line to become Lord
Mayor. Moore was a former nonconformist, and it was believed at the time that he had only
conformed to the Church in an effort to hold office in the City. However, he was “still looked on
as one that in his heart favoured the sectaries.”72 He was able to defeat the Whig candidates, Sir
John Shorter and Sir Thomas Gold due to two factors: the significant number of dissenter votes
he was able to collect, and the fact that the Whig faction had such a difficult time rallying around
one candidate, rather than two, which resulted in a split voting base.73 The fact that a poll even
occurred for Lord Mayor seemed to confirm that the Whig faction was concerned about the
possibility that he may be a Court puppet. Even Papillon admitted that “it was a strange thing to
poll for a Lord Mayor—a thing never heard of, and that if it was not against his Lordship it
would not have been put up so.”74
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Yet Moore did not garner the full support of the Whigs despite his nonconformist past
because he was believed to be “a flexible and faint-hearted man” whereas the Court saw him as
one they “could easily manage.”75 Charles was extremely pleased with the choice of Lord
Mayor, and Secretary Jenkins stated in a letter to the Earl of Conway, “it is infinitely to the
satisfaction of all good men that Sir John Moore is Lord Mayor.”76 Roger North later argued that
the Whigs were not “very averse” to him as “his office did not affect the Return of Juries, what
was their Palladium; therefore they did not unite as one to exclude him.”77
They certainly did not expect him to exercise his prerogative to appoint one of the
sheriffs or that his choice would ever be confirmed. This privilege to appoint one sheriff was
enjoyed by the Lord Mayor each year from 1347 until 1638. For the next three years, the Lord
Mayor did not make use of his right. In 1641, the Lord Mayor attempted to appoint one sheriff
but was prevented by the House of Commons, which claimed that the Common Hall should elect
both sheriffs. 78 The House of Commons sided with the liverymen of the City because its
members argued that the Lord Mayor had been negligent. From 1642 to 1674, the prerogative
was exercised sporadically. Although during the Commonwealth the City underwent a measure
of constitutional reform, the prerogative of the Lord Mayor to nominate a sheriff was not
undermined.79 For periods of time, such as 1642 to 1651, the Lord Mayor each year nominated a
candidate for sheriff, whereas no Lord Mayor utilized the privilege from 1652 to 1661.
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Nonetheless, later Lord Mayors would claim their right to nominate one of the sheriffs each year,
and did so without challenge until 1674.80
It is clear therefore that the privilege of the Lord Mayor to nominate one of the sheriffs
was not an unchallenged prerogative even before the 1680s. In fact when the Lord Mayor’s right
was challenged in 1674, the Court of Common Council issued a statement that it had decided to
examine the matter in order “to finde out some expedient for ye reconciling ye same.”81
However, no record of a final settlement can be determined from the court records. The right to
nominate one of the sheriffs had been utilized by the Whig Lord Mayor Sir Patience Ward in
1681, when he drank to Thomas Pilkington as his choice for sheriff at the bridge-house feast. As
De Krey pointed out, this was peculiar behavior from a Whig Lord Mayor but he suggested that
perhaps this “had…been a party ruse intended to draw…loyalist supporters of magisterial
privilege.”82 Whatever the reasoning behind Ward’s nomination, it confirmed a precedent that
the Tory Lord Mayor John Moore could follow by nominating his own, or rather the king’s,
choice for sheriff.
The ignoramus juries were never far from the minds of either the Court or Whig faction
in the spring of 1682 as they led Charles to seek Tory sheriffs. In April, after it was rumored that
Moore would drink to North, Papillon visited Moore at home to try and persuade him to “drink
to such a person as would fine, and then the City would be left to their free choice.”83 On the
surface, Papillon argued that he was concerned that if Moore were to choose a sheriff that the
Common Hall would not confirm that the City would lose their charter.84 However, Papillon
was just as concerned about the possibility of a Tory sheriff returning a Tory jury. When Moore
80
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challenged Papillon by asking, “what great matter can there be as to one Sheriff,” Papillon
replied that “His Lordship did know there was a great matter in it, the Sheriffs being to return the
Juries; and it was great moment to have good and indifferent Juries.”85 After the “riotous”
conditions surrounding the original election for the sheriffs of London and Middlesex on June
24, Secretary Jenkins noted that the Whigs desired
to divest the Lord Mayor of his prerogative—to set up two Ignoramus jurymen for
sheriffs.—To keep up the same spirit of sedition in the City, that has laboured all this
while not only to render the government uneasy to his Majesty, but to overturn the
monarchy86
This concern was ever present throughout the election process that lasted months. The
day after the new election called on July 14, Moore and several Aldermen met with the king-incouncil to discuss the events that had transpired during the election. It was reported that while
the election was talked about for a great length of time, the conversation also turned the
ignoramus juries. One Alderman even stated, “come brothers, this will never do the Earl of S-------------‘s business; and that of the man that was shot long since at the head of his company, may
put you in mind of your Ignoramus men.”87
Moore’s election on Michaelmas of 1681 was part of the initial process through which
Charles sought to gain control of the City, as well as to end the ignoramus verdict against
dissenters and those who enjoyed Whiggish sympathies. After Moore was inaugurated as Lord
Mayor, the Crown implemented another phase of the plan by insisting that Moore use his
prerogative to nominate one of the two candidates for sheriff for the upcoming election.
Whether Moore was “flexible and faint-hearted” or “easily managed,” the Court, or Tory, faction
was able to convince him to exercise his right and assured him that they would support him.
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Moore not only nominated a fellow Tory, Dudley North, as Sheriff of London, he also finagled
the election so that another Tory was “elected” as North’s co-sheriff. With two Tory sheriffs
sworn in September, Charles was guaranteed that he would have juries biased in his favor, and
therefore, he would not have to worry about any more ignoramus juries. The situation looked so
dire for Shaftesbury that after it was assured that the Tories North and Box would be sheriffs of
London and Middlesex that he fled, with fellow Whigs, to Holland in exile. He would die shortly
after due to natural causes.88
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CHAPTER II
THE LONDON SHRIEVAL ELECTION OF 1682

The story of the London shrieval election of 1682 is well-known, but to understand fully
the implications and repercussions of the election, it is important to revisit the events.1 Due to
the controversial and tumultuous nature of the shrieval election, numerous sources exist from the
period. The vast majority of these sources are partisan, but historians, such as Gary S. De Krey
and A.G. Smith tend to rely on these sources. The newspapers and treatises, however partisan,
followed the events surrounding the election closely. From June to September, the newspapers,
both Tory and Whig, reported daily on the events. Although there is a degree of agreement
between the Tory and Whig newspapers about what was taking place at Guildhall, these sources
had a clear bias. The Tory newspapers had a vested interest in portraying the Whig City officials
and liverymen as unruly, riotous, and unlawful in their actions throughout the election.
Furthermore, these newspapers spent more time arguing that it was the Tory Lord Mayor Sir
John Moore’s prerogative to choose one of the two sheriffs was legitimate. On the other hand,
Whig newspapers were most interested in portraying Lord Mayor Moore as infringing upon the
“ancient” rights of London’s citizens. The Whig newspapers did not try to justify any actions or
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reactions by Whigs present at Guildhall throughout the four-month election period. In fact, they
implied that the actions of both the current Sheriffs and the Sheriffs-elect Thomas Papillon and
John Dubois were natural responses to the positions they were put in by Lord Mayor Moore’s
refusal to concede his prerogative. Partisan newsbooks, memoirs, and historical accounts of the
election also followed the same pattern as the newspapers and treatises and recount the same
events.2 With a careful eye toward bias and over-exaggeration of the events by the writers, it is
nonetheless possible to piece together what happened during those crucial months of June to
September in 1682, especially when paired with the City’s own records.
City records do exist and while they may appear to be more reliable sources than the
partisan newspapers, treatises, newsbooks, or memoirs, these records present their own
problems. The most extensive and important records from the City are the Repertories of the
Aldermanic Bench and the Journals of the Court of Common Councils. The Repertories are
much more extensive than the Journals of the Court of Common Councils, including almost 300
folios per year. Despite their numbers, the Repertories in many cases are just as brief as the
Journals. The Aldermen were not required to record any of their debates nor the reasons for their
decisions. In many cases, therefore, the Repertories only include the final decision on a matter.
The Journals, while helpful, are also brief and also include discussion on the day-to-day
administrations of the City’s charities or issues pertaining to the orphans. As the London
shrieval election of 1682 was a fairly significant event, decisions of the Aldermen and Common
Council regarding the election appear in the records although they are brief. Coupled with the
sources mentioned above, it is possible to discern the process by which Tories Dudley North and
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Peter Rich were able to best Whigs Thomas Papillon and John Dubois in the London shrieval
election of 1682.
a. Moore’s Choice of Sheriff
On May 20, 1682, Tory Lord Mayor John Moore nominated Dudley North as his choice
for sheriff of London by drinking to him at the bridge-house feast.3 In the early seventeenth
century, feasting occurred as religious activity and was usually accompanied by a sermon, but by
the 1650s feasting in London took on a distinctly political connotation. Factional leaders, such
as Shaftesbury or the Duke of Monmouth, often hosted elaborate feasts in order to demonstrate
their power to recruit supporters among apprentices and the liverymen. In the 1680s alone, fiftynine feasts, Tory and Whig, were hosted.4 The bridge-house feast was held every year by the
Lord Mayor a few days before the Midsummer elections on June 24. If the Lord Mayor
exercised his right to choose one of the two Sheriffs, he customarily did so at this feast.5 The
candidate did not have to be present, and Dudley North did not attend the bridge-house feast in
1682. Custom dictated that the cup was then to be sent in the Lord Mayor’s coach, along with
City officials, to the house of the potential candidate. If the nomination was accepted, the
sheriff-elect was then to appear before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen to sign his bond.6 As
stated earlier, it was not uncommon for the newly chosen sheriff to complete this process before
the June 24 election.
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Officially one sheriff was chosen by the Lord Mayor, and Dudley North was Charles II’s
preferred candidate. Seeking to regain control of the City and to preclude any further ignoramus
juries, Charles considered North an ideal candidate. Charles hoped that North “could be
prevailed with to stand.”7 While North was the Crown’s candidate, Thomas Papillon and John
Dubois were believed to be the favorites of the City Whigs, including leaders such as
Shaftesbury, William Lord Russell, and the liverymen with Whig sympathies. If Charles’s
ultimate goal was to control the city, Papillon and Dubois were his last choice for sheriffs of
London and Middlesex. These two men were quite radical in their politics. Both men were
former Exclusionist MPs, supported the petition for a 1681 Parliament, and had served on the
ignoramus jury that had acquitted Shaftesbury.8 If Papillon and Dubois were to stand as sheriffs
of London and Middlesex, Charles would be faced with another year of a radical Whig agenda in
the City, and his success at gaining a Tory Lord Mayor in Moore would be less of a victory.
But, there was strong precedent for the Lord Mayor’s right to choose one of the sheriffs, and
Charles expected the City to abide by this tradition.
Months before Moore drank to North, rumors circulated that the Lord Mayor planned to
pick fellow Tory North as sheriff. Papillon, an active and radical Whig, was nervous about
Moore’s choice of North and visited Moore in April to discuss the matter. Papillon hoped to
convince Moore to select a person who would be willing to fine out and then the citizens of
London could elect his replacement. The Lord Mayor could save face, and the liverymen would
be allowed to elect both sheriffs. Papillon’s meeting with Moore did not go as he hoped, and it
was clear when he left that the Lord Mayor would be pursuing his own course.9 After Moore
drank to North in mid-May and North subsequently signed his bond, the City began official
7
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preparations for the Midsummer’s Day election.10 Moore issued his official precept to the livery
companies, but it was worded to stress the confirmation of his choice rather simply announcing
the election:
By the mayor.
These are to require you, that on Midsummer-day next, being the day appointed as well
for confirmation of the person who hath been by me chosen, according to the ancient
custom and constitution of this city, to be one of the sheriffs of this city and county of
Middlesex for the year ensuing, as for the election of the other of the said sheriffs, and
other officers, you cause the livery of your company to meet together at your common
hall early in the morning, and from thence to come together decently and orderly in their
gowns to Guildhall, there to make the said confirmation and election. Given the 19th of
June, 1682. JOHN MOOR.11
Even more unorthodox, Moore instructed each company to present him with a list of their
liverymen.12 Moore expected that the Whigs would try to fill the Hall with illegal voters in their
attempt to ensure that North was not confirmed. By requesting the list of liverymen, he was
hoping to stave off any such illegal activity.13 By June 23, the night before the election, the City
was abuzz with activity and the Whigs had already begun to dispute Moore’s right to choose one
of the two sheriffs. The Whigs argued that “half their Choyce is cut off, and the Freemen are
only to Confirm whom the Lord Mayor his pleased to Chuse so that ‘tis no free Election but a
Implicit Confirmation of My Lord Mryors Choyce if the Electors please so easily to give up and
part with their Liberties and Freedoms (sic).”14
The Whig faction made it clear from the beginning that no candidate of the Lord
Mayor’s, especially not a Tory, would simply be confirmed without an objection. While the Lord
Mayor’s prerogative was almost always challenged during times of factionalism, it was common
10
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for Lord Mayors to choose a sheriff each year throughout the Restoration. The Whig presses
rolled out several pamphlets and treatises that made legal arguments for their rights to elect their
own sheriffs based on the 1641 challenge to the Lord Mayor’s authority.15 These pamphlets
explicitly stated that the right to elect the sheriffs remained with the Common Hall as was the
ancient custom of the City. Despite their attempts to challenge Moore before the election, there
was not a sitting Parliament with which to turn to, as had been the case in 1641. Therefore, it
was clear that the Whigs would have to appear in large numbers at Guildhall on election day in
order to exercise the right to elect the sheriffs. For this reason, at crucial junctures throughout
the electoral process that lasted several months, key figures of the Court faction, such as
Secretary of State Sir Leoline Jenkins, the Attorney General Richard Sawyer, and Lord-Keeper
of the Great Seal Francis North among others, would be present at Guildhall during the polling in
order to support Moore.16 In the same vein, Whig leaders Robert Clayton, Sir Patience Ward,
Shaftesbury, and William Lord Russell were known to be rallying the members of their own
faction in a concerted effort to be prepared to refuse a confirmation of North.17
Despite the turmoil in the City over the upcoming shrieval election, Charles did not doubt
that North would stand as Sheriff of London. In order to show his satisfaction just days before
the election, Charles “signifying his . . . pleasure” at Moore’s resilience invited the Lord Mayor
along with his own choice of aldermen to “attend him that evening at 7 . . . [and] to come as
privately as he pleases.”18 Regardless of Charles’s confidence in Moore and North, the outcome
of the election was far from decided previous to June 24. In fact, for months, it was unclear
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exactly who would preside as Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, North and his Tory counterpart
(Box, then Rich) or Papillon and Dubois.
b. The Midsummer’s Day Election
By Midsummer’s Day, the Whiggish citizens of London were in a frenzy to prevent the
confirmation of the Lord Mayor’s choice and the election of the other Tory candidate as it was
clear that Charles was trying to control the shrievalty. By 1682, Common Hall was composed of
around 8,000 liverymen from 89 livery companies. According to A.G. Smith, the Whiggish
faction had a clear majority of liverymen in the City and within the electoral body of Common
Hall, 62 to 65 percent of the liverymen were loyal to the opposition faction. Smith argues that
while the Tory liverymen often complained that the Whiggish faction swelled Common Hall
with men who were loyal to them by placing them in the smaller guilds, that the percentages of
Whigs and Tories within the Twelve Great Companies were the same as Whigs to Tories in
Common Hall as a whole.19
Fearing that a riot would occur during the election proceedings, Moore called in the
trained bands, or London’s militia, to remain in Guildhall throughout the day. Three thousand
liverymen, majority Whigs, attended Common Hall, and according to reports were shouting “A
Hall, A Hall” along with imploring “no confirmation of Mr. North.”20 Many of the liverymen
were incensed upon seeing the militia.21 The Recorder Sir George Treby opened with a speech
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reproaching the liverymen and calling on them to “cease all Fewdes or making of Partys.”22
Following his speech, the Common Cryer announced that North was put up for confirmation, and
Papillon, Dubois, and Box for election. Moore, along with his aldermen, withdrew to their
chambers.23 He later asserted that “he was nearly ‘trampled under’ after being assaulted in a
scuffle, and his dislodged hat was ‘kickt up & down ye hall’ by electors who ridiculed him as a
‘Rogue Papist Torie.’”24
The acting sheriffs, Thomas Pilkington and Samuel Shute, proceeded to conduct the
election by voices and hands.25 According to those members of the Whig faction present,
Papillon and Dubois had the majority of votes. However, the Tory faction demanded a proper
poll to determine the election. The poll was reported to have lasted for over 6 hours. At this
point, Moored informed the crowd that anyone who had the right to vote and had not done so,
should cast their ballot within half an hour as the books would be closed.26 The liverymen,
however, continued to cast their ballots for well over an hour.
Throughout the poll, Moore and the aldermen received multiple complaints of
irregularities and that any Tories who tried to confirm North were being turned away.27
Furthermore, others who were not even present were sending their names through their fellow
liverymen to cast a vote for Papillon and Dubois. After hearing such grievances, Moore ordered
the sheriffs to close the books and bring them in for examination. After a discussion with the
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aldermen, Moore went to the hustings and “ordered [the Town-Clerk] to dismiss the Court and
desire their appearance on Tuesday morning at 9 a clock.”28 Moore left the Hall and the Whig
faction erupted, shouting once again, “A Hall, A Hall” and hissing at the Lord Mayor.29
Rather than disputing the results of the poll, the Whig liverymen were challenging the
Lord Mayor’s right to close the poll books and adjourn the common hall instead of declaring the
election. They felt that was duty of the presiding Sheriffs Sir Thomas Pilkington and Samuel
Shute. After Moore left the hall, the liverymen proceeded to poll for another two hours while
Pilkington and Shute conferred with one another about the situation. The vast majority of the
liverymen left were Whigs, as many of the loyalists had gone home because they opposed the
poll.30 Finally, the presiding sheriffs went to the hustings to address the liverymen and stated the
following:
Gentlemen,
According to the desire of many here, we do, in His Majesty’s Name, by whose gift we
enjoy this Priviledge confirmed to us [and may do, if our Disobedience already has not
forfeited them] adjourn this Court; and do declare, that the adjournment of the Lord
Mayor is contrary to our Rights and Priviledges [that is to say, our wills and Desires] and
so we desire to meet on Tuesday accordingly.31
c. The Election Unresolved
Sunday June 25, the day following the election, the Lord Mayor met with King Charles to
discuss the events of the preceding day. Following this meeting, Charles summoned Sheriffs
Pilkington and Shute, along with Moore and the Court of Aldermen to a Privy Council meeting
at Whitehall on the 26th.32 At this meeting, Pilkington and Shute were informed that they would
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be held responsible for the “ryot and other disturbances that was committed at the time of the
election.”33 After the discussion, a warrant was issued for the sheriffs, ordering them to be sent
to the Tower immediately.34 The charge against Pilkington and Shute was that they “did not
hinder the Riot, nor seize those persons who insolence led them so high, as violently to assault
the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, when he adjourn’d the Court of Hustings.”35 They were
also found at fault for the fact that the poll did not stop after the adjournment. By July 1, both
men were on trial at the Court of King’s Bench and pled not guilty.36 They were given bail and
dismissed.37 It was reported that Pilkington and Shute had sent Moore a letter requesting that he
not continue with the election process until they had gained their “Liberty.”38
John Moore adjourned the poll and meeting at Guildhall until Wednesday, July 5, as
requested by the jailed sheriffs.39 By doing this, he hoped to appear fair, but this also provided
him time to stall before calling another Common Hall. When the Common Hall finally
commenced, the liverymen were informed by Recorder George Treby that Moore was “very sick
and gone to bed.”40 Moore then issued the order that the Common Hall meet again on the
following Friday. Instead of abiding by Moore’s orders, Sheriffs Pilkington and Shute asked the
liverymen if they preferred to adjourn or to continue with the polling.41 The majority of the
Common Hall refused to postpone the balloting, and requested that the poll books be opened so
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that voting could commence and allow “those that had a right and had not done it before.”42
Voting once again continued for six hours, and afterwards Pilkington and Shute reviewed the
poll books. They determined that Papillon and Dubois were the duly elected sheriffs for the year
ensuing. According to their calculations, the voting results were Papillon 2754, Dubois 2709,
Box 1609, and North 1557. 43 Pilkington and Shute then asked the hall whether or not they
would like the proceedings of the day recorded by the town clerk, and the hall answered “yes,
yes, Record it, Record it.”44
Moore and his supporters later argued that this poll was problematic and did not count
towards the election as the Hall had been dismissed. The issue caused Moore to meet with his
Court of Aldermen the following day in order to determine if the Hall had actually been
adjourned or not. According to the Whig faction, the Recorder did not have the authority to
adjourn the Hall in the name of the Lord Mayor. In the end, both sides debated for so long that
they had to bring in outside council to settle the matter. Sir George Jeffreys and Attorney
General Sir Robert Sawyer represented Moore and the aldermen, while Mr. Williams, the
Speaker for the House of Commons, and Henry Pollexfen spoke for Pilkington and Shute.45 The
attorneys continued to argue for such a length of time that the Lord Mayor, along with some
aldermen, ordered everyone to disperse for the evening and to return to Guildhall the next day.46
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The debate was to be continued. Counsel for both sides was to present their opinions on the
matter as well as discuss the issue of fraudulent polling.47
Once again, King Charles stepped in and demanded a meeting at Whitehall with Moore,
the Court of Aldermen, and the Sheriffs.48 Charles maintained that he had no intention of
making “entrenchments on their priviledges.” 49 Depsite his protestations, Charles insisted that
Moore provide information to him regarding the poll and surrounding events at Guildhall.50
Moore and his supporters argued that the Lord Mayor “were not in the least contrary to his
Priviledge.”51 Members of the Whig faction were also present along with Moore and his
supporters. Former Lord Mayor Sir Patience Ward and sheriffs Pilkington and Shute all gave a
report as to the proceedings of the shrieval election poll. While the members of the Whig faction
sought to justify their actions, Charles dismissed them from the meeting as he was not interested
in hearing their point of view about what had occurred in Guildhall. Concerned that Moore
might fold under the mounting pressure in the City, Charles instructed Moore that he should
“stand his right and maintain the Priviledges of the City.”52 After issuing this order to Moore,
Charles called the Whigs back in and told that as result of the chaos surrounding the election that
an Order of Council was made that stated that the proceedings were to begin “anew and carried
on in the usual manner, as they ought to have been upon the Twenty Fourth day of June last”53
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d. Election de novo
Therefore, in accordance with the new order, the Common Hall met again on July 14 at
Guildhall. Moore and the Court of Aldermen appeared on the hustings and read the Order in
Council. Once again, the liverymen erupted in objection to the orders read, shouting “Burn It,
Burn It. No Confirmation. No Confirmation.”54 Moore continued despite the noise and reiterated
his choice of electing Dudley North as sheriff. At this point, he retired to his chambers, and then
Sheriff Shute came out and told the Court that they should poll for all four candidates until four
in the afternoon. In preparation the sheriffs opened the poll books with five columns. The first
column was labeled “Confirmation” and the other four were reserved for “Election.” However,
in large letters “NO CONFIRMATION” was written over the top. The Whiggish liverymen
were refusing to even allow a vote on confirmation. Upon seeing this, the Lord Mayor
determined that once again poll proceedings would be irregular.55
As the sheriffs prepared to open the poll, Moore, on horseback, entered Guildhall and
dismissed the Court again until the next day.56 Once again, the sheriffs and Whiggish liverymen
ignored the order to disperse and began to poll instead, and the sheriffs insisted that they had
been commanded by “His Majesty to decide this business.”57 Aside from the continuation of the
poll despite adjournment, other irregularities occurred. According to one witness, one liveryman
said to another, “Come Brother, poll at the Sheriff’s Book; and let us go and drink and then come
and poll again; for I have done it 4 times my self.”58 The final figures for the poll were Dubois
1487, Papillon 1481, and “against Confirmation 1000 and odd.”59 After the books were closed,
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Moore and the aldermen examined the books and then announced on the hustings that Dudley
North and Ralph Box were elected as sheriffs for London and Middlesex for the year ensuing.
As the Whigs had “boycotted” the official poll and created their own, Moore was able to
determine that Box had won through election. However, after Moore made his announcement
and departed with the aldermen, Pilkington and Shute recited the numbers they had recorded for
each candidate and declared that Papillon and Dubois had won by the majority and therefore
were the duly elected sheriffs.60
As the election continued to drag out, many felt that the only way that the election could
be settled was if North would remove himself from the poll. Several tactics were employed to
remove North from the election. First, North received an offer of a bribe worth £4,000. 61 Peter
Rich reported to Secretary Jenkins that the bribe required North to reject Moore’s nomination,
and the Common Hall would then elect him as Sheriff for the coming year.62 North, however,
refused and remained loyal to Charles, Moore, and the entire Tory faction. When North refused,
some liverymen resorted to threats of violence upon North’s person if he did not step down from
the nomination. North, once again, refused to give in to intimidation.63
The Court of Aldermen met on July 18 to determine the outcome of the election. They
confirmed and declared the election of Dudley North and Ralph Box as Sheriffs Elect for the
year ensuing. According to custom, North and Box would be sworn in as sheriffs of London and
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Middlesex.64 Moore contended that at the poll on Saturday, Box had actually acquired a
majority of votes. He determined the votes were Box 1244 and Papillon and Dubois 60 each
because he chose to ignore the votes against North’s confirmation.65 The plans in motion to
swear in North and Box were not a secret, and it was reported that both Papillon and Dubois
would also appear to take their oaths as the new sheriffs.66 The Whigs disputed the poll results
as they were interpreted by Moore. According to the Whigs, “the Lord Mayor sent an Eminent
Merchant his former servant to the Sheriffs and gave them Liberty to Poll for all 4 candidates.”67
The Whigs further threatened Moore with “a thousand actions.”68 They argued that the
liverymen, not the Lord Mayor, had the right to choose the sheriffs of London and Middlesex. In
this vein, they presented a petition addressed to the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen
requesting that Papillon and Dubois be declared sheriffs. The petition further requested that
these men be “sent for, and give Bond, or fine for the said office, as legally chosen.”69 The
petition was not signed, and it was therefore rejected.
Twenty liverymen signed and presented another petition, which Moore and the Court
answered that they would read and consider.70 Along with the petition, Moore was also
informed by Sheriff Pilkington “that there was a great number of Writs . . . entered against his
Lordship; Some of which were at the suit of the persons whose names are as followeth.”71
Moore reported to the crowd that he was aware of the seventeen writs that had been brought
64
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against him, but he would not address them this particular evening or “till such time he is out of
his office,” as his office precluded him from having to answer to such writs.72 The Court of
Aldermen then adjourned and agreed to meet the next Thursday and it was believed that a
decision would be made at that point about the sheriffs.73
The scenario repeated itself on July 21. Under-Sheriff Richard Goodenough visited with
John Moore once again to address the seventeen warrants that had been issued against him along
with forty new writs, advising Moore to choose council. While Moore acknowledged that he
might to do so, he sent the under-sheriff away. On Thursday, while Moore, along with a handful
of Aldermen, were at Guildhall, “several of the Livery-men” insisted that the Court proclaim
Dubois and Papillon as Sheriffs; “they being chosen according to Law.”74 Moore and the
Aldermen continued to meet for an hour and then came out and notified the liverymen that they
would consider their request. However, the liverymen were not satisfied as they “desired it
might be suddenly, and that THEIR Elect Sheriffs might give their bonds.”75 Moore, however,
would not give in and insisted that the Court had given them an answer in their own time. When
the liverymen did not get the answer they wanted, they then “came to push his Lordship . . .
telling him, they desired appearances to their several Actions.”76 Once again, Moore told them
they would have an answer in time. Without the desired response, the liverymen were forced to
leave.
The Lord Mayor, the Court of Aldermen, and the Court of Lieutenancy77 met again at
Guildhall on July 27, and were once again confronted by liverymen who were expecting an
72
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answer to their petitions to confirm Papillon and Dubois.78 At this juncture, Moore issued a
statement which assured the liverymen that that the Court had contemplated their petitions and
the “persons [who] shall take the Office of Sheriffs upon them as are duly elected according to
Law and the Ancient Customs of the City.”79 He also stressed to them that it was his and the
Court’s position to ensure that that “Rights and Priviledges of the Chair and of the whole City”
were upheld.80 Despite the Lord Mayor’s answer, the liverymen were not satisfied and sent
Sheriff Pilkington to talk to Moore and the Court. The message Pilkington was to deliver was
that “the Livery-men without did not judge what my Lord Mayor had said to be a sufficient
answer.”81 Moore then commanded the sheriff to disperse the crowd in the King’s name. Rather
than taking the message to the liverymen, Pilkington instructed the Court of Lieutenancy to
leave. The Court responded that “They sate there by the King’s Authority, and judged Mr.
Sheriff might be under a mistake, or in the wrong Box.”82 Pilkington returned to the Court of
Aldermen and was once again ordered to disperse the crowd, and on this occasion he did so.
After the crowd left the hall, Moore decided to adjourn and meet again after the festival
celebrated on August 24 in honor of St. Bartholomew.
e. A New Co-Sheriff
By early September, the matter had not been settled. The Whig faction was scheming an
alternative way to seat Papillon and Dubois as sheriffs. If Papillon and Dubois were not sworn
in, the Whigs had developed two possible options. The first was to wait until the Michaelmas
election of the new Lord Mayor, and then revoke Moore’s ruling. If this did not work, then they
planned to challenge Moore’s decision at the Court of King’s Bench and have a mandamus
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issued that challenged North and Box’s right to serve as sheriffs of London and Middlesex.83
Rumors abounded and as late as August, the possibility still existed that Papillon and Dubois
could be sworn in as sheriffs for the year ensuing.84 However, it did not happen.
The liverymen presented Moore and the Court of Aldermen with a third paper that argued
that Papillon and Dubois were elected as sheriffs and requested that the men be summoned so
they could either take office or pay their fines.85 Further, Ralph Box decided he no longer
wanted to be involved in the controversy and chose not to be sworn in as sheriff and instead paid
the fine of £400, which meant that another Common Hall would have to be held in order to
choose another sheriff to serve with Dudley North.86 Although North did not step down, Box
withdrew his name from the election.87 The liverymen and citizens of the City disputed this new
development, and contended that there should not be another Common Hall as the choice of
Papillon and Dubois should be honored. The proliferation of tracts, treatises, and pamphlets
continued as the Whig press sought to establish the “ancient” custom of the common hall to elect
both sheriffs, while the Tory press sought to defend the Lord Mayor and his prerogative to
choose one of the sheriffs.88 The battles in the press only heightened the tensions.
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Rather than prepare for another Common Hall, an “abundance of Liverymen” presented
themselves at a meeting of the Lord Mayor and Court of Aldermen at Guildhall on September
5.89 They gave another petition to the Lord Mayor, and asked that he proclaim Papillon and
Dubois as Sheriffs Elect for the year ensuing so that both men could take their oaths and be
sworn into office.90 The petition was read in the council chamber, and after deliberation the Lord
Mayor summoned “several Worthy citizens” into the chamber to hear the answer to the
petition.91 He responded to the petition by announcing to the liverymen that Box “hath
submitted a Fine; and therefore this Court desires you to meet again and choose another Sheriff
to joyn Mr. North.”92 He informed them that they would be privy to the time and date of the new
Common Hall shortly. Once again, the liverymen exploded in anger and began to cry “no” and
caused such chaos that Moore was forced to tell them that if they continued, he would have to
indict them for inciting a riot, and told them to leave the chamber.93 Upon their exit, the
Whiggish liverymen declared that “Our Priviledges are Infringed” and reiterated that not only
did they not want another poll for sheriff, but that they “[WOULD] NOT admit of any other to
be Sheriffs.”94 However, Moore did have a few supporters of “loyal and worthy gentlemen” in
the crowd as well, and they responded to the speech by the other liverymen, declaring that that
they would “stand by his Lordships determination.” Moore finally commanded everyone “to
depart upon pain of Imprisonment.”95
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Despite continual petitions and protests in the City, by mid-September, many were
becoming resigned to the fact that Lord Mayor was not going to surrender his right to appoint
one of the two sheriffs. Further, the liverymen had to resign themselves to another election.
Neither Papillon nor Dubois would simply be allowed to step in and hold the slot vacated by
Box.96 The City’s citizens commenced in the taking of the sacrament so that they would be
allowed to participate in the poll, or stand for nomination for Lord Mayor or sheriff.97 The
Corporation Act of 1661 required those interested in holding a public office to receive the
sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and to take the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, which
recognized the monarch as the head of the Church. While the preparations were made, the Court
of Aldermen held a meeting at Guildhall in which a petition from Tory supporters was read that
recognized Moore’s “proceedings to be Just and Right” and objected to Papillon and Dubois
serving as sheriffs. Once again the liverymen lost their tempers and declared that “from the time
of King John’s Reign it had been the undoubted Right of the Commons of London to choose
Sheriffs,” and reiterated their desire that Papillon and Dubois stand as sheriffs.98
Moore ordered all liverymen to disperse after he acknowledged their appeal as the same
as their previous petition. Once the liverymen left Guildhall, “several worthy and Loyal
Gentlemen” from the County of Middlesex were called in before the Court and another petition
was read about the choice of sheriffs. Moore continued to insist that he had not done anything
that was illegal or not within his rights as Lord Mayor. He once again stated that Dudley North
would serve as sheriff and that a new Common Hall would be called to elect his co-sheriff. When
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the gentlemen began to protest in the same vein as the liverymen, Moore commanded them to
leave, and subsequently, he and the Aldermen also left Guildhall.99
In the midst of this tension, the Crown grew concerned that North was planning to step
away from the shrievalty. Secretary Jenkins wrote to Lord Keeper Francis North asking for
reassurance that North would serve as sheriff. According to Jenkins, “a surmise blown about the
City . . . that Sheriff North is gone on the sudden out of town to take advice from you how to get
off from his sheriffwick.”100 Jenkins assured Francis North that Charles nor any of his minister’s
believed that North had decided to back away from the shrievalty, but at the same time he
requested that either that the Lord Keeper or North write to confirm that the rumor was false. In
reply, the Lord Keeper promised Jenkins and Charles that North had left London only to visit
him on a personal matter and gave his word that his brother was “a very honest man and can be
hardly deceived or frighted out of the principles he has taken up to serve the King and the
City.”101 He also reassured him that North knew him too well to think that he would “expect
assistance in anything dishonest or dishonourable.”102 Despite the frenzy surrounding the
election, North planned to serve as sheriff and he had no intention of stepping aside.
The Common Hall to elect North’s co-sheriff was set for September 19. On this day, the
Lord Mayor and the Aldermen arrived at Guildhall at 9 and the hall was already full of “both of
the Livery and others.”103 When Moore mounted the hustings to announce the purpose of the
Hall was to elect another sheriff to stand with North, the crowd made “such a hideous noise” that
the Lord Mayor retired into Council Chambers. After the Lord Mayor left, the standing sheriffs
99
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Pilkington and Shute went to the hustings and asked, “Gentlemen of the Livery, Will you stand
by your Old Choice, or have a New Poll?”104 The response by the crowd was to stand by the old
choice. The chaos that ensued caused Moore to return to the Hall and postponed the poll until
the afternoon. When the voting began, one of the current sheriffs appeared on the hustings and
declared both Papillon and Dubois to be elected sheriffs.105 Despite the insistence that Papillon
and Dubois stand as sheriffs, Moore proclaimed another Tory, Peter Rich, as sheriff for the year
ensuing.106 After making this announcement, Moore ordered the liverymen to vacate, but they
continued to insist that Papillon and Dubois were duly elected according to the City’s charter,
and that they ought to be sworn in. The Court of Aldermen, however, refused to reply.107
f. The Confirmation of Dudley North and Peter Rich
On September 28, both Rich and North were sworn as sheriffs in time for the coming
election for the new Lord Mayor.108 As Moore did not expect that the swearing would proceed
smoothly, the trained bands were ready at the entrance of Guildhall and at the hustings to protect
the Lord Mayor, North, and Rich during the swearing ceremony.109 Not only were the trained
bands present to keep the peace but they were also instructed by Moore to “keep such from
entering who were judged to have no business there.”110 It was popular belief that both Papillon
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and Dubois would also present themselves for the swearing, and the Lord Mayor expected their
supporters to cause the type of chaos that ensued during the previous elections.111
Among those turned away by the trained bands were the Mercers Company, the livery
company of both Papillon and North. Traditionally, any member of a company chosen to stand
as a sheriff or alderman was also elected as master of the respective company on the next
election day.112 The election for the new Master Warden occurred on September 5 and Papillon
was nominated instead of North.113 In spite of tradition, the Mercers voted Papillon as master of
the company for the coming year.114 In supporting Papillon, the Mercers were choosing to
support the Whiggish faction’s position in regards to the election as well as rejecting the
Crown’s interference in City politics.115
Throughout September, Papillon continued to receive support from the Mercers over
North. Closer to his swearing-in ceremony, North sent a request to the Mercers for the
traditional sixteen assistants and officers of the company to escort him to Guildhall for his
inauguration. The Court of Assistants met on September 25, 1682 to discuss the matter. The
final decision was that “Officers of this Company’s shall not waite upon the hon. Dudley North
to Guildhall on Thursday next.”116 The Mercers had not only refused to comply, but formally
voted against the matter. Furthermore, the Court also decided that the Assistants were to “meet
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at the hall in their Gowns upon Thursday morning next . . . [and] to waite upon the Master of the
Company.”117 Instead of escorting North, the Assistants chose to accompany Papillon to
Guildhall. Contemporaries took this to mean that Mercers would be attending Guildhall in order
to present Papillon to be sworn in as one of the duly elected sheriffs of London and Middlesex.118
Further, the £100 that was traditionally presented to a sheriff elected from their company would
not be given to North.119
While it appeared during the last months of 1682 that the Mercers had completely
ignored the fact that North, not Papillon, was the acting sheriff, the following year the Court
nominated and unanimously elected North as Master Warden.120 After North was installed as
Master Warden, the Court also decided to retroactively award him the £100 to put “towards the
charge of beautifying his house in the last year in the time of his Sherriffalty (sic) of this
City.”121 While the official history of the Company written by Ian Doolittle claimed that the
Mercers decided not to get involved and did not choose sides between North and Papillon, the
evidence from the Acts of Courts suggests otherwise. Initially, the Company supported Papillon
and in doing so, they were taking a stand against North as the Crown’s preferred candidate for
sheriff. When the Company chose to support Papillon, the outcome was still not clear, and many
Whiggish liverymen in the City were holding hope that Papillon and Dubois would be sworn in
as Sheriffs of London and Middlesex.
After the Lord Mayor arrived at Guildhall for the swearing of the two sheriffs, thousands
of liverymen who had been refused entrance were able to force their way into the hall, but the
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trained bands did manage to keep them away from the hustings. A short while after entering the
hall, the Lord Mayor, the aldermen, and the sheriffs appeared on the hustings for the swearing
ceremony. As Moore held out the book for North and Rich to swear upon, Papillon and Dubois
appeared and also placed their hands on the book. When Moore informed them that this was
irregular, Papillon presented him with a petition. Papillon then proceeded to read it to all the
liverymen. The petition declared that Papillon and Dubois were the duly elected sheriffs of
London and Middlesex and that both men were ready and willing to take the office. Moore
rejected their petition and ordered them to leave the hall. After Papillon and Dubois left,
accompanied by several aldermen, the ceremony continued and Dudley North and Peter Rich
were sworn in as sheriffs of London and Middlesex.122
After the swearing-in ceremony, the Whig faction hoped to put a plan into action to have
North and Rich removed as sheriffs. The first course of action was to win the election for a new
Lord Mayor. However, after a confused election and a review of the poll books in which it was
decided that many had polled who had not sworn the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy or were
excommunicated, their chance for winning the election did not appear likely. Once the votes
were counted and legitimized, Moore announced that Sir William Pritchard was elected as the
new Lord Mayor.123 Many of the members of the Whig faction charged that Pritchard’s victory
was the result of the Tories with allowing people to poll who had no legitimate right to do so.124
Subsequently, however, Moore presented Prichard as Lord Mayor elect to King Charles. He
approved of Pritchard stating, that he was “truly qualified to the Established Government and a
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person as truly Loyal to His Majesty’s Service.”125 On October 30, with a ceremonial swearing
and feasting, Sir William Pritchard was sworn in as Lord Mayor of the City of London.
Officially, Charles and the Tory faction had regained control of the City.126
Although North and Rich were sworn in as sheriffs of London and Middlesex and a new
Tory Lord Mayor was in place, Papillon and Dubois continued to argue that they were rightly
elected the sheriffs. On October 23, a motion was made at the Court of King’s Bench for a
mandamus to both the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen to swear in Papillon and Dubois
as sheriffs. An order was issued that Pritchard and the Court of Aldermen were to demonstrate
why Papillon and Dubois should not be sworn.127 Despite this ruling, “by reasons of many
weighty Affairs that then happened,” the hearing was postponed.128 After several postponements,
it was expected that a decision would be reached by November 14. By this date, the Court
contended that Lord Mayor and Court of Aldermen had to provide their reasons as to why the
mandamus must not be approved.129 On the date of the trial, the mandamus was not discussed,
and it died in the courts.130 North and Rich were the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, and
although Papillon and Dubois continued to proclaim themselves as the rightly elected sheriffs,
they did not win their case. The Tories and Charles had won.
Conclusion:
The London shrieval election of 1682 was a highly contentious event. With the hopes of
a parliament closed off, national politics were forced into a smaller and more local arena, the
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City. The outcome was far from certain throughout the whole process, and none of the Whig
faction expected Charles or the Court faction to prevail. In the end, Charles defeated the Whigs
and was able to gain control over the City and the dissenters who resided there. While
technically a local election and a local victory, the results of the election of 1682 had national
implications. The Crown’s triumph only caused the Whig leadership, such as Shaftesbury,
William Lord Russell, and the duke of Monmouth, to grow increasingly more radical throughout
the rest of the 1680s, and some of the Whig leadership lost their lives due to the fear of their
plots and schemes. For North, the victory would later come at a steep price—his chance at an
extended political career—as the London shrieval election of 1682 served as a means for him to
enter the national political sphere and his actions as sheriff would ensure that his political career
was brief.
The shrieval election of 1682 proved to be a turning point in Charles’s II reign. He was
able to secure two Tories as sheriffs of London and Middlesex, effectively controlling the juries.
By the end of the year, a Tory far stauncher than Moore would become Lord Mayor. By 1683,
the quo warranto had been settled against the Corporation of London and Charles had fully
solidified his hold over the City. Aside from Charles gaining control over a rebellious city, he
had also effectively shut down Parliament and was able to institute his own period of personal
rule that would last throughout the remainder of his reign. Without a Parliament, both the Tory
and Whig factions were forced to find a new forum to further their agendas. In 1682, the City of
London served this purpose and allowed the issues of the day to remain in the national political
sphere. The treatises, pamphlets, songs, and poems that were written by both sides about the
shrieval election of 1682 were widely read throughout the City and even in the countryside. This
propaganda not only furthered each side’s agenda in the election, the writings helped to shape the
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rhetoric of emerging political parties.131 Without Parliament, the City of London became the
new forum in which Whigs sought to fight against “arbitrary” government, and the Tories
continued their agenda of loyalty to the monarch.
The politics of the City, whether through juries or the shrieval elections, also provided an
arena through which wealthy merchants, such Bethel, Dubois, Papillon, Pilkington, North,
Moore, Rich, Shute, and Ward could participate and influence national politics. Each of these
men was considered a leader of his respective faction.132 Without the benefit of a parliament,
these men were able to return to the City where it was only natural that they would retain
leadership roles in the City’s government. Effectively, the English Civil Wars and the
Commonwealth politicized the City in an unprecedented way. Once the Commonwealth fell,
however, the City continued to be political on a national scale. It surprised no one that when
Charles prorogued Parliament national attention would turn to the City as a means of continuing
the political agenda of the opposition and the Court faction.
Once North was established as sheriff of London and Middlesex, he served the Court as
promised. He was responsible for handpicking the juries that would try, convict, and sentence to
death William Lord Russell, a prominent Whig leader, along with four other conspirators
involved in the Rye House plot to assassinate the King and his brother as well as incite rebellions
in London and the English countryside. North also delved deeper into national politics as an MP
under James II. However, his controversial actions as sheriff forced him out of government once
the Revolution of 1688 occurred. He was only able to maintain his political career only as long
as the loyalist party was at the helm. Once the Whig faction was able to oust James and replace
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him with a friendlier monarch, North’s political career effectively ended and he turned his
energies to becoming a political economist. Regardless of the brevity of his political career,
North’s actions, particularly as sheriff, caused a great impact in the national sphere.
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CHAPTER III
DUDLEY NORTH AS SHERIFF

For Dudley North, the London shrieval election of 1682 was an opportunity to enter into
the London political arena as the national political sphere. The election served as a battleground
in which political ideologies were defined nationally. The chaos and tensions surrounding the
election only served to help harden emerging party lines. After months of tensions and
factionalism within the City, North and his co-sheriff, Peter Rich, were sworn in as Sheriffs of
London and Middlesex on September 28, 1682. Just as the election had not proceeded smoothly,
neither did the swearing-in ceremony. In fact, as De Krey has pointed out, the election of the
North and Peter Rich as sheriffs was not a complete victory for the Tories but rather resulted in
“a contest for legitimacy between pairs of Tory and Whig sheriffs.”1 After North’s inauguration
as sheriff had concluded, the loyalist aldermen left the hustings and Thomas Papillion and John
Dubois were sworn in as sheriffs by aldermen with Whiggish sympathies.2 Papillon and Dubois
claimed to be the true sheriffs of London and Middlesex through a mandate of the people. They
contended, as did their Whig supporters, that the City’s electoral rights had been usurped by the
Crown and his loyalist agents within the City, including the trained bands. Therefore, both pairs
claimed the right to serve as sheriffs.
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Amidst this chaos and factionalism, North and Peter Rich began to carry out their duties
as sheriffs while their opponents continued to decry the illegality of their election.3 Although
North was sheriff, the threats and attacks in the press continued as they had during the election
process. North was touted as a “zealous sham-sheriff” who “walk[s] hand-in-hand” with the
Crown.4 The City Whigs expected that once North assumed the office of Sheriff of London that
he would be a pawn or tool of the Crown within the City and the trials of dissenters and Whig
leaders would continue. Printers who supported the Tory cause published tracts that assured
those with Whiggish leanings that their fears regarding Tory sheriffs were real. Tory printer
Nathaniel Thompson published a poem, Loyalty Triumphant, which taunted Whigs by declaring
that they “need not despair; If Rich find Timber (give them scope)/ Brave North will never
grudge the Rope.”5 The Tory faction assumed much the same as the Whigs; however, in their
case, they felt that if the Whig leaders committed acts of treason then they should be rightly
prosecuted. The Tories believed that North would carry out his duties in a way that not only
would ignoramus juries be a thing of the past, but that the Whigs could be expected to be found
guilty of their crimes if North chose the juries.
According to Roger North, his brother Dudley was of a peculiar temperament that
allowed him to function and carry out his duties in the face of such opposition and for this he
earned a nickname, “blind Bayard,” throughout the City.6 Roger contended that North “went
about his business, and walked the streets to and fro” during “a time when his name was broiling
upon the coals.”7 Just as the threats and bribes had not affected him during the election, North
3
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did not let the continued negative, or positive, press affect him as sheriff. He continued to carry
out his duties despite the fact that obvious segment of the City held a great deal of ill-will
towards him.
By accepting the position of sheriff, North began a political career in which he would
have to make controversial decisions, such as selecting jurors for high profile trials. Ultimately,
the choices North made during his tenure as sheriff would end his short political career. In his
actions as sheriff, North proved to be a staunch Tory who was far more politically conscious than
either he or Grassby claimed. A good number of the liverymen opposed North’s confirmation
as Sheriff of London and yet, North refused to step down even when his person was threatened
with violence8 North also accepted the nomination well-aware of the controversy surrounding
the selection of juries as well as the Crown’s desire to end the possibility of any ignoramus
juries. Once in office, North carried out his duties in line with the Crown’s expectations and
while some Whig leaders, including William Lord Russell, lost their lives, others such as
Shaftesbury and Papillon were forced to flee into exile. In an attempt to show North’s political
nature, this chapter will examine the two most controversial actions North carried out during his
shrievalty: the mayoral election of Sir William Pritchard and his involvement in the jury
selection for the trials of the Rye House conspirators
a. The mayoral election of Sir William Pritchard
Charles and his ministers had already begun to prepare for the election of the new Lord
Mayor well before September as Charles’s plan to secure his power within the City included the
election of a Tory as Lord Mayor. During the tumultuous shrieval election process of July,
Secretary of State Sir Leoline Jenkins began to inquire as to whether Charles could ask Moore to
extend his time as Lord Mayor for another year rather than face the possibility of another Lord
8
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Mayor who identified with the Whig faction.9 Jenkins hoped that if need be Charles could
“continue this Lord Mayor for another year” as “Such things have been done by the Usurpers” as
to make it difficult to know how a mayoral election in the City so soon after the shrieval election
would turn out.10 Jenkins also investigated if “any Lord Mayor has on being presented been
refused by the Lord Chancellor, the Constable of the Tower, or the King.”11 Both Charles and
Secretary Jenkins were hoping that if a Whig won the election that they would be able to hold up
the inauguration or prevent the new mayor from taking office by refusing to acknowledge him.
In the face of animosity in the City, North’s most immediate responsibility as the new
sheriff was to assist in the election of the new Lord Mayor. According to tradition, the Court of
Aldermen met and nominated Sir William Pritchard and Sir Thomas Gold for the office of Lord
Mayor. Pritchard was a far stauncher Tory than Sir John Moore. The liverymen who tended to
vote with the Whig faction were just as desperate to prevent another Tory victory within the
City, and a poll was demanded that would include Sir Henry Tulse and Alderman Henry
Cornish, along with Pritchard and Gold.12 The Court of Aldermen agreed. North and his fellow
sheriff were responsible for conducting the election. When it became clear that another election
would take place to determine a new Lord Mayor, Secretary Jenkins sent Lord Mayor Moore and
the Aldermen a letter which reminded them that they were expected to “present all new elect
mayors to [Charles] before they were sworn or admitted” and reminded them that they “should
do their duty herein and accordingly required them to present to [the king] the person chosen to
be Mayor.”13 Papillon and Dubois still claimed the shrievalty and accordingly they also
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attended the election as if they were the sheriffs so that they might be able to help influence the
outcome of the election. De Krey argues that this had been the plan of the Whigs all along and
had been the motivation of the Whig aldermen when they swore Papillon and Dubois as sheriff.14
Immediately after the poll in Common Hall, North took the results to the incumbent Lord
Mayor Sir John Moore and the aldermen and called the election for Pritchard to the dismay of
those of the Whig faction. Papillon and Dubois were present as “acting” sheriffs and accused
North of ignoring the polls for the Whig candidates, Cornish and Gold, and demanded another
poll be taken for all four candidates. Moore ordered North and Rich to conduct the poll for all
four candidates on October 4. It lasted for two hours before it was adjourned until the following
Monday.15 Before the poll books were to be closed, “a scrutiny” of the books was demanded and
the votes were Pritchard 2233, Tulse 236, Gold 2289, Cornish, 2258.16
The high number of votes for the Whig candidates was enough to raise suspicion about
the legality of a great number of the votes. Combined, both Whig candidates received 4547. In
July, two separate polls were conducted for the shrievalty. In that election, a far more
contentious election than that of the Lord Mayor, Papillon (2754) and Dubois (2709) received a
combined vote of 5463 in early July. Two weeks later, the combined Whig vote was 2968: 1481
for Papillon and 1487 for Dubois. In the shrieval election, the liverymen with Whiggish
sympathies were polling for two candidates to serve as sheriff, and therefore, their vote was not
necessarily split, as it would have been in the election for the new Lord Mayor in which those
who supported the Whig faction had to choose between two candidates. Historian A.G. Smith
estimated that perhaps the City contained about 5000 liverymen who tended to vote for Whig
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candidates.17 Therefore, the number of combined votes for Gold and Cornish fell within the
realm of possibility of the number of liverymen who might have voted for a Whig candidate, but
compared to the turn out for the shrieval election, the high number of votes seemed unlikely.
After the initial votes were revealed the presiding Lord Mayor, Sir John Moore, agreed to an
examination of the poll books against the company’s lists of their members.18 Moore also
announced that after the inspection had been approved by the aldermen, the new Lord Mayor
would be declared.19
As sheriff, North had the added task of maintaining the lists of liverymen within the City.
These rolls contained the names of the prominent members of each livery company who were
allowed to vote in Common Hall. Moore ordered all the livery companies to produce a new list
of all their members to be compared to the poll books. The sheriffs, along with a group of
inspectors, were to determine that only true liverymen had voted in the poll and that they had
also taken the oath of allegiance to the Crown and their corporation and livery oaths. Each
faction, Tory and Whig, chose six inspectors to help conduct the scrutiny.20 North drew up a
detailed list of the “objections” to the polls for Pritchard, Gold, and Cornish as well as a list of
“errors” in the polls.21 In regards to Pritchard, North’s main protests were centered on those who
had voted but had not paid their fees as liverymen to their respective company. In the case of Sir
Benjamin Newland, North invalidated Newland’s vote because he was “charged not to be free of
the City he appeared and declared himself a freeman of about 30 years standing, but produced no
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Copy of his freedoms, saying it was burnt.”22 Other objections included those who were
pensioners, did not live within the confines of the City, were not members of a Livery Company,
or had not been legally sworn into their respective companies by the date of the poll. According
to North’s tally, a total of ninety-five men had erroneously polled for Pritchard, which reduced
his total from 2233 to 2138.23
For Gold and Cornish, the objections were more numerous and varied. North was far
more meticulous in his examination of the poll books for Gold and Cornish. Just as in the poll
for Pritchard, one of North’s most common notations was that the respective men were not
legally members of livery companies because they had not taken the oath required or had been
“made free of other Companys” but had not legally “translated” their membership to the livery
company that they were voting with on the day of the election.24 Due to these problems, two
companies, the Haberdashers and the Merchant Taylors had more men vote than they could
account for among their members.25 The second most common objection was against men who
were Quakers, a radical sect that had emerged during the revolution and civil wars of the 1640s.
In 1661, the Quakers officially declared their principle of “absolute pacifism,” which,
Christopher Hill explains, was meant to “protect Quakers against charges of sedition.”26 This
assertion of absolute pacifism was also coupled with “an absolute refusal to accept civil or
military office.”27
In practice, these beliefs prohibited Quakers from taking civil oaths, such as the oath of
allegiance or the oaths of the respective livery companies. Within the City, Quakers, as
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dissenters, tended to ally themselves with the Whig faction. Without taking these oaths, Quakers
were ineligible to vote in any City election as they were not considered true liverymen. In all,
North asserted that twenty-four of the one hundred sixty-five erroneous votes for Gold and
Cornish were cast by Quakers and therefore did not count towards their final tallies. The Whig
faction took issue with this assertion and contended that “the elected, not electors, are obliged to
take the oaths” as were required by the Corporation Act of 1661.28 This Act was intended to
ensure that only members of the Church of England held public offices. In answer to North and
the inspectors’ complaints that the men had not taken their livery oaths, the Whig faction
contended that these oaths were voluntary and completely dependent upon the individual
company. In the end, because the Court of Aldermen was dominated by Tories, these arguments
were ignored.
Aside from these two complaints, North also took exception to those who had voted and
did not “have the Cloathing” or would not “own that he ever wore a Gowns.”29 It was customary
during elections at the Guildhall for the livery men to wear the ceremonial dress associated with
their companies. During the 1682 London shrieval election, Sir John Moore had required the
livery companies to appear in their gowns on election day due to the number of men who were
trying to vote who were not actually members of any livery company. North objected to both the
voting of “an alms man,” as well as a man who could not remember the day he had voted nor if
he had voted “in the hall or the yard.”30 After tallying up his final objections, North considered
one hundred sixty-five of the votes to be invalid.
Yet, he did not separate the polls for Gold and Cornish. Instead, he subtracted the entire
one hundred sixty-five votes from each of their totals, which left Gold with 2124 and Cornish
28
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with 2093. By combining their votes into one pool and calculating one set of objections, North
was able to ensure that Pritchard received the largest number of legitimate votes. The Court of
Aldermen, which was dominated by members with allegiances to the loyal faction, chose to
accept North’s calculations and discount those presented by the Whig faction. Upon hearing that
the loyalist Sir William Pritchard was to be sworn in as the new Lord Mayor for the year
ensuring, the King’s brother, James, the Duke of York wrote to his son-in-law, William the
Prince of Orange and exclaimed that “we shall have a good and loyal Lord Mayor as well as two
sheriffs of the same stamp, which is a mighty mortification to the Whigs.”31
North’s actions during the mayoral election of Pritchard set the tone for his shrievalty.
He acted in line with the Crown’s expectations that he would be an ally in the City and he carried
out his duties accordingly. North’s actions as a new sheriff suggest that he bought into ideas of
his faction. Historian Richard Grassby contends that North’s conduct as sheriff was “exemplary”
and that he was “scrupulous” in carrying out his duties. However, this interpretation is too
clouded by the debate ignited by the historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which
sought to paint North as either an honest or corrupt politician/sheriff rather than examining
whether or not he was acting within his own political ideology. Grassby further denies that
North was an ideologue like his brother Francis, yet an examination of his first actions as sheriff
suggests otherwise.
North was loyal to the Crown and his interpretation of the Corporation Act ensured that a
staunch Tory would be elected Lord Mayor. North toed his faction’s ideological line by
invalidating the votes of dissenters. As historian Mark Knights has shown, political ideologies
and parties were formed as a result of the bitter conflicts that often played out in the elections of
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the later Stuart period.32 The first election North participated in was a bitter contest that
emphasized the differences between the two factions. Upon his return from Turkey, North
might not have fully formed his political ideas in the same manner as had his brother Francis,
who worked closely with and for Charles, be that as it may, Grassby admitted that North was
ambitious and loyal to the Crown.33 This sense of loyalty, which was the basis of Tory ideology,
was already present in North, and it was the guiding factor in his politics at the outset of his
tenure as sheriff.
b. The Rye House Intrigues
The election of Sir William Pritchard as Lord Mayor was not the most controversial
matter North dealt with throughout his shrievalty, nor would it be the last time he would be able
to display his ideological leanings. With Tories filling the positions of Lord Mayor and sheriffs
of London and Middlesex, the Whigs leaders began to shift gears from trying to work within the
government to trying to replace the existing one. As loyalists now held both the mayoralty and
shrievalty in the City, many of the Whig leaders, such as the earl of Shaftesbury and William
Lord Russell, were not only concerned about the Crown policies in the City and the nation, but
also about their own security. In October, while the City was involved in deciding the election
of the new Lord Mayor, North and Peter Rich were also responsible for choosing the new grand
juries which would replace those chosen by the former Whig sheriffs.
The new jurors chosen by North and Peter Rich were staunchly loyal to the Crown rather
than the Whig faction. In their presentments, or official reports, the new grand juries made it
clear that they would actively prosecute dissenters who they believed were “destructive to the
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Interest of the Kingdom.”34 Dissenters were not the only target. The grand juries insisted that all
groups that were larger in number than allowed by laws who met in “Conventicles, Clubs, or
Cabals” or “who go from County to County and Associate in Numbers to do Unlawful Acts”
were a threat to the nation and should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.35
Prosecution of Whig leaders and dissenters, who tended to ally with the Whigs, pushed
the Whig leadership into a corner and even the more moderate leaders, such as William Lord
Russell, began to entertain more radical ideas than before. De Krey contends that it was the
highly contentious City elections of 1682 that “seemingly marked a transition from occasional
Whig resort to rhetorical violence and physical force to the rationalization and legitimization of
such behaviour as instruments in Whig party warfare.”36 Crown persecution of Whig leaders
and conspirators was pursued in the years leading up to the shrieval election, but Charles had
been hindered by the Whig stronghold on the City. Further, after the election of William
Pritchard was concluded, Charles began actively pursuing the quo warranto proceedings against
the Corporation of London. With new loyalist grand juries in place and the charter of the City
under attack, the Whig leaders felt that they were backed into a corner. In various meetings, the
more radical of the Whig leaders began to plot the overthrow of the government by assassinating
Charles and his brother James and fomenting insurrection throughout London, the countryside,
Scotland, and Ireland.37
Historians for centuries have denied the reality of the plots and conspiracies that
transpired in the latter months of 1682 and into 1683, insisting that the plot was a myth
concocted by the Court and its party in an effort to purge the Whig faction of its leaders. In this
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vein, historian Barry Coward maintains that “it did not matter that the evidence for a conspiracy
was so circumstantial, vague, and contradictory that one wonders whether there was a Rye House
Plot at all.”38 Further, any evidence regarding the plots and conspiracies revolve around
confessions and trial testimonies that contradict one another. Conspirators often tried to
exaggerate the role of others while downplaying their own. However, recent scholarship refutes
this traditional interpretation, and historians such as Richard Ashcraft, Richard L. Greaves, and
Tim Harris have shown that the conspiracy was indeed a real threat, and that after the radical
Whigs failed to push the Exclusion bill through Parliament and lost the 1682 City election, the
elite Whig leaders made a concerted effort to mobilize the Crown’s discontented subjects
throughout the kingdoms in order to achieve radical reforms in the government and the Church
through extra-legal means.39
Greaves argued that government agents carefully gathered evidence before issuing the
arrest warrants, but that the prosecution botched the handling of the trials by introducing the
alleged suicide of the earl of Essex, a conspirator, as evidence of guilt of the other parties
involved. Torture was also used in gathering confessions of some of the witnesses. In doing so,
the trials themselves were viewed by many Whig supporters as arbitrary, and led many to
question if the plots were real.40 By careful examination of the confessions and descriptions of
the events, historians have nonetheless been able to discern where the testimonies overlap and
have been able to piece the events together based on the conspirators’ accounts.
North’s role in the prosecution of these conspiracies not only defined his tenure as
sheriff, but would be the determining factor in how he has been portrayed by historians. While
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North’s biographer, Richard Grassby, has asserted that it was North’s misfortune that the plots
and conspiracies directed at the King, his brother, and those in high positions of government
were discovered during North’s tenure as sheriff, the reality was that Whig plots to incite
rebellion and to assassinate the king were well underway in the years before North took office.41
Twice in 1681, Charles had thwarted Shaftesbury and the other Whig leaders from
carrying out their plans for action against the government. During the Oxford Parliament,
Charles ordered a large number of his royal guard to remain in London to prevent any uprisings
in his absence. In July of the same year, Charles also arrested and unsuccessfully tried the Earl
due to the juries packed with Whiggish sympathizers. In May of 1682, Charles unexpectedly fell
ill, and the prospect of his brother, James, the duke of York, succeeding Charles pushed the
Whigs into action. Once again, Shaftesbury met with Lord Grey, Lord Russell, the duke of
Monmouth, and Thomas Armstrong at Shaftesbury’s London home, Thanet House, to discuss
their contingency plan should the king die. They decided that the immediate course of action
should be to call Parliament into session and the first order of business would be the
unprecedented move of choosing a successor in place of James. After the initial conversation,
Shaftesbury agreed to confer with other “leading men in the city” and get their feedback.42 Later
that evening the group reconvened and Shaftesbury assured his cohorts that they would receive
support as long as he, Monmouth, and Lord Russell would “assist in the city with them.”43
These plans all came to naught as Charles recovered and the Whig leaders turned their attention
to securing the London shrieval election.
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The leaders of the Whig faction had a great deal riding on the shrieval election.
Shaftesbury had already been arrested once and tried for treason, and his neck had been saved
only by the acquittal of the ignoramus jury despite the large amount of evidence against been
him. When North and Rich were sworn in as Sheriffs in September, Charles fully controlled the
shrievalty and the juries. Shaftesbury, along with the other Whig leaders and dissenters, began to
fear that the outcome of subsequent trials might not be so favorable. Shaftesbury assembled
Grey, Lord Russell, and Monmouth at his London house to design their next course of action.
According to Grey, these men feared “their necks were in danger” and therefore felt that, if need
be, they should resort to “arms, if they would save themselves.”44 After this initial meeting, the
men, along with other Whigs who were disenchanted with the City’s current administration,
continued to meet at Thanet House where they devised a plan of multiple and simultaneous
rebellions throughout the country and determined who would lead each revolt. Shaftesbury was
in charge of raising support in London, while Lord Russell was responsible for meeting with
Whig supporters in the West Country. Grey was to take charge of Essex county and Monmouth
planned to ride up to Cheshire in the North to attend horse-races so that he could rally support
among Whig sympathizers.
In the end, the task of organizing the multiple uprisings became impossible due to the
unreliability of the men who were in charge of gathering the support needed. Monmouth arrived
in Cheshire with an entourage of between 120 to 200 men, including co-conspirator Thomas
Armstrong. In Cheshire, Monmouth found a great many supporters, but a successful uprising
was doubtful due to a lack of organization and money. Charles and Secretary Jenkins kept a
close watch on the Duke and those who traveled with him. The Crown received several reports
of his activities as Monmouth traveled to and arrived in Cheshire, including a description of a
44

Grey, Secret History, 15.

118

“great riot here, 500 men . . . throwing stones . . . have broken St. Peter’s Church windows to
ring the bells.”45
By September, the plan seemed to be falling apart. On September 20, Monmouth was
arrested on order of the king for inciting the riot. Thomas Armstrong was sent ahead to London
by Monmouth in order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus for the Duke and to try to meet with
Shaftesbury and the other conspirators to determine if they wanted the uprising to be carried out.
However, Russell had reported back that the West Country was not amicable at that moment to a
rebellion, and he was hesitant to act without their support. Further, Grey refused to take the
matter to Essex because he did not believe that the Whigs there could be trusted. Therefore, the
plans for the multiple insurrections fell through and Monmouth returned to London where he was
arrested again. This time, the Duke was able to acquire a writ of habeas corpus, but Charles
remained suspicious and continued to monitor Monmouth’s activities.
The plotting further made clear that the members of the Whig faction were far from
cohesive in their ideals and goals; as they became increasingly more radical in the latter months
of 1682, these divisions became even clearer. At the same time that Shaftesbury and his cohorts
were trying to incite a country-wide rebellion against Charles, a separate group of Whigs was
plotting a far more radical plan—to assassinate the king and his brother as they were returning to
London from the October horse races in Newmarket. The conspirators also discussed the
possibility of assassinating the royal brothers as they dined with Sir William Pritchard, the Lord
Mayor-elect. After Monmouth failed to act in Cheshire, Shaftesbury was disappointed and
distrustful of the Duke and became increasingly intrigued with the idea of assassinating Charles
and James.
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Shaftesbury gained less support from his monarchist friends, such as Russell and
Monmouth. Russell would not accept any plan which would restore England back to a republic,
which he abhorred, and Monmouth would not agree to any plan that would endanger the life of
his father. Therefore, Monmouth decided to keep an eye on Shaftesbury and those plotting the
assassination and he asked Shaftesbury’s chaplain, Robert Ferguson to act as an “agent
provocateur” so that he could find out as much information about the assassination conspiracy as
possible with the hope that Monmouth would be able to stop it. As well as working as an agent
for Shaftebury to get information on Monmouth’s plans, Ferguson was also a liaison between
Shaftesbury and Monmouth.
Despite all the planning, the assassination attempt did not happen in October, and
Shaftesbury once again turned his attention to instigating revolts throughout the country.
Monmouth, Russell, and Grey met with Ferguson who was acting in place of Shaftesbury’s
stead, who had gone into hiding. At this meeting, Ferguson informed his co-conspirators that if
they decided not to act, the Earl would likely act without them. When Ferguson assured
Monmouth, Russell, and Grey that Shaftesbury had garnered the support of armed men within
the City, they agreed to act and chose Sunday, November 19, as the date the insurrections would
begin.46 The hope was that thousands of men within London and in the countryside would rally
to the cause of the Whig leaders. With this large contingent of supporters, the conspirators
planned to seize key locations in the City while Shaftesbury’s promised one thousand foot
soldiers to deal with the king’s guard.
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Yet, once again, the plan was impeded by Charles. In preparation for the celebrations of
the anniversary of Elizabeth I’s accession to the throne on November 17, Charles decided to be
extra cautious and had Lord Mayor Pritchard issue an Order of Council which prohibited any
person from “making any Bonfire, or other Publick Fire-Works upon any Festival-Day, or any
other Time or Times whatsoever, without particular Direction or Order first had from His
MAJESTY.”47 By banning the bonfires, Charles hoped to prevent “the Evil Designs of Persons
disaffected to the Government, who commonly make use of such Occasions to turn those
Meetings into Riots and Tumults.”48 Rather than the traditional burning of the pope, celebrants
were encouraged to “hang or drown him.”49 As sheriffs, North and Peter Rich were responsible
for ensuring that the king’s orders were obeyed and that no bonfires were lit in London.
Without the cover of the November 17 celebrations, Shaftesbury and the conspirators
decided to reschedule their uprisings. While the conspirators of both the rebellions and the
assassination plot were planning to continue on a different date, Shaftesbury felt that his time had
run out. With two Tory sheriffs, he felt that it was only a matter of time before he would be
arrested and tried again. Therefore, he decided to flee the country in an effort to save himself.
The earl was able to take advantage of a major fire in Wapping where he was hiding.
Shaftesbury, along with Ferguson and another fellow co-conspirator, Thomas Walcott, fled
England on November 28 for the Netherlands where he died in Amsterdam on January 28, 1683.
Shaftesbury’s death did not prevent the remaining radicals from continuing with their
plans for rebellion. Monmouth, Russell, Essex, Lord Howard of Escrick, Algernon Sidney, and
John Hamden formed what was known as the “Council” of Six and they began to form another
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plan for rebellion. However, the Council of Six decided to extend the rebellion to include
Scotland as well as London, the West Country, and Cheshire. Another radical group, led by
Robert West, also kept the assassination plot alive. Before Shaftesbury decided to flee, he had
tried to communicate with West through Walcott about drafting a manifesto that laid out a
revolutionary agenda; however, West refused to participate in the creation of a manifesto. He
had moved beyond the point of accepting a monarchical government. West revived the old plan
to kill the king and his brother en route to London from the races in Newmarket, but this time the
plan would be carried out in the spring rather than October. The strategy was to kill the pair as
they passed the Rye House in Hoddesdon in Hertfordshire. Before he escaped with Shaftesbury,
Ferguson continued to go between both groups. The two plots could not successfully combine
their efforts, however, as only three—Essex, Sidney, and Hampden—advocated a
commonwealth, while the other three remained monarchists who believed that they could
convince Charles to hear them out in the wake of the mass rebellion. The split Council of Six
did less to prevent the assassination attempt than the at Newmarket that forced Charles and
James to leave earlier than they had originally intended.
With Charles and James still alive, the Council of Six did not give up on their plan to
carry out their simultaneous rebellions. They reached an agreement on their intended goals and
drew up a declaration that established several provisions. The militia would be maintained by
Parliament. Sheriffs would be elected by the counties not by appointment. All nobles who had
not acted in the best interest of the people were to be“degraded.” Also, the declaration provided
for toleration of dissenting beliefs and practices.50 Despite numerous plans and defined course of
action after the assassination and rebellions, in the end, the conspiracies became too large and
encompassed too many conspirators to be successful.
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On June 12, the government received information regarding both plots from Baptist
Josiah Keeling, and he agreed to testify on the treason of Whig leaders. Charles and his
ministers acted quickly and ordered the immediate arrests of those who had been involved in
plotting the deaths of the King and his brother as well as the rebellions throughout the kingdoms.
On the same day, Charles announced that the matter of the charter of the Corporation of London
was decided and that “the franchise and liberty of London be taken into the King’s hand.”51
Officially, the charter of the City of London was not dissolved, but only seized by the Crown.
Therefore all of the City’s liberties and properties were maintained, but would be subject to the
King’s will.52 With the charter securely under Charles’s control, he could carry on with the trials
against the conspirators without fear that once North and Peter Rich’s terms were up in
September of 1683, the City would undergo another hotly contested shrieval election.
c. The Trials of the Rye House Conspirators
The first trials proceeded just as quickly as the arrests. On July 12 and 13, 1683, the
commoners Thomas Walcott, William Hone, John Rouse, and William Blague were tried, as
well as Lord Russell. The same day, the government issued further indictments against the other
major conspirators who had already fled, including Monmouth, Ferguson, Armstrong, Grey,
Richard Goodenough and his brother Francis, and a slew of minor persons in the plot. Walcott,
Hone, Rouse, and Blague were all arraigned on July 12. All four were charged with “Conspiring
against the Life of the King, and endeavouring the Subversion of the Government,” and they all
plead not guilty.53 According to Ashcraft and Greaves, the charges of treason against these men
were justified based on the laws of the time. During Shaftebury’s trial, Lord Chief Justice
Francis Pemberton made clear exactly what the Crown constituted as treason and informed the
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jury and Shaftesbury that since the statute 25 Edw. 3., treason had been defined as “any one to
compass, imagine, or intend the Death of the King, and to declare it by Overt-Act, or to levy War
against the King.”54
The law had been altered in the reign of Charles II by the statute 13 Car. 2, st. 1, c. 1.
The new law determined that “compassing the King’s death,” without declaring it through an
overt act, as treason. Furthermore, the law also stated that “the very Design, if it be but utter’d or
spoken, and any ways signify’d by any Discourse” was now considered treason.55 Only two
witnesses were needed to prove that treason had been committed, and it was not uncommon for
the state to call accomplices to testify against their co-conspirators. The person accused of
treason had limited rights, which did not include a written indictment or consultation with
counsel before the trial. Moreover, the defendant was forced to admit to certain facts during the
trial before he could obtain counsel’s advice on the matter, and he did not have the right to
challenge the authenticity of the testimonies given against him. The defendant could call his
own witnesses to testify to his strength of character and was allowed thirty-five challenges to the
jury to prevent the seating of unacceptable jurors. The jurors, however, were not required to be
freeholders, or those who held the right to a piece of property, a point which Lord Russell
challenged during his trials.
The first trial, that of Captain Thomas Walcott, took place on July 12, the same afternoon
as the arraignment. Greaves maintained that Walcott’s trial was first for strategic reasons as the
state could connect him to both plots: Shaftesbury’s plan for multiple and simultaneous
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insurrection and West’s cabal’s plot to assassinate the royal brothers.56 Before Walcott’s
imminent arrest, he sent Secretary Jenkins a letter in which he offered to provide the Crown with
a confession that would provide even more information than Keeling had provided, if Charles
would grant him a pardon. On July 8, just days before his trial, Walcott gave his confession to
Charles. In Walcott’s confession, he implicated Shaftesbury, Russell, Monmouth, Howard of
Escrick, and Colonel Rumsey in the plot to command an insurrection in the entire country.
Walcott insisted that he had always opposed any plans for assassination of either the King or his
brother.57
The government did not really need Walcott’s confession, as many others had come
forward, including West and Colonel Rumsey, who served as witnesses for the state against
Walcott. Along with West and Rumsey, the state also called two more conspirators, Zachary
Bourne and Josiah Keeling. Along with prosecuting Walcott, the government also intended to
lay out the details of the conspiracy for the jurors, and the four witnesses spent the majority of
their testimony doing so.58 In their discussion of the general plot, the witnesses placed Walcott
at key meetings in which the insurrections and assassination plots were discussed. Both West
and Rumsey not only contended that Walcott was lying about his role in the assassination plot,
they also asserted that he had agreed to lead the very armed guards who would attack the King.59
The jury retired briefly to deliberate and returned a verdict of guilty, setting the tone for the rest
of the trials.60
The very next day, on July 13, Hone, Lord Russell, Rouse, and Blague faced their trials.
Hone, Rouse, and Blague were all tried by the same jury that had convicted Walcott. Hone’s
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trial was the first of the morning, and once again the state called West and Keeling as witnesses,
along with two other men, Sir Nicholas Butler and Captain William Richardson.61 Hone, who
did not challenge any of the jurors’ right to sit, was accused of involvement in the conspiracy to
kill the royal brothers. The prosecution also alleged that he had agreed to supply arms. Hone
admitted that he was guilty of the conspiracy but denied that he had agreed to provide the arms
for the plot.62 Unlike Walcott, the jury did not need to retire in order to come to a verdict, and
found Hone guilty immediately after the testimonies of the state’s witnesses.
Immediately following Hone’s trial, Lord Russell was brought before the court at nine
o’clock in the morning to be arraigned and then tried. According to Greaves, by the standards of
the time, Russell’s trial was quite fair due to the wishes of King Charles. Russell was assisted in
his defense by four barristers, Sir Henry Holt, Henry Pollexfen, Edward Ward, and Mr.
Dodsworth, as well as by Mr. Shaw, a solicitor chosen by Russell’s wife.63 Along with his
defense team, Russell was allowed to call eleven character witnesses, and he was prepared for
the types of questions he would be asked at his trial as the Privy Council had interrogated him in
advance of the trial. Finally, the court provided a list of over one hundred potential jurors.
Russell tried to delay the trial by denying that he had been given such a list of potential jury
members, but Lord Chief Justice Pemberton determined that his counsel had received the list and
had failed to give it to Russell.64 Therefore, Pemberton refused to delay the trial and proceeded
to prepare for the selection of the jurors who would ultimately preside over the trial. Once jury
selection was underway, Russell was allowed to challenge up to thirty-five jury members who
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were called. He challenged thirty-one jurors before the final twelve were selected. One of the
jurors accepted was Thomas Short, who had sat on the juries of Walcott and Hone.65
With the jury chosen and seated, the trial began and lasted into the afternoon. The state
called four witnesses—West, Rumsey, Thomas Shepherd, and Lord Howard of Escrick—to
testify that Russell had conspired against the King. Basing his defense on technicalities, Russell
did not deny that he had attended the meetings but maintained that he had not heard anything or
participated in any discourse against the Crown. He was careful not to admit to even a
misprision of treason as Walcott had done during his trial.66 The line between treason and
misprision was considered too hazy and Russell was hesitant to enter into that discussion.
Russell also tried to claim that the government did not have the requisite two witnesses needed to
convict a man of treason. Russell argued that the two witnesses, Rumsey and Shepherd, had
attested to two separate acts of treason. Rumsey testified that Russell was involved in the design
of the treason, whereas Shepherd could only confirm that Russell attended a meeting. According
to Russell, “this is tacking of two Treasons together.”67 Russell called eleven witnesses, but
none could combat the testimony of the witnesses, attesting that Russell was an upright man.
After the closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate. At four o’clock, the jury returned to
the court and gave a verdict of guilty.
Russell’s trial was an ordeal, but it was not the last trial of the day. The trials of Rouse
and Blague took place that same afternoon. Although they were tried separately, both men were
tried by the same jury, which was not identical to Hone and Walcott’s as Rouse challenged
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several of the jurors and his trial was the first of the afternoon. In the end, Rouse and Blague’s
jury contained six of the men who had sat for Walcott and Hone, and were therefore familiar
with the conspiracy.68 Two witnesses, Thomas and Mate Lee, were produced and after their
testimonies, Rouse was unable to produce any witnesses on his behalf and the jury convicted him
of treason. Blague’s trial followed immediately afterwards, and he did not contest the jury. In
the case of Blague, the jury did not have enough evidence to convict, and they returned a verdict
of not guilty.69
In two days, the state was able to secure four guilty verdicts against Walcott, Russell,
Hone, and Rouse. On Saturday, July 14, the four men were brought before the court and
sentenced to “be Hanged by the Necks, then cut down alive, their Privy-Members cut off, and
Bowels taken out to be burnt before their Faces, their Heads to be severed from their Bodies, and
their Bodies divided into four parts, to be disposed of as the King should think fit.”70 The
executions of Walcott, Rouse and Hone took place on July 20, and were presided over by North
and Peter Rich as part of their duties as sheriffs of London and Middlesex. Walcott and Rouse
asserted that they blamed neither the judges nor the juries for their fates.71 In his final speech as
his execution, Walcott stated, “I do neither blame the judges, nor the jury, nor the king’s
council.”72 Rouse expressed the same sentiment as Walcott, except he extended his statement to
include those who had acted as witnesses against him.73 Hone stated that he had “nothing further
to say, but that I have been guilty of the crime” of which he had been convicted. 74
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Russell was executed the following day despite his pleas and petitions to Charles.
Charles refused to pardon the sentence or delay the execution but did remit “the parts of the
sentence which were to follow the beheading.”75 In his last written statement, which Russell
presented to the sheriffs, he stated that he was innocent of the crime which he was accused of
and was guilty only of misprision. He also asserted his hatred for popery and established his
opinion that the Exclusion bill had been correct in its intentions. Lord Russell contended that his
death sentence was not a surprise because “From the Time of chusing Sheriffs, I concluded the
Heat in that Matter would produce something of this kind; and I am not much surpriz’d to find it
fall upon me . . . . But I wish the Rage of hot Men, and the Partiality of Juries, may be stopp’d
with my Blood.”76
For Russell, North and Rich were directly responsible for the guilty verdicts and the
death sentences. While the trials of the Rye House conspirators provided the Crown an
opportunity to purge the Whig faction of some of its radical members, the trials also supplied
North with another occasion to express his loyalty to the King. North and his co-sheriff had
already chosen the grand juries, but these trials did not require the entire grand jury. Rather,
each man was tried by a jury of twelve. The first trials against the Rye House conspirators were
not necessarily arbitrary, and the government had amassed a great deal of evidence against many
of the main plotters, and even some of their lesser counterparts. Be that as it may, even with the
evidence that the government had amassed and the witnesses it had summoned, the outcomes of
these trials were in many ways predicated on the jury that sat for the trials. This had become
clear in the 1681 trials of the earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen College, and for this reason
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Charles was driven to ensure that the sheriffs elected in 1682 were loyal to the government, not
the Whig faction.
The panel of jurors, which was broken down by ward, provides a great deal of evidence
that North shied away from wards that tended to lean the most towards the Whig faction. The
City of London was comprised of 26 wards in the seventeenth century.77 These wards were
more than administrative divisions of the City of London. According to De Krey, faction was a
“neighborhood affair” and in his research, he has been able to delineate between what he terms
Whig space, Tory space, and contested space.78 De Krey maintained that while freemen of the
City from all social groups and occupations could be found on both sides of every issue, the City
can be divided into distinct spaces in which different political and religious ideas flourished. In
order to determine if a ward was a Whig or Tory space, De Krey examined the elections of
common councilmen from each ward from the years 1680 to 1683. If more than 55 percent of
their common councilmen elected in the three year period were Whig or opposition candidates,
then De Krey considered the ward to be a Whig space. In wards where 40 to 55 percent of the
common councilmen were Whig, De Krey delineated the areas as “contested” space.79

In order

for De Krey to demarcate a ward as “Tory-inclined,” the ward had to elect loyalist candidates for
more than 60 percent of their common council men. In total, De Krey asserted that Whig space
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comprised 10 of the City’s wards, whereas the Tory’s space covered 12 wards. The contested
areas encompassed the remaining 6 wards.80
Through a close examination of De Krey’s division of wards based on political and
religious inclinations, North’s logic regarding the juries becomes more apparent as he sought to
avoid pulling jurors from wards that were inclined toward the Whig faction. Therefore, it was
more likely that the jurors would return a verdict that the Crown preferred. The panel of jurors
that North constructed for the first series of Rye House conspiracy trials contained a total of 122
men from the following 18 wards: Coleman Street, Aldgate, Billingsgate, Broad Street,
Dowgate, Bishopsgate Within, Bridge, Candlewick, Lime Street, Walbrook, Langbourn,
Cripplegate, Farringdon Within, Farringdon Without, Aldersgate Within and Without,
Cordwainer, Vintry, and Castle Baynard. Of these wards, six were included in the Whig space,
as defined by De Krey, of the City. Three of these six Whig-inclined wards were among the
most populous in the City: Aldersgate Without, Cripplegate Without, and Aldgate. De Krey
noted that these wards were also among the poorest in the City, despite the fact that at least 100
wealthy merchants lived in Aldgate. Dissent also flourished in these wards partly due to lack of
clergy. 81
North drew 11 jurors from the Whiggish wards of Candlewick (4), Cordwainer (1),
Walbrook (4), and Vintry (2). The first three wards listed, along with Bread Street, were home
to about seven percent of the City’s population, yet these wards were among the wealthiest.
Further, Walbrook and Candlewick housed the largest concentration of merchants of any other
ward in the City. While North did not completely avoid choosing jurors from Whig wards, he
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included a minimum of 18 in his panel of 122. This is not to say that these 18 men were Whigs.
As De Krey makes clear through his analysis of the political and religious make-up of each ward,
men who associated themselves with the Whig faction lived within Tory-inclined wards, and
vice-versa. The City wards were not perfectly divided by the Tory and Whig factions. 82
However, in order for North to increase the likelihood that jury would not be disposed to issuing
a verdict of not guilty, or worse, of ignoramus, he was careful not to draw too heavily from
wards that tended to lean towards the Whiggish faction.
While only a sixth of the panel was chosen from Whig-leaning wards, almost half the
jury panel was selected from eight wards with Tory sympathies, specifically Castle Baynard (8),
Farringdon Without (17), Billingsgate (4), Broad Street (11), Bishopsgate Within (3), Lime
Street (9), Dowgate (4), and Aldersgate Within (1).83 Whereas a dissenting tradition tended to
dominate the religious and political culture of the Whig-leaning spaces in the City, Church and
loyalist institutions dominated within the boundaries of the Tory sympathetic wards.84
Farringdon Without, the Tory ward from which North drew the most potential jurors, stood out
as a ward that was influenced by the royal institutions, such as Bridewell and Fleet prisons, the
Inns of Court, and the Sessions House of the Old Bailey. The institutions, along with a prevalent
Court culture and prominent churchmen residing within the ward, promoted a strong sense of
loyalty to both the Crown. However, at least three dissenting meetings occurred within the
borders of Farringdon Without, and it was also home to the Green Ribbon Club, a political group
that included members of the radical Whig faction that had been involved in the Rye House Plot.
Despite this, De Krey contends that Farringdon Without remained a Tory space in that in
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December 1682, just after the hotly contested shrieval and Lord Mayor elections, the Whigs
failed to gain a single common council seat from the ward.
Jurors from Broad Street and Lime Street also made up a significant portion of North’s
list. Broad Street and Billingsgate were home to a large number of merchants with a
considerable amount of wealth who tended to sympathize with Tory faction due to the number
who held government offices. Broad Street was home to the Royal Exchange, the Hearth Office,
and the Excise Office. The home offices of the East India Company, the most important jointstock company of the Restoration, were located in Lime Street and Bishopsgate Within, which
also served as the home base for the Royal Society. Overall, throughout these wards, prominent
Church and government institutions, as well as officeholders, encouraged a strong Tory tradition,
and therefore, jurors from these wards would have been strongly-inclined to produce a verdict
that would please the Crown, especially in trials of men who suspected of trying to assassinate
Charles and his brother.85
The remaining forty-seven jurors resided in the following “contested” wards: Bridge (3),
Langbourn (8), Coleman Street (17), Cripplegate (9), and Farringdon Within (10). According to
De Krey, this meant that these wards faced contradictory political and religious impulses, partly
due to the fact that these wards bordered on wards that were solidly Whig and Tory. These
wards also housed a great deal of men who were middling and tended toward the Whig tradition.
Wards such as Langbourn and Bridge were home to Quaker merchants and shopkeepers and
dissenting meetings, but at the same time, Langbourn was one of the wealthiest wards in the City
with a large number of influential and wealthy merchants and bankers who were mostly loyal to
the Crown. The same held true of the Coleman Street, Cripplegate, and Farringdon Within. A
strong dissenting tradition was present in these wards, much of it dating back to the 1640s, but
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institutions such as the Royal College of Physicians and professional groups with royal charters
promoted loyalty to the Crown. 86 While North may have avoided choosing potential jurors from
known Whig wards, he did not hesitate to include those from wards that were divided in their
loyalties. However, as his actions during the mayoral election of Sir William Pritchard suggest,
he would have avoided including a known dissenter, especially, a Quaker, on the juries as he did
not have considered them qualified to either vote in City elections or to sit on the juries.87
North never denied that he had chosen the jury for Russell despite the fact that “so far as
he remembers, the juries before were returned by the secondaries.”88 He maintained that because
Russell’s trial was “very extraordinary business, he thought it requisite to take care of it
himself,” whereas in the trials of the other conspirators, he left the task up to his deputies.89
North’s claim about the juries for the commoners involved in the plot was disingenuous as he
instructed his Secondaries Edward Trotman and Mr. Normansell to use the list of names he
compiled of potential jurors and to ensure that the jury was composed of men from several
wards. 90
By the time the juries were chosen for the first trials of the Rye House conspirators,
North had vetted the list. Even though three of the accused exercised the right to challenge the
jurors presented to be sworn, their replacements were drawn from the list North provided to the
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court.91 North had worked to make it as likely as possible that the juries would be made up of
men who were loyal first to the Crown, and therefore would not issue ignoramus verdicts.
In the end, the jury that convicted Captain Thomas Walcott and William Hone contained
seven men from the Tory wards Castle Baynard and Broad Street collectively. Five of the jurors
were men from the wards of Coleman Street and Bridge, which De Krey labels as divided in
their factional loyalties. There was not a single juror from a ward that tended to support the
Whig faction.92 The jury of John Rouse and William Blague was dominated by men from the
“contested” wards, with eight men from Coleman Street, Bridge, and Farringdon Within, while
only four men were sworn who were from the Tory wards of Castle Baynard, Broad Street, and
Farringdon Without. Once again, no Whiggish wards were represented among the jurors.93
Despite this, Walcott, Hone, and Rouse did not blame a “pack’d” jury for the sentences.
The make-up of Lord Russell’s jury was quite different from the juries of his fellow
conspirators. Since he used thirty-one of his potential thirty-five challenges of the selected jury,
Russell’s jury consisted of only two men from Tory-leaning wards, while three were from
Whiggish wards, and seven were from the “contested” wards. The remaining three men resided
within a ward that tended to support the Whig faction.94 In theory, Russell’s jury was far more
diverse than the juries of Walcott, Hone, Rouse, and Blague. Unlike his co-conspirators, Russell
directly blamed his jury for his conviction in his final speech and insisted that he knew that when
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North was chosen as sheriff that the persecution of the Whig leaders would soon follow.95 While
he would later admit misprision of treason, at the very minimum, in a letter to Charles just before
his death, Russell firmly believed that he was found guilty not because of evidence but because
the jury had been “pack’d” against him.96
Regardless of his protestations, the evidence of North’s shrieval papers and the lists of
potential jury members that he created show that he did seek to create a jury that would be more
likely to issue a verdict that would please the Crown than those of the previous two years.
Although North never wrote a political treatise, his actions as sheriff indicate that he was a
staunch Tory and he sought to carry out his duties as sheriff with his loyalty to the Crown in
mind. By interpreting laws through his loyalist lens, North was able to ensure that Sir William
Pritchard, a staunch Tory, won the position of Lord Mayor for 1683. The laws in place at the
time did not necessarily prohibit dissenters, and more specifically Quakers, from voting in City
elections, but through his own loyalist interpretation, North was able to make certain that those
votes would not be counted.
North approached creating a list of potential jurors in the same manner. By avoiding
wards that tended to heavily lean towards the Whig faction as much as possible, he was able to
create a jury that would be more inclined to be loyal to the Crown than the Whiggish faction.
Grassby, North’s historical biographer, has argued that North was simply a victim of
circumstance and the time in which he served in political office. He simply had the “misfortune
to be the instrument of political policies that he did not subscribe.”97 Yet, North could have
refused to serve as sheriff and Peter Rich’s testimony before the Murder committee suggests that
North and Rich were well aware of the controversy surrounding the shrievalty and the juries
95
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before they were sworn into office. A member of loyalist family, North demonstrated his loyalty
to the Crown throughout his tenure as sheriff, and in return the Crown granted him the customary
knighthood and found additional positions for him within the government.98
Russell’s last wish for prosecution of Whigs did not materialize. The trials of the Rye
House conspirators stopped for a short period, only until November. Greaves asserts that the gap
was necessary in order for the government to gather witnesses against Sidney and Hampden as
they had been implicated by Howard during Russell’s trial.99 Monmouth seemed the most
obvious choice as he was the King’s son and perhaps could be convinced to turn witness in
return for a guarantee of his safety. In reality, he was one of their only hopes for a second
witness. Russell and Essex were both dead, whereas Ferguson, Grey, and Armstrong were living
in exile. Even with a “packed” jury, without a second witness the government could not pursue
treason charges against Hampden and Sidney.
By the time Charles and his son worked out a deal by which Monmouth would be
pardoned in return for his testimony against Sidney and Hampden, Dudley North and Peter Rich
were no longer sheriffs of London. While traditionally the election for new sheriffs occurred
every year on June 24 with a swearing-in ceremony in September, Charles had continually
postponed the election of new sheriffs and a few other City officials in 1683, perhaps because the
Crown’s attention was focused primarily on the trials of the Rye house conspirators. During this
time, it remained unclear if North and Peter’s terms would simply be extended in the same
manner that Charles had tried to prolong Sir John Moore’s tenure as Lord Mayor. As Charles
had seized the City’s charter, in a show of submission the Common Council granted the Court of
Aldermen, which was dominated by a Tory majority, powers of nomination in regards to
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municipal offices.100 According to historian A.G. Smith, the Court of Aldermen, with this new
power, was able to ensure that only “suitable” candidates sympathetic to the Tory faction would
be chosen for City offices.101 On September 5, the shrieval election was held for the liverymen
to confirm the Lord Mayor’s choice of Aldermen Peter Daniel and to elect his co-sheriff.102 The
liverymen who tended to ally themselves with the Whig faction did not appear at the Common
Hall, and Samuel Dashwood was chosen to serve along with Daniel.103
After the election, Secretary Jenkins marveled to the Duke of Beaufort that “what was
most remarkable was that the whole proceedings were without noise or clamour,” but “with that
good order and gravity as equaled the examples of the best times.”104 Therefore, neither North
nor Rich was responsible for compiling new jury rolls for the trials of Algernon Sidney and John
Hampden. Yet, Charles had two new Tory sheriffs and North had served him well as sheriff,
and had carried out his duties exactly in the manner expected of him. North performed his duties
so well that his career as sheriff ultimately dominated his political and historical legacy. Only in
recent historiography have North’s contributions to the development of a political economy
centered around free trade been discussed. For North and his contemporaries, his actions as
sheriff defined him as a loyalist politician who the Crown could trust and call upon again and
again to carry out his duty.
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CHAPTER IV
NORTH’S POST SHRIEVALTY POLITICAL CAREER

The new Sheriffs of London and Middlesex were sworn into office on September 5, 1683
and North was able to pursue other offices. North accepted the customary honor of knighthood
from Charles and continued to serve in the City government as he was elected as aldermen of
Bassishaw.1 Charles also wished to reward North further for the loyalty he had shown during the
shrievalty and he consulted with North’s brother, the Lord Keeper, as to what position would be
best suited. The Lord Keeper encouraged Charles to appoint North to the Commission of the
Customs, just as he had persuaded the Crown that North was an ideal choice for sheriff.
According to the Lord Keeper, if North was appointed as a Commissioner then he believed
revenue from the Customs would increase by £50,000.2 Charles accordingly appointed North to
be one of the six Commissioners of the Customs, and North served in that function from March
26 to July 1684 and from March 1685 to April 1689.3 In between his two tenures as
Commissioner of the Customs, he served in the Treasury Commission from July 1684 until it
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was dissolved on February 16 1685.4 Roger North also suggests that Charles believed that
Dudley North would be a nice counterpart to Nicholas Butler, “who came in by the Duke of
York; and the king did not like him.”5
North accepted the position, and along with his stint in the 1685 “Loyal Parliament,” he
turned his attention to matters of trade and revenue. In the remaining years of his political
career, North was able to influence trade and customs policies in a manner that was befitting his
loyalist ideology, but he continued to be involved in controversy that pitted him against not only
old Whig nemeses, such as Thomas Papillon and Sir Patience Ward, but also other merchants.
North carried out his duty as a Commissioner and MP zealously and almost always to the benefit
of the Crown, which also coincided with his own interest as a merchant. This chapter examines
North’s post-shrieval political career as a Commissioner of the Customs and Treasury and as an
MP in Parliament in 1685. In these posts, North was able to use his extensive experience as a
merchant to create policy. North, however, was not only guided by his expertise as a merchant
but also by his political ideology. North continued to act as a Tory in all his posts for the
remainder of his political career. As suggested in the previous chapter, despite North’s own
assertions, he was political in his actions, but he was also a merchant. He acted consistently in
line with his loyalist ideology, but he also was able to introduce policy which would benefit both
the Crown and himself. Taken together, both North’s political allegiances and his occupation as
merchant provide a better understanding of his role in the overall political process of late
seventeenth-century England.
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a. Treasury Commissioner under Charles II
During North’s short tenure in the Treasury, he was called on as an expert in trade and
taxation. Charles requested that North consider the possibility of a tax on beer and paper, as well
as examine the Crown’s debt.6 Along with his regular duties as a Lord Treasurer, Charles,
however, asked North to perform a more specific and unusual task for him. Lord Rochester,
Lord President of the Council, was feuding with Lord Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, over a farm of
the revenues from the Hearth and Excise taxes. A revenue farm was created when the Crown
leased a tax out to private contractors, which could be an individual, a group, or a corporate
body, for a number of years in which the farm paid a fixed sum for the year and any remaining
profits were kept by the farmer.7 The Hearth Tax had been a response to Charles’s lack of
money in the early years of his reign. Upon his Restoration in 1660, Parliament estimated that
the King required an annual income equal to £1,200,000, but in reality, the revenues apportioned
to him totaled only about half that amount in the first two years. To fix the matter, Parliament
voted a Hearth Tax in 1662 which placed a tax of one shilling on every “firehearth and stove”
due twice a year on September 29 (Michaelmas) and March 25 (Lady Day).8 The Hearth Tax,
along with the excise tax, or taxes on consumer goods, helped bring the King’s annual income up
to estimated sum.
According to Halifax, the treasury books regarding the Hearth and Excise taxes were
doctored and several pages were missing from the books.9 Furthermore, Halifax charged that
contractors who were collecting the taxes were amassing large profits while the King was
6
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suffering a great loss. Halifax estimated that £40,000 of the King’s revenues from the hearth tax
was pocketed by the contractors and that Lord Rochester knew of the deceit and had taken a
share of the money as a bribe.10 At Halifax’s insistence, Charles agreed to have the books
examined by an Auditor, William Aldworth, who “answered nothing but doubts, and was very
shy of saying anything at all.”11 Unsatisfied with Aldworth’s report, Charles requested that
North take the books and study them as well to determine if the King had been cheated out of
revenue.12 Once again, North was in a position to prove his political loyalty to the Crown.
Charles knew he could trust North to examine the books and give an accurate report as to
whether or not any money was missing. North agreed to investigate the matter and Charles also
ordered Aldworth to aid North in his examination.
According to Roger North, the behavior of the auditor only further deepened North’s
suspicions that something was awry. When Aldworth was questioned by North about any entry,
“the auditor hummed and hawed, as if he had lost his utterance.”13 North, therefore, felt that
Aldworth was purposefully vague and untrustworthy. After a careful scrutiny of the books,
North found an entire column of false entries that had been written after the investigation of the
farm had begun. North believed that this column was an attempt to hide the true profits of the
revenue farm. Once North made this discovery, he sent Aldworth back to report to Charles, but
the King refused to believe it until he held an audience with North and they went over the books
together. With North’s confirmation that the report was true and that the Crown had been
cheated out of profits, Charles dissolved the farm and placed it under the direct management of
the Exchequer. It is likely that Charles would have pursued further actions against those who
10
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had cheated him out of his rightful revenue, but before any further actions could be taken against
Lord Rochester or the contractors who had profited at the King’s loss, Charles died on February
6, 1685 and the whole affair was dropped as James II ascended to the throne.14
b. James II ascends the throne
The transition from Charles to James was far smoother than had been anticipated.
Charles’s illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, still found support among those who were
hesitant to welcome a Catholic king. After Charles fell ill in early February, the government
administration began to prepare for the worst as Charles’s Catholic brother James was set to take
the throne. In case of a rebellion or uprising, the government readied troops, closed ports, and
even arrested those they felt were acting in a suspicious manner.15 James’s accession was met
with popular loyalist support, and he gave a speech to his Privy Council promising
I will endeavour to follow [Charles’s] example . . . . I shall make it my endeavour to
preserve the government in Church and State as it is by Law established, I know the
principles of the Church of England are for Monarchy, and that the Members of it, have
shewn themselves good and Loyall Subjects . . . I know likewise that the Laws of
England are sufficient to make the King as great a Monarch as I can wish.16
James also made it known that all officials should retain their posts for the time being to prevent
any disturbances in governmental operations. James was initially concerned over the matter of
finance and national security. Charles had been granted revenue from customs and excise for the
duration of his life, but there had been no provision for the continuation of these taxes for any
period of time for Charles’s successor. Therefore, James issued another proclamation on
February 9, just three days after Charles’s death, which allowed for the Crown to continue
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collecting customs and tonnage and poundage, but also promised that Parliament would be called
soon so that a satisfactory income could be determined for his reign.
James claimed that the immediate concern was that of national security which required
funding for the Navy and the protection of trade. Therefore, for the immediate time being, the
Commissioners of the Customs that Charles had appointed retained their positions so that the
collection of the customs and tonnage and poundage was not disrupted. Tim Harris noted that
while the arbitrary collection of taxes would become a central issue for those involved in the
Glorious Revolution, at the time of James’s ascension to the throne, there was “little difficulty”
in collecting the revenue.17 England’s merchants did not resist James’s attempt to extend these
taxes because they understood that in order to protect their respective trades the Crown needed to
fund the Navy which meant the continual collection of revenue. Any interruption in the
collection of revenue had the potential to also interrupt trade. Even the most “fanatical” of the
English merchant companies were concerned that if James was unable to raise the necessary
money to maintain the Navy, then “the Dutch, who are always ready to take all advantages . . .
will immediately pour in upon us . . . all sort of commodities, that the trade would not be
recovered again in two or three years.”18 With this in mind, many of the merchants in London
agreed that “the necessity of trade requires that there be no intermission of payments.”19
Therefore, the “General merchants of London” formally and publicly yielded to James’s
proclamation in a printed address published by the London Gazette in March 1685. In this
statement, the merchants stated their support of the Crown and assured that they understood the
continued collection of the customs was needed for the “maintenance of the Navy, as well as for
defence of the Nation, and the Security of Trade.” The petitioners agreed to “submit to the
17
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payment of our Customs according to your Majesties Royal Proclamation of the month past.”20
In order to ensure that the James was able to receive the income from customs, he also needed
the Commission of the Customs to remain in working order, and therefore, he did not
immediately replace the Commissioners and Dudley North retained his post.
Although the government dropped the matter regarding the Hearth and Excise tax
farmers after the death of Charles, Roger North insists that North was never forgiven by Lord
Rochester for what he felt had been a slight against his person. Roger North claimed that
Dudley North had not necessarily believed that Rochester was involved in actively stealing from
Charles, but rather that Rochester had done a poor job and not caught the inconsistencies written
in the books by the tax farmers. Nevertheless, Rochester took the investigation to be a charge
against him of “corruption and treachery,” and while he continued to work with North under the
new regime of James, Rochester never again considered North a friend.21
North had proven, once again, that he was loyal, trustworthy, and dependable when it
came to the Crown. By revealing the duplicity of the farmers and perhaps that of one of the
Treasury officials under Charles’s regime, North was able to ensure that the Crown under James
retained more of its money. Initially, upon the death of Charles, North retained his post for a
short time. Yet, after James reshuffled his ministers, Rochester replaced Sidney Godolphin as
First Lord of the Treasury, and North lost his post.22 Rochester and James were close, as
Rochester was the brother of James’s first wife, and James believed that “no one [had] served his
Majesty with more fidelitie and affection.”23
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James not only gave Rochester the head position within the Treasury, but also promoted
Rochester’s brother, the earl of Clarendon, to the Lord Privy Seal.24 Despite James’s close
relationship with his brother-in-law, he did not have the same feelings of ill-will towards North
as did Rochester. James was aware of how useful North had been to Charles. James also trusted
that with North’s knowledge of trade and his sense of loyalty to the Crown that he could be of
service. James ordered Rochester to find a place for North as a Commissioner of the Customs
so that his extensive mercantile experience could be utilized. James also appointed North as a
Commissioner of Lieutenancy for the City of London, which served as the militia force for the
City.25
c.

The Commission of the Customs

Under Charles, North served only about five months in the Customs, but during James’s
reign, North worked in the Customs for about four years. Before 1671, the Customs had been
managed through revenue farms. During the reign of Charles II, however, the Crown sought
greater authority over the Customs in an effort to increase the income and efficiency, and the
Customs were therefore taken out of farm.26 Through the Commission of the Customs, the
government sought to collect the maximum revenues in the most efficient manner possible
without hindering trade. The Commissioners of the Customs, along with several accountants, a
Secretary, a Comptroller-General, and three Surveyors-General, a Receiver-General, and at least
one solicitor, were responsible for reporting to the Exchequer, the government arm used to
manage and/or directly collect revenues, as well as ensuring that the Exchequer received the
revenues. The Customs was a large operation and maintained sixty-eight customs-houses,
twenty of which were in London. In London alone, two hundred forty-four customs officials
24
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worked to prevent fraud and to ensure that the goods that were imported and exported were
properly recorded and the proper duties were imposed.27
The Commissioners of the Customs held many responsibilities. One of the most
important tasks was to collect tonnage and poundage, a tax imposed of “5 per cent on the value”
upon every ton of imported wine and vinegar and every pound of “all merchandise except wine,
fresh fish, and ‘bestial’ inward, and exported wool, fells, and leather.”28 From the reign of
Edward II until that of Charles I, tonnage and poundage was granted to the king for life by
Parliament and was considered a major source of income for the Crown.29 Along with the set
duties imposed upon goods, individual imports or exports could also be taxed at higher rates.
The Commissioners were also responsible for enforcing the Navigation Acts, confiscating
contraband, prohibiting smuggling, maintaining order in the ports, and traveling to the outer
ports and colonies to ensure that the Customs laws were enforced. At the same time, the ultimate
goal was to encourage trade and generate as much revenue as possible for the government. The
vast majority of the Commissioner’s time in office was spent attending meetings, managing
junior officials, maintaining the accounts and port reports, and preparing reports for the
Treasury.30
Due to the overwhelming responsibilities of the Commissioners, the Customs was
plagued with problems of inefficiency and corruption. The Commissioners fought a constant
battle against merchants who sought to avoid the duties that were imposed through falsely
identifying their goods with fake packaging or seals. Whereas merchandise such as wine,
vinegar, and cloth were taxed according to their weight, the duties of other goods were
27

Grassby, English Gentlemen in Trade, 159-161.
Grassby, English Gentlemen in Trade, 161; Henry Atton and Henry Hurst Holland, The king's customs (J. Murray,
1908), 23.
29
Atton and Holland, The king’s customs, 2 vols, passim.
30
Grassby, English Gentleman in Trade, 161.
28

147

determined by a revised version of the Book of Rates which had been approved by 12 Car. II, c.
4. One such commodity was sugar, the tax on which varied depending on its “category,” which
was determined by the color and fineness of the grain. Therefore, it was not uncommon for
merchants to add artificial dyes to their sugar in an attempt to lower the duty. Further
complicating matters was the fact that the duties imposed did not always reflect the actual market
price. If the price of sugar fell, the duty did not. Finally, the sheer number of goods that was
transported into the ports prevented the outnumbered port officials from always correctly
identifying or levying the accurate tax in a timely manner. Delays were not uncommon and in
the event that goods were confiscated, the process for the merchant to regain them was slow.31
Despite the problems, the Crown benefited from new system, and in the 1680s, the Customs
generated far more revenue for the Crown than Parliament had estimated, including £330,000
from tonnage alone.32
North was a vigorous and committed Commissioner and he sought to ensure that every
duty that was owed was paid. Determining North’s specific influence on the decisions of the
Commissioners can be difficult as the records from the Customs House from his tenure did not
survive. Furthermore, in the records that do exist, individual arguments, negotiations, or
decisions are not mentioned. Often, only the collective decision of all six Commissioners was
recorded and issued. Despite this, the decisions recorded by the Commissioners fall into line
with North’s belief that all revenues owed to the Crown should be collected and his methodical
nature that leaned towards efficiency.
According to North, the revenues generated by the Customs required a great deal of
attention to detail. In order to collect the revenues properly, one must understand that “the
31
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customs was made up of little particulars; and that a neglect of the least thing is an immense
loss.”33 North believed that the strict adherence to the outlined tax regulations was needed in
order to collect the revenues due to the Crown. Therefore, North would not abide by “a fraud in
any man,” however small. He insisted, “the revenue (as I said) was made up of small things
swept together; and if not strictly conserved, the whole, like sand, would slip through their
fingers.”34 In order to prevent the loss of revenues from customs, North and his fellow
Commissioners sought to discourage and stop any merchant from trying to commit fraud as well
as to close any potential loopholes, especially those pertaining to sugar, despite the protestations
from the New World colonies.35
d. The “Loyal” Parliament and New Impositions
Along with serving James as a Commissioner of the Customs, North was also able to
serve in the “Loyal” Parliament of 1685. As a Commissioner, North could have been elected as
an MP for one of the port cities, but he made the decision to serve for the corporation of
Banbury, which was only three miles from the late Francis North’s home in Wroxton, which
North frequented to check on his ward, the young Lord Guildford.36

According to Roger North,

Dudley North made this choice so he could “make room for another of the king’s friends” and he
could also continue to manage his ward’s trust.37
By serving in both the Customs and Parliament, North was not only responsible for
enforcing the customs laws and collecting revenues for the Crown but was also able to influence
and create new trade and customs policies. In his service as an MP, North once again proved to
33
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be a loyal servant to the Crown and worked diligently to pass legislation that not only benefited
the Crown but also ensured that the King’s reign was funded for the duration. Upon his
accession to the throne, James promised to call a Parliament, and after the burial of his brother,
parliamentary elections were held for both the Scottish and English Parliaments. The Scottish
Parliament planned to meet in April, whereas the English Parliament was scheduled to meet on
May 19 after James’s April coronation.38
James wanted the Scottish Parliament to meet first as he felt that it would set an example
of loyalty for the English Parliament as the Scots had “zealously” supported James when the
English had “contended so vehemently to deprive him of his right.”39 The Scottish Parliament,
in fact, met one month before the English and passed a new Excise Act on April 28.40 In 1661,
the Scots had granted Charles revenues from “inland and foreign commodities” for life and had
extended the taxes for five years beyond his lifetime.41 In 1685, the Scots decided unanimously
that the “their present monarch, and . . . his lawful heirs and successors” should collect the excise
“forever.”42 On May 13, shortly after the English Parliament met for the first time, the Scottish
Parliament granted James additional revenues with an Act of Supply which provided £216,000
yearly for James’s lifetime.43 The Scottish Parliament performed just as James hoped it would
by granting him revenues and pledging loyalty to his reign.
While James counted on the Scottish Parliament to set an example for the English
Parliament, he also planned to ensure that the May Parliament was decidedly loyal to the Crown.
The government took an active interest as to who was elected to the new Parliament. James’s
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Secretary of State, the Earl of Sunderland, took care to send letters to various constituencies. To
the Earl of Plymouth, Sunderland wrote that Plymouth should “employ all [his] interest as
Governor of Hull . . . to secure the election of good members for the Parliament, but not to
engage [himself] to any particular person” until James could decide whom he wanted to
support.44 To the Deputy Lieutenants of Warwickshire, Sunderland urged that they “employ all
[their] interests that persons of approved loyalty and affection to the Government be chosen,” but
also that they “use [their] utmost endeavour for preventing intrigues and disorders.”45
Particularly, James did not want the Whig faction to use the opportunity of his brother’s
death to strengthen their cause after Charles had spent the last few years of his life trying to
stamp them out. Whiggism had not died completely during Charles’s reign but his iron grip on
the corporations, trade companies, and press had severely crippled the cause. Exclusion of
James from the throne had been a primary concern of the Whigs in the early 1680s and James
was understandably cautious and concerned that his ascension to the throne might spark a revival
in the Whig faction.
James and his government felt that it was important that they “oppose the election of any
person that was for the bill of exclusion.”46 Many of the recipients of such letters responded that
they would work hard to ensure that “none be chosen but persons of approved loyalty.”47 Along
with James’s own efforts, Charles’s quo warranto campaign that had been carried out against
corporations in the last years of his life also strengthened Tory positions within the local
governments. As in the case in London, the seizures and dissolutions of corporation charters
allowed the government to purge the townships and their governments of the undesirable Whig
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element. After the purges, the government bodies of the corporations were solidly Tory. The
local governmental purges carried out by Charles only further helped James to ensure that the
elections throughout the country were primarily manned and controlled by the loyalist faction.
Tory sheriffs manned the elections and in many cases prevented those who would support Whig
candidates from voting. In some instances, the Tory sheriffs went further and prevented Whig
candidates from standing for election.48
The government’s tremendous efforts paid off. Only fifty-seven total known Whigs
were elected out of the five hundred thirteen total seats.49 One of the new Tory majority was Sir
Dudley North who gained the seat from Banbury, his family’s constituency. The election results
in England prompted Rochester to brag to James’s son-in-law, the Prince of Orange, that “the
elections for Parliament men are generally so good that there is all the reason in the world to
believe it will be a very happy meeting between the King and them.”50 During the Crown’s
campaign to elect as many Tory MPs as possible, the government also wanted to make certain
that the MPs that would sit for Parliament were amiable to James collecting “all customs as in
the last King's reign.”51 James needed money to finance his reign and he expected Parliament to
provide it.
In his opening speech to the English Parliament, James promised “to preserve this
Government both in Church and State, as it is now by Law Established” but he requested that
both Houses work “to the settling of my Revenue, and continuing it, during my Life, as it was in
the Life-time of my Brother.”52 James insisted that he needed the lifetime revenues “for the
Benefit of Trade, the Support of the Navy, the Necessity of the Crown, and the Well-being of the
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Government it self.”53 James also discouraged the MPs from “feeding me from time to time” by
granting short-term revenues with the hopes that he would then be forced to call Parliament more
frequently. Rather, James argued that this “would be a very improper Method to take with me,
and that the best way to engage me to meet you often, is always to use me well.”54 Shortly after
the King’s speech, Parliament agreed “that the Revenue which was settled on his late majesty for
his life be settled on his present majesty during his life.”55 Neither House addressed James’s
earlier extension of tonnage and poundage without calling Parliament.
Yet, James required more money than his brother had been granted as he was now
responsible for his brother’s debts, the Navy was depleted, and perhaps most serious, James was
now fighting a rebellion in Scotland led by Monmouth and Archibald Campbell, ninth earl of
Argyll.56 Within days of the parliamentary approval of James’s lifetime supply, he once again
addressed both Houses and requested additional funds. James assured Parliament that he “would
not call upon you unnecessarily for an extraordinary Supply,” but he needed more revenue to
counter Monmouth’s rebellion. Despite his illegitimacy, Monmouth argued that as Charles’s
eldest son he was the rightful heir to the throne and should have succeeded him rather than
James. Monmouth retained the support of the radicals who had fled the country after Charles’s
prosecution of Rye House Plotters. Argyll, a former ally of James in Scotland, had been charged
with treason and sentenced to death in 1681 for his written objections against the Scottish Test
Act which required officeholders to swear that both Jesus and the monarchy were the head of the
Church.
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After Argyll’s escape from Edinburgh, he fled into exile and he was courted by radical
Whigs as a potential candidate for leading the rebellions in Scotland in 1683. In 1685, as the
English and Scottish Parliaments were meeting, Argyll and Monmouth decided to act and they
revived the plan of 1683 for coordinated rebellions in Scotland and England. Argyll would set
the plan in motion with an uprising in Scotland that would divert the King’s attention and
military forces, while Monmouth would then lead a rebellion in the West Country, which would
set off a chain of rebellions in London and Cheshire. Initially, the rebellions were planned for
May, but delays due to weather slowed down the uprisings, and allowed James to petition
Parliament for the necessary revenue to bolster his forces. The rebellions were quelled with the
capture of Argyll on June 18 in Scotland and the defeat of Monmouth’s army at Sedgemoor on
July 6.57 Argyll had already been tried of treason and sentenced to death in 1681, and twelve
days after his capture, he was executed under the same judgment. Monmouth suffered the same
fate and he was beheaded on July 15, only a week after his capture.58
Due to the threat to the Crown that such an uprising had posed, especially with a
diminished Navy, James requested that Parliament “oblige me to a considerable Expence
extraordinary” to combat all the unexpected costs that had risen.59 James pledged that he would
use the funds only for the reasons he had outlined.60 Parliament granted James the supply he
had requested to put “towards his extraordinary expence for suppressing the Rebellion of the late
duke of Monmouth, and the pretended earl of Argyle.”61 However, Parliament restricted the
amount and resolved that the extraordinary supply could not exceed £400,000.62 While James’s
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Parliament was loyal, the members were careful not to “overdo in giving in an increase in
revenue, for fear ill use might be made of it for Popish designs.”63 The Loyal Parliament knew
that it was absolutely crucial to provide James with enough income to defend the nation and its
trade, but they were also cautious about overfunding the new Catholic King. There was also a
great deal of debate about how the additional £400,000 should be raised, and several taxes,
including those on houses and land, were considered. In the end, the vast majority was more
comfortable with increasing indirect taxes on imports.64
As a Commissioner of the Customs and a prominent merchant, North was very
knowledgeable not only of trade but also of customs laws. He was in a good position as an MP to
play an integral role in securing the Crown revenues from the taxation of imports. North served
on several committees in the Commons that dealt with economic policies, which included “those
to inspect the accounts of the disbandment commissioners, to amend bankruptcy laws, and to
encourage shipbuilding.”65 Along with his work on these committees, North also acted as the
chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means.66 According to Roger, North “took the place of
manager for the crown, in all matters of revenue stirring in the House of Commons.”67
Once the issue of James’s extraordinary revenue had been settled, Parliament decided
that the next most urgent order of business was to address the issue of how to raise funds for
desperately needed naval repairs. The committee assigned to investigate the best method of
raising the taxes reported back to the Commons that an “Imposition be laid on all Wines and
Vinegars.”68 The committee also suggested that the tax be the same as “that was laid . . . by an
63
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Act of Parliament, 22 Charles II” in 1670. The bill drawn up specified that the imposition last
from June 24, 1685 to June 24, 1693. The Commons passed the bill on June 3 and the Lords
followed suit two days later.69
In an effort to raise even more revenue, North also decided to examine the books of the
Customs-houses. He “took a strict account of all the commodities in trade . . . and considered
which would best bear a farther imposition.”70 North’s conclusion was that a “tax of one
farthing upon sugars and one half-penny upon tobacco imported, to lie upon the English
consumption only” for a period of eight years would provide the needed revenue. North argued
that a tax such as this was preferable as it “would scarce be any burthen sensible to the people.”71
North took particular interest in the passing of the new impositions on sugar and tobacco.
As a Commissioner of the Customs, he was familiar not only with the Book of Rates but also
with the Custom-house books. As the bill was reviewed in the committee and in the Commons,
North went over the bill “paragraph by paragraph . . . dictating amendments in numerous
instances.”72 The Commons agreed to the new impositions, a bill was drawn up and passed the
Commons on 15 June after multiple readings.73 The Lords passed the bill on June 16.74 Finally
on June 20, the Commons considered new taxes on “French Linnen, all Brandies imported, all
home-made Spirits and strong Waters, all Callicoes, and all other Linnen imported from the
East-Indies . . . . Silks imported from the East Indies, or manufactured in France, and all other
foreign . . . Silks imported.”75 By July 1, both Houses passed the new impositions on linens,
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silks, and foreign and domestic liquors.76 In all, MP Sir Thomas Clarges estimated that the extra
taxes would yield total revenue of £3,400,000, and combined with the lifetime supply, James had
received “in all six Millions.”77
The new impositions on sugar and tobacco were met with a great deal of opposition,
specifically from grocers who sold the products and the merchants who transported them from
the colonies. The Merchant Adventurers of Bristol petitioned the Commons to reconsider the
imposition on tobacco and sugar. 78 The traders, retailers, and merchants who dealt in tobacco
and sugar argued that the new taxes would mean “the utter ruin of all the plantations . . . and all
trading from thence, and all dealing whatever in those commodities, were to be confounded at
one single stroke.”79 They argued that the new duties were so complicated that “men would
rather quit, than lose their time about it: and then, a rise of the commodity at home would lessen
the trade.”80
Along with the petitions to the House of Commons, the Commission of the Customs also
dealt with protests, as “a parcel of grocers, sugar-bakers, and tobacconists” came to argue to the
Lord Treasurer Rochester that if such a bill passed that the duties would force them to stop
selling the goods.81 Rochester requested that the protesters come back the next day when they
would be able to speak to North, who was still serving as a Commissioner of the Customs.
Rochester was also present the following day when even more tradesmen appeared to question
North and once again claimed that they would not deal in sugars or tobacco if the new duties
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were imposed. In response to their protestations, North asked the men that “if one comes to your
shop to buy sugar, will you sell any?” to which they replied “yes.”82 North then answered “if
you will sell, I’m sure you’ll buy.”83 In the end, Rochester sent the retailers away as he was
satisfied that North had answered their questions.
North’s knowledge of customs and trade allowed him to pinpoint the commodities that
could withstand a new and higher tax. All the commodities chosen by North were either luxury
items or goods that were low in price because they were not being dealt in large quantities.
Overall, James received far more revenue from the duties imposed on wine and vinegar than he
did on sugar and tobacco.84 As a supporter of the monarchy, North did not question James’s
request for revenue. He simply sought to pinpoint the commodities that would yield the highest
income without damaging the trade. By providing James with the revenues he requested, North
only helped James to become independent of Parliament.
Along with aiding the Crown, North was also acting in his own best mercantile interest.
As a businessman and a merchant, North needed a stable government and a funded navy to help
protect his shipments of overseas goods. Further, many of the debts that Charles II had incurred,
and subsequently passed down to James, were loans that had been given to the Crown by
merchants, particularly by the East India Company and the City of London. The East India
Company had initially refused Charles a loan of £20,000 or £30,000 in 1662.85 When the time
came for the Crown to grant a new charter on October 15, 1677, the Company and the Crown
were on far better terms. The East India Company granted Charles an advance loan of £40,000
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in 1676 and after the charter was issued, gave him another loan of £50,000 in 1677.86 These
were not one-time loans. Both Charles and James continued to receive loans, or “consideration
money” from the East India Company whenever the charter came up for renewal.87 Although
North was primarily a Levant Company merchant, he did branch out after 1680 and joined the
Russian Company as well as the Royal African Company. Along with his membership in these
companies, North also invested in the diamond trade with was regulated by the East India
Company.88 North never formally joined the East India Company as it was the main rival to the
Levant Company, but his investment in the diamond trade allowed him to gain access to the vast
profits of the East India Company.
Along with investing into different trades and companies, North also provided small short
term loans. Although he was an Assistant in the Levant Company, a direct competitor of the
East India Company, North loaned £1,500 to the East India Company.89 The initial loan was for
six months, but he renewed it.90 While he would loan money to the large mercantile companies,
North chose not to provide credit for the City of London or to the Livery Companies. North also
did not provide any loans for Charles, but he extended a six-month loan of £1,000 to James II in
1685.91 With money invested in both the East India Company and in the Crown, it was in
North’s best interest for the James to receive adequate funding. Without sufficient funding,
James could not hope to pay back the loans he took from the East India Company, or any other
trading company, and therefore, North was less likely to also regain his investment.
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On November 9, the Loyal Parliament met for its second session and was starting to show
signs of resistance against James. In his attempt to combat Monmouth’s rebellion, James
significantly increased the size of the standing army from 8,565 to 19,778.92 The size of the
army was less of a problem than the behavior of the soldiers throughout the countryside. The
soldiers were stationed in and around London as well as in a number of areas in the west, such as
Plymouth, Exeter, Taunton, and Bridgewater, where Monmouth had sought to raise his
rebellion.93 The government fielded complaints of soldiers demanding free quarter and
committing “very great outrages,” which forced James to issue a declaration that all troops were
to pay for their quarters and “use no violence or threatening” and to avoid taking “quarter in any
private house whatsoever.”94 Along with the disturbances caused by the troops throughout the
country, James’s ministers were primarily concerned with his decision to appoint Catholics as
officers in the army and to retain them after the rebellion was crushed.95 James viewed
adherence to the Test Acts as an “affront” as the intent of the laws had been to pave the way for
Exclusion and therefore “were made on design against himself.”96
Halifax, once an ally to James during the Exclusion crisis, was Lord President of the
Privy Council. During the Exclusion Crisis of the late 1670s and early 1680s, Halifax was
“almost the sole person, in the House of Peers, who first choaked and opposed the Bill of
Seclusion of the present King.”97 Halifax, however, was appalled at James’s blatant defiance of
the 1673 Test Act, which required all government officeholders to take sacrament in the
Anglican Church. In Council, Halifax spoke out against the appointments and insisted that “an
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order should be given to examine, whether all the officers in commission had taken the test, or
not.”98 While Halifax had friends on the Council who supported him, none seconded his motion.
In return, James dismissed Halifax from the Council and replaced him with the Earl of
Sunderland.99 A few of his cohorts—the Duke of Ormonde, the Earl of Bridgewater, Viscount
Falconbridge, and Bishop Compton of London—decided to retire from the Privy Council,
although they had not spoken out as Halifax had done, as they believed that “ther presence was
not very gracious to the King, nor to Rochester the Treasurer, nor to the Popish party.”100 Along
with Halifax’s release, the Earls of Devonshire, Dover, and Thanet resigned their commissions as
Colonels in the King’s army “because, it was said, they saw Popish officers mainly trusted in the
army.”101
James continued to face opposition for granting officer’s commissions to Catholics when
his Parliament met again on November 9. In his speech to both houses, James once again asked
them to grant him additional supply to maintain his army “which is now more than double what
it was” because “there is nothing but a good force of well-disciplined troops in constant pay that
can defend us, from such as either at home or abroad.”102 While James wanted Parliament to
grant him additional revenues to support his new militia, he was unwilling to budge on the issue
of the new Catholic officers. He contended that the men he had chosen were “well known to me,
and having formerly served me on several occasions, and always approved the loyalty of their
principles by their practices, I think them now fit to be employed under me.”103 After the King’s
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speech, a debate arose on several points, including if a standing army was necessary or
dangerous if Catholic officers could legally serve in the King’s army.
On November 16, the Commons issued a formal address to James that informed him
“that those Officers cannot by law be capable of their Employments, and that the Incapacities
that they bring upon themselves that way, can no way be taken off but by an act of
parliament.”104 The Commons did assure James that they would prepare a bill that would
“indemnify [Catholic officers] from the Penalties they have now incurred” in light of the fact that
they had aided the Crown during the rebellions.105 The address from the Commons infuriated
James, and he promptly replied on November 18 that he did “not expect such an Address.”106
Despite the refusal to accept James’s Catholic officers, the Commons set about
considering James’s request for supply on November 17. The debate about the supply centered
on two issues: the need of additional supply and the amounts required, ranging from £1,200,000
to £200,000. While Sir John Ernly argued that the Commons should grant £1,200,000 because it
was “needful,” others, such as Sir Thomas Clarges, raised objections that such a sum was too
much. Those in opposition to the large sume argued that they should vote a “little now, to have
opportunity to give more another time.”107 This was the type of argument that James had
anticipated and warned against in his first speech to the new Parliament in May. After a long
debate, the Commons settled on a supply of £700,000 “and no more” to be given to James, and
they once again set out to determine how to raise the sum.108
John Ernly moved to place an additional duty on wines that would yield a sum of
£400,000 with the support of North who was serving as the Chair of the Ways and Means
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Committee. Ernly and North contended that the remaining sums could be made up by raising
rates on such goods as soap, “planks and other boards,” raisins, prunes, iron, copper, and drugs
and spices from Holland, as well as by extending the impositions on French linens and East
Indian silks.109 North supported Ernly’s proposal and concurred that the Book of Rates
suggested that these “goods are capable of bearing the duties proposed.”110
North argued in his only recorded parliamentary speech that if James “took 40l. per tun
on French wine at 20,000l. yearly, he would be a loser by it.”111 Once again, North used his
authority as a Commissioner of Customs to push through the new impositions on wine, just as he
had done to raise duties on tobacco and sugar. North believed that if the Crown requested
revenues then the revenues should be raised. He was prepared to use his abilities to the benefit
of the Crown. The Commons then sought to establish the number of years the new impositions
should last, but determined that the Custom-House books needed to be examined to verify how
many tons of wine were imported yearly.112 On November 19, the Committee reported that
based on the Custom-House books a duty of £4 per ton of wine would result in a sum of
£350,000 yearly.113 The Commons concluded that the duty should be placed on wine for nine
and half years beginning on December 1, 1685, and agreed to draw up a bill.114
While the Commons debated the terms of the new supply for the James, the House of
Lords decided on November 19 to examine the King’s speech given ten days earlier. Bishop
Compton of London and Halifax both rejected “the compliment of giving Thanks for a Speech,
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when there was no special reason for it.”115 Halifax and Compton maintained that “the Test was
now the best fense (sic) they had for their religion; if they gave up so great a point, all the rest
would soon follow.”116 They further argued that if James was allowed “by his authority [to]
supersede such a law, fortified with so many clauses . . . it was in vain to think of law any
more.”117 Halifax and his supporters accused James of seeking arbitrary and absolute rule.
James was present for the debate in the Lords, and he was once again outraged at the defiance of
his Parliament. On November 20, he sent a command to the Commons to join him in the Lords,
and he prorogued the Parliament until February 10, 1686. James would never again call a
Parliament during his reign.
By dissolving Parliament before both Houses could vote on the new supply bill, James
lost the potential £700,000 in revenue which North had worked so hard to procure for him. The
“Loyal” Parliament, as it was called, was loyal to the monarchy and to the Anglican Church.
James misunderstood their reaction against his Catholicism and his attempts to install Catholics
into the government and army as a reaction against himself and his reign. Despite the
disagreements over Catholic appointments, North and his fellow Tories sought to help James
gain even more revenues than they had initially granted in the first Parliamentary session.
James’s temper prevented him from understanding the exact allegiance of those whom he should
have counted among his staunched supporters, and he was thus unable to gain access to the new
income which could have potentially allowed him to rule comfortably for the duration of his
reign without having to call Parliament again to request a new supply.
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c. North’s Last Years in Government
In the coming years, James did not need to call a Parliament. Despite the fact that he did
not receive the £700,000 the Commons wished to grant him, he was able to rule without that sum
and still maintain his large standing army. Along with the supply granted by the first session of
the Loyal Parliament, James also retained a close relationship with trading companies, primarily
the East India Company and the Royal African Company. Josiah Child, the Governor of the
East India Company, had turned Tory in 1682 in an attempt to preserve his standing within the
Company and to ensure Charles’s continued support of the company’s charter.118 Along with
yearly loans, Child bestowed a gift of £10,000 on Charles.119 After the death of Charles, Child
remained loyal to the Crown and provided James with same gift of £10,000, which prompted
James to become a stockholder in the East India Company.120 In return for his generosity, Child
served as James’s primary economic adviser.121 Aside from the large one-time gifts given to
each monarch, the East India Company also remained one of the largest loan providers for the
Crown throughout both Charles and James’s reigns.122 These types of loans from chartered
companies, such as the East India Company, helped to make it possible for both Charles and
James to rule without a Parliament.
While the East India Company maintained a close relationship with the Crown, the
Company did not have a monopoly on James’s support. Since the inception of the Royal African
Company in September 1672, James had served as the company’s governor and largest
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stockholder.123 Josiah Child, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and John Locke were all also original
stockholders in the company, though during the Exclusion Crisis of the late 1670s both
Shaftesbury and Locke sold their stock in the Company. This signaled a widespread exodus of
Whiggish sympathizers from the Royal African Company, and by the 1680s, the company’s
members were overwhelmingly loyal to the Crown and to James.124 In October 1681, North
bought 500 shares in the Royal African Company.125 According to Roger, North found “the
great trading companies in credit, and himself a stranger to that sort of dealing.”126 Roger North
claimed his brother wanted to learn about the management of joint-stock companies and
therefore, he bought enough shares to guarantee that he would “qualify . . . to be of the
committee for direction of trade.”127 With his shares, North was able to serve the Royal African
Company as an Assistant in 1681 and from 1685 to 1686, as Deputy Governor from 1682 to
1683, and as Sub-Governor in 1684.128
The Royal African Company was profitable for James, North, and the other shareholders.
The Company dealt in goods from Africa, such as ivory, elephant teeth, copper, and cotton
cloth.129 These products, however, generated only about two-fifths of the Company’s total
income.130 The main commodities that the company dealt in were gold and slaves from the Gold
Coast in West Africa.131 With the funds that he earned from the East India Company, the Royal
African Company, and other mercantile companies that loaned money to the Crown, James did
not need Parliament in order to raise money. Further, North remained a Commissioner of the
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Customs throughout the rest of James’s reign and continued to be vigilant in collecting all
customs that were owed to the Crown.
After James prorogued Parliament in November 1685, he continued to maintain his large
standing army, to appoint Catholics to public office through individual dispensations, and to rule
by prerogative rather than through Parliament. While James did not need Parliament to gain
access to money, he did need Parliament to repeal the Test Acts. James’s religious toleration
fostered a peace that allowed trade to flourish which resulted in relative prosperity. As James
sought toleration for his fellow Catholics, he found natural allies in dissenters and members of
the Whig faction. Throughout 1686, James worked to gain the trust of dissenters. In March,
James pardoned those who had been charged with participating in conventicles or with not
attending church. He also freed 1200 Quakers, and announced that they could hold meetings.
When the Baptist sect expressed gratitude to James, he made the same concessions to them as
long as they remained loyal.132
James’s concessions to Catholics and various dissenting groups only angered the one
group, Tory Anglicans, who had shown him support even prior to his reign. These were the
same men who had made up his first parliament in 1685. James hoped that he would be able to
recall the parliament that he had prorogued in November. Starting in December 1686, over a
year since Parliament had met, James began to personally interview, otherwise known as
closeting, the current MPs in both houses. James hoped that he would be able to exert enough
pressure on the MPs that he would not have to completely dissolve the Parliament and call for
new elections.133 James put the most pressure on those men who were also in positions that were
controlled by royal patronage, such as North’s appointment as a Commissioner of the Customs.
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As North enjoyed his position at the Crown’s pleasure, he could also lose his appointment if he
acted in such a way that the Crown was offended. North answered during his interview that he
“was always a faithful subject and servant to his majesty, and would do all he could for his
majesty’s service.”134
Roger North, however, claimed that when North was asked if he would vote to repeal the
Test Act in front of James, he replied that he “could not, and therefore, would not, pretend to tell
what he should do upon any question proposed in parliament . . . till he had heard the debate.”135
North was pressed further during the interview but he did not give any other answer. Roger
North contended that James had “valued himself for securing Sir Dudley North,” yet he did not
show any “tokens of his displeasure.”136 Roger North’s depiction of the interview, however,
must be taken with a grain of salt as he was seeking to defend the actions of his brother as well
as convince readers that North was not an absolutist. Tim Harris contended that many Tories
gave answers much like Roger North described.137 James was frustrated and angry at the
response he received from those who had claimed to be so loyal to him at the beginning of his
reign. Despite his alleged answer to the king, North did not lose his commission in the Customs,
but Roger North claims that James was quite disillusioned with North, and “resented it
sufficiently; for he never was well with him, nor ever showed him a fair countenance after
that.”138
Realizing that he would not be able to ensure completely that the prorogued Parliament
would vote in the manner he wanted concerning the Test Acts, James decided that he would have
to call an entirely new Parliament. But, first, he decided to “suspend their operation” until a
134
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Parliament could be elected that would fully repeal the Acts.139 On April 4, 1687, James issued
The Declaration of Indulgence, which stated that he “could not but heartily wish, that all his
subjects were members of the Catholic Church: yet he had always declared, That conscience
ought not to be constrained nor people forced in matters of mere Religion.”140 James, therefore,
“gave his free leave to all his loving subjects to serve God their own way either in public or
private” and further assured his subjects that no one would be required to take the Oaths of
Allegiance or Supremacy as required by the Test Acts.141
Further, James insisted that the Declaration be read from the pulpits in the following
months. This request caused a widespread bucking among the clergy, and seven bishops,
including the Archbishop of Canterbury, signed a petition that directly questioned the king’s
authority to suspend parliamentary acts with a blanket dispensation. James was outraged that the
bishops had contested his prerogative and he had them charged and arrested for seditious libel.142
The trial took place at Westminster hall on June 29 and 30, 1688. The defense argued that “it
could not be a Libel, being done from a conviction of Conscience by such Persons in such a
humble modest manner.”143 The trial lasted for one day and on the next day, the jury found the
bishops not guilty.144
After publicly issuing the Declaration of Indulgence and battling the Church, James
sought to create a Parliament that was even more “loyal” than the last. James this time hoped to
sit a Parliament with “members chosen that would comply and take those troublesome tests out
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of the way.”145 He dissolved Parliament on July 2, 1687 and began to prepare for new elections
by “regulating, or rather corrupting, corporations, that had right of election, by putting out and in,
mayors, recorders, burgesses &c.; and where they were stiff, by coming upon them with quo
warrantos, and the terror of charges.”146 James began to carry out purges of the local
municipalities in the same vein as his brother in an attempt to assure that the most loyal men
possible were elected. James announced in Council on August 24, 1688 that the next Parliament
would be called to meet on November 27. James, however, never got the chance to issue the
writs due to the “advice of the prince of Orange’s designs.”147
While many Tory-Anglicans had become disillusioned with James and his pro-Catholic
policies, the final straw came with the birth of his son, James Francis Edward, later known as the
Prince of Wales, on June 10, 1688.148 James issued a royal proclamation appointing “a time of
public thanksgiving to Almighty God throughout this kingdom for so great a blessing.”149
Although James and his wife were celebrating the birth of the new heir to the throne, the rest of
the country was not so enthused. One reason why James’s aforementioned pro-Catholic antics
had been bearable was the fact that the king was in his early fifties, presumably near the end of
his life, and those who were loyal first and foremost to the Anglican Church, as well as those
angry at James’s seemingly arbitrary rule, were hopeful that his Protestant daughter, Mary, wife
of the Prince of Orange, would succeed James upon his death.
Rumors abounded that the new baby was an imposter as some claimed the Queen was not
actually pregnant and others believed that she had given birth to a still-born baby.150 These
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rumors were only further fostered by the fact that the Protestant peers who had attended the birth
had turned their heads away as the child was born and thus they were able to claim that they had
not actually seen the Queen give birth to a legitimate heir.151 The reality was that James saw the
child as his legitimate heir that meant that England would see another Catholic on the throne, and
not the Protestant Queen they were hoping for throughout James’s reign.
The reaction to the birth of the Prince of Wales coupled with the verdict vindicating the
seven bishops attested to the less than amiable climate in the country towards James. On June
30, the same day the of the acquittal of the seven bishops, the earls of Shrewsbury, Devonshire
and Danby, Henry Sidney, Edward Russell, Lord Lumley, and Bishop Compton of London wrote
a letter to William of Orange and stated that “the people are so generally dissatisfied with the
present conduct of the government, in relation to their religion, liberties, and properties. The
letter also informed William that “not one in a thousand” believed the new Prince of Wales to be
son of the Queen. The men gave William a guarantee that “at your first landing,” he would “be
able to draw great numbers” of men in support of his cause.152 The letter served as formal
invitation for William to intervene against James. Along with protecting his and his wife’s rights
to rule England, William wanted to protect the Dutch interest against the French. William’s
reign would combine the Dutch and English commercial interests and put an end to the rivalry
that had resulted in warfare since the days of the Commonwealth.153
William made preparations for invasion throughout the summer. By September, James
was aware of William’s intentions and began to abandon many of his pro-Catholic policies. He
disbanded the Ecclesiastical Commission, a body of oversight for the Anglican clergy. He
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continued, however, with his plans to call a new Parliament with men who were as loyal to him
as possible, though he also restored the old city charters.154 Despite James’s seeming
capitulation to his subjects’ demands, William was not turning back and he hoped to invade in
the south in October, but bad weather prevented him from doing so until November 5, when he
landed in Tor Bay off the coast.
Within in a short time, William gained tens of thousands of English supporters, and while
the revolution was not bloodless, James could not match William’s military strength and grew
increasingly disillusioned when a number of his closest friends, advisors, and even his own
daughter openly supported William.155 Facing defeat, James deserted his army and decided to
flee to London to attempt to smuggle his wife and infant son out of the country and to safety in
France on December 10. The following night, he threw the Great Seal in the Thames and made
his first attempt to escape disguised as a fisherman but he was discovered and returned to
London.156
Riots had erupted throughout London upon the departure of the King, and when James
returned to London, celebrations broke out in the forms of bell-ringing and bonfires. William,
however, would not accept this show of support, and he sent troops to the palace at Whitehall
where James was staying. On the 18th, William sent a message to James requesting that in order
to prohibit disorder in London that James retire to Ham House in the countryside. James resisted
but eventually agreed to go with the guards. With James out of London, William was able to
enter the city in triumph, and on December 23, James fled for France.157
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The invasion of William of Orange and James’s abdication had direct ramifications on
the political career of North. After William of Orange assumed the throne of England as
William III, North’s career as a politician and civil servant came to an end. North tried to hedge
his bets by donating £1,000 to a loan to William. In spite his financial commitment to the new
king, North did not sign the address from the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London
thanking William “for communicating your gracious purposes to this City and for the assurance
of your kindness and protection to us.”158 North did not intend to sign the address, but he also
did not want to cause a scene by not signing it and therefore he “walks round about the chair as If
he sought Corner to creep in at and he came about and joining with those that had signed came
off together with him.”159 In do so, “No Mortall could tell that he had not signed.”160 Roger
North claimed that North told him with great glee about how he had tricked the Lord Mayor and
Aldermen into thinking he had signed the document when in fact, he had not. Roger noted that if
North did sign the “declaration for William of Orange” then “he is Not the Man I took him
for.”161
Those who had served in the Loyal Parliament of 1685 were not eligible to sit in the
Convention Parliament in 1688 and North never again served in Parliament. He did retain his
commission at the Customs for a short period after the Revolution, because “that collection was
not to be disturbed till the main was safe.”162 In the few remaining months of his tenure as
Commissioner, North and his fellow Commissioners were ordered to enforce the embargo order
against France issued by William on January 29.163 North did as ordered until he was relieved of
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his duties as Commissioner. Once William had time to appoint his own Commissioners, North
was removed from his post. After North left the Commission of the Customs, he never again
served in political office. His political career was over.
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CHAPTER V
NORTH OUT OF OFFICE

Sir Dudley North remained in the Customs for a short period after the Prince of Orange
assumed the throne, but the Glorious Revolution essentially ended North’s political career.
Along with his post as Commissioner of the Customs, North lost his Aldermanic seat in the City
of London when Parliament passed a bill in May 1690 that reversed the judgment of quo
warranto against the City and restored its “ancient Rights and Privileges.”1 With the passage of
this bill, the City “was put in a state referring to a time before he was chosen.”2 That same
month, King William III issued a bill of indemnity known as the Act of Grace, which forgave
those who had followed James, as he was not pleased with the attempts by the Whigs in
Parliament to punish those who had supported both Charles and James.3 The Act of Grace
named thirty-one specific followers who were exempted and could therefore face repercussions
for their actions, including the deceased Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys, former
Commissioner of the Customs Sir Nicholas Butler, and the Tory publisher Roger L’Estrange.4
Although North was not specifically named as exempted from the Act of Grace, he worried that
he would be added due to his role in the Rye House trials. If William or Parliament added his
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name to those who were exempt then he would be open to prosecution for his actions as sheriff
and as a Commissioner of the Customs and Treasury.
While no longer a politician, North resorted to his first occupation: merchant. According
to Roger, North began to trade once again in cloth as he detested being idle.5 North was still a
member of the Levant, Royal African, and Russian Companies.6 He had worked with others to
build three ships that were better defensible against pirates, and this “engaged him deeper in
adventure than otherwise he had been.”7 Although North’s attention was now almost solely
focused on business, the war with France that followed after the Glorious Revolution cost his
estate an estimated £10,000.8 North was also in charge of the late Francis North’s estate and he
took on an apprentice, Fairclough, whom he stationed at his home in Constantinople to manage
his interests.9 At home in England, North began to investigate procuring an estate in the country
where he could “employ himself . . . by ploughing and sowing.”10 He placed bids on multiple
estates but was unable to secure one before he fell ill.
Although North was retired from politics and seeking a life in the country, he continued
to articulate his ideas about trade and the economy. As Grassby pointed out, North did not plan
to become an economic theorist and never expected his ideas to be published. However, he did
intend for them to be heard. North prepared two speeches regarding trade and money while the
1685 Parliament was still in session. When James dissolved Parliament, North lost his chance to
express his ideas in that particular forum. After North’s death, his brother Roger North took his
brother’s notes from the two intended parliamentary speeches and published them with a preface
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and postscript in 1692 as Discourses Upon Trade.11 Although these theories did not come to light
until after North’s death, the Discourses provides insight into his ideas about the role of the
government in trade and help to explain why North, who claimed he was not a partisan politician
or an absolutist, was able to introduce policy that would have enabled James II to be financially
independent and rule without a parliament as an absolutist monarch.
The parliamentary investigations of North were in many ways an attempt by the
Whiggish faction to right what they had perceived as wrongs committed against them during the
Tory Reaction of the early-to-mid-1680s. The House of Lords Murder Committee provided an
official platform by which to question the legality of not only North’s shrieval actions his
holding of the shrievalty itself. Thomas Papillon and John Dubois had asked for such an inquiry
during the shrieval election and had tried to force the matter after both North and Rich were
sworn in to no avail. As Papillon sat in the Commons, the inquiry into customs and excise
collection gave him a direct opportunity to question North. In the end, neither committee
recommended any action be taken against North, but the investigation into his shrievalty, in
particular, offers insight into North’s mentality and rationale during his shrievalty.
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a. North’s Economic Theories
North’s theories regarding trade were developed during his time in Parliament, and these
theories directly influenced the type of policy that he introduced. Before James dissolved
Parliament, North had prepared to give speeches concerning issues of money, and in his notes he
included a discussion of general trade as well as his ideas about the trade in money. North was
alarmed at the consistent devaluation of the money that was circulating in the nation due to
clipping of silver from coins.12 Clipped money was actually worth less than it was valued, and
North argued that clipped money should be taken off the market, melted down, and re-coined.13
Roger North maintained that, according to his brother, “debasing the Coyn is defrauding one
another, and to the Publick there is no sort of Advantage from it.”14 For North, money was the
same as all other commodities. Money was “taken from them who have Plenty, and carried to
them who want, or desired them, with a good profit as other Merchandizes.”15 For North, money
should be valued at what it was worth.
In his notes regarding money, North also included his observations about trade in general.
North did not subscribe to the traditional economic theories of mercantilism or the theory of
balance of trade. Mercantilists believed in a finite supply of money and for a nation to acquire
wealth, it had to export more than it imported.16 A precursor to Adam Smith, North advocated
free trade without the restrictions of monopolies or isolationist policies which sought to restrict
trade with individual nations. According to North, if a
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Town, or County were cut off from the rest of the Nation; and no Man would dare to
come to Market with his Money there . . . Now would such a Constitution as this, soon
bring a Town or County to a miserable Condition, with respect to their Neighbors, who
have free Commerce? The Case is the same, if you extend your thought from a particular
Nation, and the several Divisions, and Cities . . . to the whole World, and the several
Nations, and Governments in it.17
For North, trade between nations was the same as trade between individuals and should not be
overly regulated. In the preface, Roger North summarized North’s theory most famously stating,
“the whole World as to Trade, is but as one Nation or People, and therein Nations are as
Persons.”18 North envisioned a truly global economy, and therefore to refuse to trade with one
nation meant that “so much of the Trade of the World rescinded and lost, for all is combined
together.”19 North did not believe that any trade with any country was inherently unprofitable.
For this reason, while in Parliament, North did not advocate banning trade with the
Dutch, England’s main trade competitor, a policy that was supported by other Tories. Steve
Pincus maintains that most Tories believed the Dutch to be seeking “universal dominion through
commercial hegemony.”20 For Pincus, the Tories also feared the Dutch political model as they
revolted against Spain and established a republic.21 Although North was a partisan Tory, he did
not believe that taxes should be used to discourage trade; but rather taxes were simply to raise
revenue, which is why he chose to tax only those commodities that he felt could bear the burden
of higher taxes. North believed that the greater danger came from banning trade with specific
countries as it meant that the nation would experience great losses in revenue.
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Pincus has argued that the Whigs and Tories were competing for the hegemony of their
respective political economies. The Whiggish political economy emphasized manufacturing and
raw materials over land and advocated for the creation of a national bank. Many Whigs also
promoted an embargo against Catholic and absolutist France. The Tory political economy was
land-based and supported the monopolistic trade companies instead of the notion of a national
bank. Where the Whigs sought to exclude the French trade, the Tories sought to restrict trade
with the Dutch. As the two parties developed, their respective notions of the political economy
became embedded and intertwined with their respective political philosophies.
North’s view of the political economy does not fit neatly into the two categories that
Pincus has created. North disagreed with other members of his faction about restricting trade
with the Dutch and he did oppose government interference in trade. According to North,
Countries which have sumptuary Laws, are generally poor; for when Men by those Laws
are confin’d to narrower Expence that otherwise they should be, they are at the same time
discouraged from the Industry and Ingenuity which they would have imployed in
obtaining wherewithal to support them.22
While he acquiesced that it was not impossible to make money with such laws in place, he
believed that “the growth of Wealth in the Nation is hindered.”23 North’s model of a political
economy based on unregulated trade resides outside of the Tory political economic model.
Although North’s theory of the political economy was significantly different from that of
Tories like Sir Josiah Child, he did not completely disagree with Child’s notion that monopolistic
companies chartered by the Crown should be the center of the economy. Sir Josiah Child,
James’s economic adviser and the Governor of the East India Company, argued that monopolies
protected English economic interests because it was detrimental for English merchants to
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compete with one another in the same trade. 24 North himself was a member of three trade
companies and he never wrote any treatise against the use of monopolies. This suggests that
perhaps North felt that trade companies, rather than Parliament, would be the guiding force of
the economy. For North, Parliament was supposed to raise revenue not to regulate trade.
While North’s free trade policy may seem to be antithetical to the Tory philosophy of
restricting trade with the Dutch, his free trade ideas aligned nicely with his political philosophy.
As an MP in 1685, North actively campaigned for customs duties that would have allowed James
to rule without Parliament and would have created a financially independent monarch. James
saw himself as an absolutist monarch, but in order to rule as such, he needed to secure adequate
funds for a reign in which Parliament would not be necessary. North found a way to make this a
possibility before the 1685 Parliament was dissolved. North chose not to restrict trade with any
particular country. Rather, he proposed raising the duties on individual commodities that could
support the tax, and as a Commissioner of the Customs, he was in a position to know exactly
which goods to raise taxes on. He was in a position both as an MP and a Commissioner of the
Customs to aid James in his goals of creating an absolutist state as he worked to ensure that the
Crown could be sufficiently funded so that Parliament would be rendered obsolete.
North was not the only advocate of free trade in the seventeenth century. Nicholas
Barbon argued against mercantilist notions of wealth as he claimed that “the Stock of a Nation”
was “Infinite, and can never be consumed.”25 Therefore, Barbon claimed that men who
“commends Parsimony, Frugality, and Sumptuary Laws” were mistaken, and trade should be
encouraged because it “Increaseth the Revenue of the Government.”26 The greater threat was not
Dutch republicanism or French (or Spanish) absolutism and Catholicism. If England placed
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embargos on countries with which it had ideological or religious disagreements, then England
would suffer because of a loss of revenue and this would be the greatest injury. Whereas profit
drove trade, Barbon argued that “many Prohibitions” would result in the “Decay of Trade.”27 By
the late seventeenth century, England’s economy was driven by trade and to cause trade to
deteriorate would also cause the overall decline in the nation’s welfare.
Another economic theorist, Charles Davenant agreed with Barbon that too many
restrictions and regulations on trade would lead to decline of the nation’s economy. Davenant
was also concerned about English merchants as he saw them as the backbone of the English
economy. According to Davenant, too many trade regulations would result in “the body of our
merchants [to] lie under general discouragement,” which would cause to them to “neglect
looking after the national gain, which English merchants have perhaps heretofore as much
considered in their dealings.”28
Like North, both Barbon and Davenant were advocating for a freer system of trade.
North would have been engaged in this debate about a free trade economy, but he was also in a
unique position to put into practice his notions about trade and taxation. North, as a
Commissioner of the Customs, had access to the Book of Rates, which allowed him to determine
specific commodities that could accept higher taxes without overburdening merchants or the
goods. As a member of several parliamentary committees that dealt with economic affairs, he
could introduce policy which directly reflected his own ideas.
North’s theories of trade were significant in his time because he employed them to try to
aid James to become a financially independent entity. North ignored the common political
economy associated with the Tory party and instead advocated for minor tax increases on
27

Ibid.
Charles Davenant, The Political and Commercial Works of Charles D’Avenant, Sir Charles Whitworth, ed.
(London, 1771), 274.

28

182

mercantile goods. Few in his time likely noticed that North was even practically applying his
ideas about the political economy as his theories were not published during his lifetime. Even
after his death, and after his brother published the Discourses, North did not receive any
recognition for his ideas. Grassby contends that North’s ideas and manner of delivery were not
accessible to most and had he been more “bookish and urbane,” he might have been more
influential.29 Nonetheless, it is likely that he discussed his ideas regarding trade with his fellow
MPs, as well as his brother. Both Roger North and Grassby claim that the reason why North’s
Discourses were not widely received or read was simply because his ideas were lost in the “flood
of pamphlets provoked by the financial issues of the 1690s.”30 Yet the reality is that North’s
theories were most likely ignored because they were tainted with the scandals surrounding his
political career as he was brought before multiple parliamentary committees in retaliation for his
actions during his short political career.
b. House of Lords Murder Committee
The last years of North’s life were clouded by the parliamentary investigations of his
actions as Sheriff of London and as a Commissioner of the Customs. Even as North had turned
his attention away from the political sphere and back to business, he had made many enemies
who were determined to right the “wrongs” committed during his time as Sheriff of London and
Commissioner of the Customs. Although William had issued the Act of Grace which had
prevented prosecution of those who had supported the policies of Charles and James, the Whigs
in Parliament continued to investigate the grievances they had outlined at the beginning of the
regime. Although North was technically covered by the Act of Grace, he was called to testify
before both houses of Parliament to defend his actions under both Charles and James. The
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Murder Committee of the House of Lords investigated North’s role in choosing the juries of the
Rye House conspirators. The Commons addressed the legality of North serving as sheriff in
1682 and determined that Sir John Moore and North were both “Authors of the Invasion made
upon the Rights of the City of London” due to their role in the shrieval election of 1682.31 The
Lords Murder Committee continued the enquiry into North’s legality as sheriff and his manner of
choosing the jury of Lord Russell. Because North served in the Treasury and the Customs, the
Commons also planned to investigate if North was involved in illegally collecting revenue
immediately after the death of Charles II.
Within months of William of Orange’s arrival in London, the new Parliament had already
begun to address grievances of the Whigs in a declaration against the “oppressive and illegal
Measures of the late King,” as well as those they felt had been committed by Charles.32 The
House of Lords accused James of “[endeavouring] to subvert and extirpate the Protestant
Religion, and the Laws and Liberties of this Kingdom.”33 The declaration also charged James
with circumventing Parliament to impose taxes in order to gain revenue and also claimed that “of
late Years, partial, corrupt, and unqualified Persons, have been returned and served on Juries in
Trials; particularly divers Jurors in Trials for High Treason, which were not freeholders.”34
According to the declaration, William and Mary, Prince and Princess of Orange, were to be King
and Queen of England, France, and Ireland, and that regular meetings of Parliament should be
held “for Redress of all Grievances.”35
On March 5, 1689, the House of Commons appointed a Grand Committee of Grievances
to investigate what they believed to be injustices committed under both Charles and James’s
31
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reigns. The first grievance addressed on the report from the Committee concerned “the Rights of
the City of London, in the Election of Sheriffs in the Year 1682, were invaded; and that such
Invasion was illegal.”36 By May 29, a report was created that sought to determine the “authors
and advisors of the . . . Grievances . . . relating to the City of London.”37 The Committee drew
up a list of names of people who had been involved in the election and they were called to testify
before the Commons to defend their actions.
Among those called was the former Lord Mayor, Sir John Moore. Moore was questioned
on several occasions in order to determine by what prerogative he had sworn Sir Dudley North as
sheriff, and Moore argued that he “did nothing therein, but by the Advice of the Court of
Aldermen.” 38 According to Roger North, the examinations of those called were public and the
galleries “and every Corner were filled” on the day his brother testified as “some sport was
expected.”39 Moore maintained that it was the Lord Mayor’s right to elect one of the sheriffs.
The Committee countered that
from the Twenty-first of Edward the IIId unto the Year 1641, the Way of making Sheriffs
was, That the Lord Mayor named One to be Sheriff and presented him to the Common
Hall, who did confirm him, and choose another to act with him; except in Three or Four
Years within that Time, when the Common Hall chose both the Sheriffs.40
The Committee further argued that the ceremony of the Lord Mayor nominating one sheriff had
become a mere formality and that it had become tradition that the nominated sheriff would only
accept the post only if the Common Hall confirmed him.41 Recorder Sir George Treby only
bolstered this argument when he told the committee that he had conversed with Lord Keeper
Francis North in 1682 who had assured Treby that “the Common Hall was not bound to confirm
36
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the Person named by the Lord Mayor; but might reject him . . . and . . . His Brother should not
hold, unless the Common Hall did confirm him.”42 Although Treby made this claim, it is clear
that North was aware that his nomination of sheriff was not welcomed by the Common Hall and
he refused to step down and paid his bond to serve as sheriff before he was officially elected.
Also, Lord Keeper North expressed with absolute certainty to Secretary Jenkins that his brother
would not be scared off by the threats and violence in the City and would hold the office despite
his unpopularity as the Crown’s choice.
After Moore’s testimony, North was called to testify. MP Paul Foley asked North to state
by what authority he held the office of Sheriff of London, “which did not belong to [him]?”43
North argued that he believed that the Lord Mayor had the right “to choose One of the Sheriffs;
and he being drunk unto by Sir John Moore . . . He thought it was lawful” to serve as sheriff.44
Roger North suggested that the members of the Committee were aware of North’s temper and
therefore did not ask him about the role his brother, Lord Keeper North, had played in his
accepting the position as they knew he “would not have borne it.”45 However, the Committee
did ask him to “point to” the members of the Court of Aldermen who had “unanimously required
him to serve.”46 North obliged and then MP Dutton Colt, another committee member, asked the
Chair, “since this gentleman is so tender that he must not be asked questions concerning himself,
we will let that go, and presume him guilty of all that has been alleged against him. But I hope I
may ask him a question concerning somebody else.”47
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At which point, Dutton inquired if Secretary Jenkins “did not come to the city, persuade
him to take the office of sheriff?”48 According to Roger North, his brother yelled a pronounced
“NO” that was both “violent and unexpected.”49 Roger North contended that the Committee had
hoped that their investigation would result in either Moore or North “nam[ing] the King, or some
of the Ministry, particularly the Lord Chief Justice North and Secretary Jenkins,” however, both
refused to admit that the Crown had been involved in installing sheriffs in the City of London
with the purpose of “packing” juries.50 After his response, North was dismissed and he was not
called again to testify before the House of Commons. Although in the end, the Committee’s
official decision was that both Sir John Moore and Sir Dudley North were “the Authors of the
Invasion made upon the Rights of the City of London” during the London shrieval election of
1682, no further action was taken by the House of Commons against North.51
In March before the House of Commons Grand Committee of Grievances finished its
report, both houses of Parliament agreed to pass a bill entitled, “An Act for annulling and making
void the Attainder of William Russell, Esquire, commonly called Lord Russell” which sought
vindication for the late Lord.52 The act called for the “conviction, judgment, and attainder” of
Russell to be “repealed, reversed . . . and declared null and void” due to the “illegal return of
jurors . . . and by partial and unjust constructions of the law.”53 By November 1689, an
investigation was initiated by the House of Lords under the Murder Committee, which not only
continued the inquiry instigated by the House of Commons Committee of Grievances into the
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legitimacy of North and Peter Rich as Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, but also only inquired
into the selection of the jury for Russell’s trial.54
The Murder Committee called both North and his co-sheriff, Sir Peter Rich and their
secondaries Edward Trotman and Mr. Normansell to testify about the process by which William
Lord Russell’s jury was chosen. Normansell asserted that the jury was returned by North and
that “sir Dudley had the books from him and from his brother secondary; and . . . he chose the
jury out of several wards and sent the names of them” to the secondaries with orders that they
should summon those he had chosen.55 Trotman confirmed Normansell’s account in his
testimony, but both asserted that they did not “know” whether North had packed the juries, and
argued that it was not unprecedented for a sitting Sheriff of London to choose juries rather than
delegating the job to the secondaries.56
When questioned about his role in the jury selection process, Sir Peter Rich claimed that
he had “never empanelled any jury, or signed any panel” throughout his time in the shrievalty.57
Rich argued that he had been aware of the controversy surrounding the empanelling of juries
even prior to his term as sheriff, and because he did not wish to become involved in the “packing
of juries,” he had “resolved he would not return any juries in his year.”58 He then indicated that
he believed that either North or the Secondaries of the Compter, the sheriff of London’s deputies,
were responsible for returning the juries in London and the county of Middlesex; the task was
usually given to the under-sheriffs.59
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Once Rich denied any involvement in the selection of jury members for the trials,
attention turned to North, who was subsequently questioned numerous times about his criteria for
choosing juries. He admitted that he had chosen the jury for Russell despite the fact that “so far
as he remembers, the juries before were returned by the secondaries.”60 He maintained that
because Russell’s trial was “very extraordinary business, he thought it requisite to take care of it
himself,” whereas in the trials of the other conspirators, he left the task up to his deputies.61
While North contended that he had not chosen the juries for Walcott, Hone, Rouse, and Blague,
he was involved in the impaneling of those juries as well. According to his secondaries, Edward
Trotman and Mr. Normansell, the jury for Walcott, which provided the foundation for the juries
of Hone, Rouse, and Blague, was chosen from the same panel of jurors that North used for
Russell’s trial.62 North instructed his Secondaries to use this particular list of names when
deciding the jurors and to ensure that jury was composed of men from several wards.63
Both Trotman and Normansell were questioned as to whether such instructions were
common, and they answered that “formerly the Sheriffs themselves did not intermeddle in the
Return of Juries, but left it to their Secondaries; until about Two Years before that time it had
been otherwise; and that it began in Bethell and Cornishe’s Time.”64 Trotman and Normansell
also testified that the trend of returning juries from several wards began under the shrievalty of
Bethel and Cornish. Once again, the Whig faction set the precedents that would later be utilized
by the Crown and Tory faction to defend their actions. Since the previous Whig sheriffs for
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1680 had set the precedent of the sheriff choosing the juries, rather than delegating the task to his
deputies, Normansell stated that he did not believe that “Sir Dudley North packt the jury.”65
North denied the notion that he had acted alone, and without the approval of Rich. North
insisted that he had shown Rich the list of jurors and that he had agreed with the choices.
Further, North argued that if Rich had not approved of the jury, then “he should not have done
it.”66 Upon admitting that he returned Russell’s jury, North was questioned as to what his
criteria were in determining who was eligible to sit on the juries for the Rye House conspirators’
trials as he had been accused of returning only jurors who were sympathetic to the Tory faction.
North contended that he “took no care of what opinion the jury were, but only that they were
substantial men.”67 Even in his own written defense, North insisted that he had carried out the
duties of his office by trying to return a “good” jury. 68
However, North never defined what he had considered to be a “good” or “substantial”
jury in his oral or written testimony. He did not present any of the criteria that he used to
determine which men were either good or substantial. He also denied the notion that he had been
pressured to choose the jury by the Crown or by Russell’s prosecutors, stating that he had “no
orders nor directions from any man alive to take of this business.”69 In the same vein, the
committee inquired as to whether North believed that he held his position of sheriff legally and if
he had been coerced to accept the office. North answered that he had spoken only with the Lord
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Mayor and the Aldermen about the shrievalty, and that he believed himself to be a “legal
sheriff.”70
While there is no evidence that North conversed with anyone other than Rich about the
panel of jurors, the expectation of Charles that he return a loyal jury would have been clear to
North, as control over the juries was one of the main reasons that the Crown was so persistent in
pursuing the shrievalty. Rich’s testimony confirmed this as he acknowledged that leading into
that he knew when accepted the position that the matter of choosing juries was at the heart of the
push for Tory sheriffs. Furthermore, in the months leading up to the shrieval election of 1682,
the matter of juries and jury verdicts were of major concern to Charles and his ministers, and
primarily his Secretary of State Jenkins. In February, the grand jury produced several ignoramus
verdicts against Protestant dissenters and issued two ignoramus verdicts against Secretary
Jenkins for “committing a person” to prison and the second was for sending another person to
“another prison than the county gaol.”71 Coupled with the ignoramus verdicts in the trials of
Stephen College and Shaftesbury in 1681, the Crown began to look into a way to stop the
ignoramus verdicts, which led them to consider revoking the charters of corporations,
specifically the charter of the City of London. In his “Observations concerning charters to
corporations,” Jenkins argued that issuing writs of quo warranto was worth dealing with the
backlash from the opposition because “it will be enough to have it in the King’s power within
one month after election and before the swearing to disapprove the election of any Mayor or
sheriffs.” Jenkins maintained that if after three elections the King was not pleased, then he would
have the power to appoint the officers himself.72 Quo warranto, therefore, was the best tool the
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Crown could use to ensure that the opposition did not win any more shrieval elections as the
King could refuse to approve of their elections.
North insisted that he had only tried to return a “substantial” jury and that he had not
taken council from anyone other than Rich in determining the jury, but he did not define what he
meant by substantial. North kept a complete list of all the wards and those who were qualified
for jury duty among his papers, but just as he did not define the term “substantial” or “good” to
the committee, the lists do not include those he would not consider for the juries or why.
However, based on the trial of the earl of Shaftesbury in 1681 and the arguments used by Russell
in his own defense, it is clear that what the Whig faction considered a “substantial” jury was
quite different from the view of the government. Grassby, who was adamant that North was not
guided by political ideas and carried out his shrieval duties as honorably as possible, admitted
that although the evidence was inconclusive, North was unlikely to have simply picked jurors
randomly and to have ensured that they were distributed evenly over the wards.73 For Grassby,
the most conclusive evidence that North was conscious of his choice of jurors was that three of
the men on the panel list, Thomas Povey, Nathaniel Hornsby, and John Kempthorne, were
personal acquaintances of North.
Both parliamentary committees believed North was guilty of illegally holding the
shrievalty. The committees also held him directly responsible for the death of William Lord
Russell and the other Rye House conspirators who were tried in July 1683. Despite their beliefs,
no legal actions were taken against him. North was brought before both committees and he
testified in public that he had held the shrievalty because he believed that the method by which
he was chosen was legal. He admitted that he had participated in the selection of the jury for
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William Lord Russell, but denied that he had “packed” the jury with men who were predisposed
to give a verdict one way or the other.
c. House of Commons Committee of Inquiry
While both the Commons and the Lords were investigating North for his actions during
his shrievalty, the Commons also opened an inquest into the collection of customs and excise
duties immediately after Charles II’s death and North’s career as a Commissioner of Customs
was also scrutinized by a Committee of Inquiry in July 1689. Thomas Papillon, North’s main
opponent in the shrieval election of 1682, was on the Committee, as well as the radical Whig Sir
Patience Ward. The Committee’s primary order of concern was the “collected Customs from the
Death of King Charles the Second to the Time of the Parliament held in the Reign of King James
the Second.”74 While many of the merchants of London and others throughout the country had
accepted James’s collection of the customs and excise by proclamation in 1685, the Committee
now deemed the act illegal and sought to investigate the Commissioners’ actions from February
6, 1685, the day Charles died, to May 19, when the first session of the new Parliament
convened.75
The Committee of Grievances determined that the collection of customs and excise
duties after Charles II’s death before Parliament could meet was also illegal.76 Roger North
claimed that North “was then in the Treasury, and not in the Customs.”77 However, as has been
shown, at the time of Charles’s death, North was in the Treasury, but he returned to the Customs
in March, and he would have been responsible for collecting customs by proclamation for James
for that two month period. After examining the books and the information provided by the
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former Commissioners, the Committee came to the conclusion that the proclamation issued by
James regarding customs and excise “requires all Commissioners and Sub Commissioners of
Excise, and all Officers to be aiding and assisting in the collecting and levying the said Duties.”78
Therefore, the Committee determined that “the Report do lie upon the Table, to be considered
when the Heads of Exceptions out of the Bill of Indemnity shall come again to be considered.”79
Aside from challenging the legality of collecting customs and excise by proclamation
rather than through a parliamentary bill of supply, North also faced accusations from fellow
merchants that he had dealt unfairly with them in his position as Commissioner by cursing at
them and refusing to accept appraisals of goods other than his own, especially those such as
sugar and tobacco which held additional duties.80 Although North spent a great deal of time
defending himself in both houses of Parliament for his time as both sheriff and Commissioner of
Customs, Roger North claimed that these inquires caused North “no great anxiety.”81 North kept
meticulous records of his testimonies and he never waivered from whatever account he gave.
Roger North felt that North was the victim a “factious party” who were keen to find “faults with
former administrations” and had a “stronger inclination to fasten upon Sir Dudley North than
upon any other minister or agent.”82 The Committee never formally found North at fault or that
he had acted in a manner that was inappropriate to his station, but for the rest of his life, North
feared that he would be prosecuted.
North posed a threat to the Whigs but it was a greater threat than he had demonstrated by
his actions during the shrievalty in which he created a panel of jurors that led to the execution of
William Lord Russell and his fellow conspirators. North was in a position in which he was able
78
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to influence trade policy in a manner that suggested that he supported a financially independent
monarch. North was the exact type of man that both Charles II and James II needed in order to
make their dreams of an absolutist England a reality. Politically and economically savvy, he was
able to demonstrate his loyalty to the Crown early in his career, which garnered him further
appointments in the government. In his later political career, North’s talents as a merchant and
businessman had the potential to be infinitely useful to the Crown. Using both his positions as a
Commissioner of the Customs and as an MP, North was able to put his notions of the political
economy to use.
The political economy, as North envisioned it, would have only bolstered James’s dream
of an absolutist state. According to Tim Harris, Whigs and many Protestants in England already
believed that James had set up an absolutist state and the “worst predictions of the Exclusionists
had come true.”83 An openly Catholic monarch was sitting on the throne and was maintaining a
large standing army that was populated by Catholic officers despite that fact that England was
not at war. He had dissolved Parliament in 1685 and when he considered calling the body again,
he worked tirelessly to pack it with loyalists to the point that it could hardly have been
considered a free assembly. Without a Parliament, James ruled through his own prerogative and
issued religious toleration, not only to Catholics but also to Protestant dissenters. Harris
contended that James was the most religiously tolerant English monarch to date.84
North’s political economy model and his work in the last days of the 1685 Parliament
provide a glimpse into what later Stuart absolutism could have looked like. There would be no
need for a Parliament as the Crown would have been properly funded through the collection of
taxes by customs officials. Merchants already did well under James’s regime as they operated in
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a peacetime economy, but they would have had more profits as trade with individual nations
would not have been restricted. The trading companies would have served as the regulatory
bodies of the merchants and their industry. Although North was investigated by several
parliamentary committees for his actions as Sheriff of London and as a member of the
Commission, it is possible that the Whigs he faced in Parliament knew that North posed an even
greater threat than they were acknowledging. North was a merchant and politician who had
quietly advocated for an absolutist monarchy in the last years of the Stuart regime and his plan
likely could have succeeded had James not dissolved Parliament.
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CONCLUSION

North died on December 31, 1691, just two years after he was investigated by both
Houses of Parliament.1 At North’s death, he was “reduced to his first principles, a mere
merchant,” as he was no longer involved in either the government of the City of London or any
post of the national government.2 Although he was never formally prosecuted for his actions
during his shrievalty or later political career, he lived under the constant threat that charges
would be brought against him for his role in the Rye House conspirators’ trials, or worse, that his
political enemies would harm or kill him as they had been threatening since 1682.
North was involved in politics and government for a short time, only seven years
combined under Charles and James. In those seven years, he remained loyal and dedicated to the
Crown. He also was not a man with undefined political ideas or a merchant simply concerned
with the bottom line. North was a loyalist and an absolutist Tory. Throughout his political and
governmental career, North melded his partisanship with his mercantile interest and in this
manner, he was able to work on policy that benefited not only himself but also the Crown.
The first year of his political career was devoted to his duties as Sheriff of London, and
he carried them out in the manner that the Crown expected. He sought to carry out his duties as
sheriff with his loyalty to his faction and his King in mind. By interpreting laws through his
loyalist lens, North was able to ensure that Sir William Pritchard, a staunch Tory, won the
position of Lord Mayor for 1683. The laws in place at the time did not necessarily prohibit
1
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dissenters, and more specifically Quakers, from voting in City elections, but through his own
interpretation, North was able to keep those votes from being counted. North approached
creating a list of potential jurors in the same manner. By avoiding wards that tended to lean
heavily towards the Whig faction as much as possible, he created a panel that would be more
inclined to be loyal to the Crown than to the Whiggish faction.
Once North’s shrievalty was over, he was appointed to positions within the
Commissioner of the Customs and the Treasury. While in these positions, he continued to show
his dedication to the Crown, by investigating customs farms that were cheating Charles from his
rightful revenues, even when it meant implicating someone whom he had considered a friend.
After Charles’s death, North continued in the government and he had the opportunity to serve in
Parliament. Here, North worked to ensure that James had enough revenue to rule without
Parliament. Although James dissolved the Parliament before he could receive this revenue,
North once again proved that he was not just a staunch Tory, but he was an absolutist who
supported the Crown’s attempts to create an absolutist monarchy.
North was not a “reluctant” politician as Grassby has portrayed him. North’s entrance
into the City’s political arena, much less the national political sphere, was not by a happy
accident.3 Grassby maintained that North was not a “political animal” with a fully defined
political ideology because North denied it himself. As evidence, Grassby also pointed out that
North never wrote a specifically political treatise. Grassby further claimed that North did not
subscribe to theories of absolutism. However, North’s actions suggest the opposite is true.
North aided Charles in his attempts to establish an absolutist state by helping him to crush
temporarily the opposition’s leadership, forcing them to flee the country. With financial
assistance from France, Charles was able to rule with Parliament and maintained an iron grip on
3
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the corporations. North’s time as Sheriff was significant for two reasons: the historical acts that
he carried out that had a direct impact on the national political sphere and the shrievalty was an
opportunity to prove himself useful to the Crown. Once in the shrievalty if North was successful
and pleased the Crown, it was likely he would then be appointed to other positions in the
government. By carrying out his duties in a manner that the Crown approved of and expected,
North was able to prove himself to the Crown as a loyal and dutiful servant. His loyalty then
won him further positions within the government where he could have a greater impact on
national policy.
Grassby has argued that North was a victim of circumstance and the time in which he
served in political office. He simply had the “misfortune to be the instrument of political
policies to which he did not subscribe.”4 The crucial factor that Grassby ignores in his study of
North is his actions, because he contends that North’s overall intentions can be “documented
with confidence.”5 Yet, the majority of the records that exist which explain North’s motives and
intentions are not trustworthy. Grassby seemed to think that North’s statement written during his
parliamentary investigations, coupled with the biography written by his brother Roger, was
enough to determine whether North was politically motivated. By relying on these sources,
Grassby ignored North’s actions. Once North was sworn in and officially began acting as
sheriff, he made controversial decisions that were based on a Tory ideology that upheld the
Crown’s prerogative and sought to protect the Church of England.6 After his shrievalty ended,
North, in all his post-shrieval posts, continued to advocate for policies that strengthened the
Crown’s power at the expense of Parliament.
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While Grassby argued that North was not ideologically or politically motivated, other
historians, such as Macaulay, tend to see North as the Crown’s pawn. However, this is also an
inaccurate representation. North was not a passive participant in either Charles’s or James’s
absolutist experiments. To suggest this is to remove North’s agency. He knew exactly what was
expected of him when he accepted the shrievalty and the other posts within the government. He
was expected to demonstrate loyalty to the Crown first, and to carry out whatever task the Crown
requested with this in mind, and North met these expectations.
In the later years of his political career, North’s loyalty to the Crown resulted in his
creating policy that would have resulted in the creation of an absolutist state. North supported a
model of the political economy which called for free trade between nations and no regulation by
Parliament. For North, the only regulatory bodies necessary were the trading companies that
could serve to guide the individual regional trades. However, he saw no reason for trade to be
restricted with any particular country as he saw this as potentially devastating to the national
economy. While in Parliament, North worked on and helped to introduce legislation which
would have raised taxes on individual commodities that could sustain a tax, and in doing so, he
found a way to provide an additional £700,000 to the Crown. This money would have allowed
James to rule effectively without a Parliament and would have established him as a financially
secure monarch.
Historian Steve Pincus has argued that in the late Stuart era, two models of political
economy existed which helped to form the foundation of the Whig and Tory parties. In the Whig
model, labor and manufacturing formed the basis of the economy, property was viewed as a
human invention rather than a natural right; and the legal exclusion of trade with the Catholic
French was favored. The Whigs also hoped to establish a national bank. On the other hand, in
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the Tory model, land was the foundation of the economy and ownership of land was considered a
natural right and because land was finite so was wealth. This view of finite wealth was also
extended to trade and Tories supported monopolistic trade companies rather than a national bank.
The Tories did not view the French as the dire economic threat, and they favored excluding the
Dutch, who they believed were a natural enemy to the English with their republican ideals and
their vast trading empire.
Although it is true that many Whigs and Tories may have subscribed to these two models
of the political economy, North’s theories show that the notions of a political economy were far
more complicated than two models allow. Pincus contends that neither Whigs nor Tories
supported a model of government nonintervention in the economy, but that is exactly North’s
idea. North was a Tory and, according to De Krey, he was leader in the Tory faction, yet he did
not subscribe to the model that Pincus suggests. Because of his Tory ideology, North was
comfortable envisioning an economy that was based on free trade and an England without a
Parliament.
North’s short political career and his ideas about the political economy help to shed new
light into the relationship between politics and the economy in the late Stuart era. By the late
seventeenth century, politics and the economy could not be separated. To espouse a certain view
of the economy was to make a political statement. Ideas about the economy helped to influence
the formation of the political parties. This is not to say, however, that just because one identified
as a Whig or Tory that he also adhered to the Pincus’s models of the Whig and Tory political
economies. North was a Tory politician with very definite ideas about how politics and trade
functioned, and it did not mesh with a Tory model of the economy. North used his ideas to
support national policies that would have supported not only a free trade economy but also an
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absolutist monarch. In his work on the English Revolution and Civil Wars, Robert Brenner tried
to categorize merchants into political camps based on their occupations, and Perry Gauci has
worked to determine the demographics, i.e., age, religious affiliation, and occupation of
merchants who served in politics. However, what is more relevant is to look at individual
merchants such as North and to examine how their political philosophies and/or ideas about trade
led them to push through legislation or national policy. Political merchants such as North had
definite trade and political agendas, and political careers allowed them an opportunity to apply
their ideas.
Although North was always expected to put the Crown first, this does not mean that he
did not also have his own interest at heart as well. Throughout his political and governmental
career, North melded his partisanship with his mercantile interest. By advocating policies that
ensured the Crown was properly funded, North was also securing his own financial interests. As
a merchant, he needed the Crown to be financially stable and to pay back its loans so he would
not lose money on his own investments. Grassby asserted that this indicates that North was
concerned only with his own bottom line, but North supported policies that went beyond
securing his own financial interest. If Parliament had not been dissolved in 1685, North would
have worked to push through legislation that would have made James financially independent of
Parliament. North did not follow blindly, as he was aware of the actions he was carrying out,
and they were in line with his own political beliefs.
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